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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the conditions under which growers have effectively resolved
collective good problems associated with the rise of supermarkets. It answers two
questions: What institutional arrangements have growers used to resolve collective
problems and what explains the differences in these arrangements in terms of what they
achieve and whom they benefit.
Brazilian fresh fruit growers have turned to a variety of institutional arrangements in
resolving collective good problems, including growers's associations, cooperatives, trade
groups; closer ties with public sector agricultural research and extension agencies; and
closer ties with their buyers and input suppliers. Economic incentives and constraints are
at the basis of which strategy growers pursue and its effectiveness. Yet findings suggest
that growers' responsiveness to the rise of supermarkets are also a function of incentives
and constraints embedded in 1) the form of government support in the 1970s and 1980s
which led to varying structures of production and government-grower relations that still
predominate today, 2) crop characteristics that affect how growers organize, where more
complex crops (costlier, riskier) are associated with greater collaborative efforts, and 3)
Japanese-Brazilian ethnic ties that have facilitated the resolution of collective good
problems among groups of medium growers. Interpreting the recent development of fruit
production across these cases as a reflection of these locally-embedded factors suggests
that developing country governments often have greater margin for action than that which
is often portrayed.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The restructuring of food retail in the 1990s has made production and marketing
of fruits even more difficult.' Buyers, especially supermarkets, have increased their
demands for quality and consistency, reliable supplies, and improved varieties. This, in
addition to the demands of importing country governments, such as the pest management
and pre-clearance programs of the USDA and the pressures for integrated production
from the EU to further reduce pesticide residues. Meeting many of these norms and
standards generate collective good problems because of the need for agricultural research
(such as for improved varieties and the development of integrated production practices),
the need for mediation with importing country governments (such as the pre-clearance
programs imposed by the US Department of Agriculture), and the rising costs of non-
compliance, where the failure of one firm can hurt the reputation of the entire cluster.2
For all but the largest growers, the demands for quality and consistent supplies also
require joint post-harvesting and marketing.
The need for collaborative responses is clear.3 How growers get there is another
story. This dissertation is about the ways Brazilian growers gave responded to these
demands, and asks two questions: What institutional arrangements have growers used to
resolve collective problems and what explains the differences in these arrangements in
terms of what they achieve and whom they benefit?
See Carter et al (1996), Dolan and Humphrey (2004), Henson and Loader (2001), Reardon and Farina
(2001), Thrupp (1994), and Unnevehr (2001).
2 Others stress the need for collaborative responses because of the public good natures of certain kinds of
hazard control (Calvin et al 2002, Unnevehr 2001), and the setting, implementing and certifying of grades
and standards (Nadvi and Kazmi 2001, Reardon and Farina 2001). A classic case of the common good
problem of reputation is that of the Guatemalan raspberry crises, where the 1996 cyclospora outbreak in the
US linked to Guatemalan raspberries decimated the number of growers in the sector and their exports, and
ruined Guatemala's overall reputation as a supplier of raspberries and other fresh berries (Calvin et al
2002).
3 Some scholars have begun questioning this logic, arguing that the restructuring of value chains has
changed the logic of collective action in precisely the opposite direction. Meyer-Stamer and Seibel (2002),
for example, drawing from the tile industry in Santa Catarina, Brazil, argue that higher costs of joint action
along with higher uncertainties of returns from these actions dissuade firms to collaborate with each other
even when they had done so in the past. Schmitz (1999) presents a similar argument in which quality-
driven pressures led some of the leading firms to strengthen their vertical ties with their foreign buyers,
while withdrawing from local collaborative efforts that could have potentially benefited the entire cluster.
In the case of Brazilian fresh fruits, however, the expected returns from resolving these collective good
problems are substantial since they often underlie growers' upgrading efforts, without which they would be
unable to remain in the market.
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Evidence from the Brazilian fresh fruit industry suggests that growers have
turned to a variety of institutional arrangements - including growers's associations,
cooperatives, trade groups; closer ties with public sector agricultural research and
extension agencies; and closer ties with their buyers and input suppliers - to resolve
common good and other problems associated with competing in a globalized market.
Economic incentives and constraints are at the basis of growers' decision-making of
which strategy to pursue and its effectiveness, but so are incentives and constraints
embedded in 1) the structure of production and historical patterns of grower-state
relations, 2) the technical characteristics of crops growers produce and their markets, and
3) ethnic ties among groups of Japanese-Brazilian medium growers.
I arrived at these conclusions by examining three of Brazil's largest clusters4 of
fresh fruit in terms of production, number of growers, and employment: apple production
in Santa Catarina (SC), mango and grape production in Petrolina-Juazeiro (PJ), and
melon production in Rio Grande do Norte (RN). Brazilian exports of these fruits have
more than trippled in value in the past decade, increasing by 306%, compared to an 80%
increase in the case of Latin America and 35% for the world.5 Together, they represent
6about half of Brazil's total fresh fruit exports between 1990 and 2000. Importantly for
an export success story, most of this production is sold to the Brazilian domestic market.
The cases7
The three cases chosen for this study have been recognized elsewhere as "success
stories" because of their outperformance (on average) of other municipalities in their
respective states in terms of agricultural production, and the associated increase in quality
4 The term "cluster" is used loosely throughout this dissertation to refer to a spatially-bound agglomeration
of firms.
5 Based on average annual value of exports for 1990-1992 and 2000-2002, estimated from data from FAO.
The average annual value of exports of Brazilian apples, mangos, grapes, and melons was $32 million for
the 1990-1992 period and $130 million for 2000-2002. For Latin America, the values were $827 million in
1990-1992 to $1.5 billion in 2000-2002. And for the world, $4.6 billion in 1990-1992 to $6.2 billion in
2000-2002.
6 According to data from SECEX, average annual export values for Brazilian apples, mangos, grapes, and
melons accounted for 52% of total fresh fruit exports. In the year 2000, the combined value of these
exports was US$ 106 million, out of a total of US$ 169 million.
7 This study defines each case based on the municipalities in each state that together account for most of
that state's production. The selected municipalities are based on IBGE data on average annual hectares
planted between 1998-2002, as listed in Appendix A.
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of life indicators associated with this growth.8 As described in Table 1, SC is Brazil's
leading apple producer, with over 700 growers and 14,000 hectares, employing 30,300
workers and accounting for about half of Brazilian apple exports.9 In PJ, over 100
growers produce 17,000 hectares of mangos, and 600 growers producing 5,000 hectares
of grapes, in addition to hundreds of other growers cultivating bananas, coconuts,
watermelons, and other crops.' 0 The production of mangos and grapes alone employs
over 29,000 workers in producing 90% of Brazil's mango exports, and 30% of its table
grape exports.' 1 Lastly, melon growers in RN produce 5,000 hectares of melons,
employing 19,000 workers in producing about 40% of Brazil's melon production and
90% of its exports. Their locations are shown in Map 1.
8 According to Bonelli (2001), the average annual rate of growth of the primary sector between 1975 and
1996 in SC's apple sector was 8.7%, compared to 3.7% for the entire state of SC. Similarly, the growth
rate for PJ was about 12.7% compared to an average of 3.2% for the states of Pernambuco and Bahia, and
4.8% for the melon producing area in RN compared to 1.8% for RN as a state. Bonelli further claims these
growth rates explain most of the increase in the estimated increases in quality of life indicators across the
municipalities.
9 Production is spread across two subregions - one centered around the city of Fraiburgo (including the
municipalities of Lebon Regis and Monte Carlo), the other around Sao Joaquim (including Bom Jardim da
Serra, Bom Retiro, and Lages).
10 This region covers an area of 20,500 square miles, including the municipalities of Petrolina, Santa Maria
da Boa Vista, and Lagoa Grande in the state of Pernambuco, and Juazeiro, Curaga, Casa Nova, and Sento
S6 in Bahia.
"1 Data from Damiani (1999). Employment figure for 1996, export figure for 1997.
1 Production is concentrated in the northwest municipalities of Mossor6 and Barauna.
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Table 1. Basic characteristics of cases
Santa Catarina Petrolina-Juazeiro Rio G. do Norte
apples mangos grapes melons
Area planted (hectares)a 13,046 10,432 5,683 4,545
Tons producedb 511,000 84,000 108,00 206,000
Number of growers 700 150+ 400+ 100+
Total employmentc 21,243 29,000 13,632
Employment per hectare 2
Value of production (US$), 2001 $ 52 million $ 37 million $ 56 million $ 13 million
Value of production (US$),1995 $ 23 million $ 8 million $ 45 million $ 19 million
Share of national productiond 51% 26% 8% 38%
Share of output that is exportede 7% 35% 11% 50%
Share of total exportsf 96% 90% 30% 90%
Value of exports (US$),92002 $ 31 million $ 51 milion $ 34 million $ 38 million
Main buyersh Holland (48%) Holland (51%) Holland (48%) UK (44%)
UK (18%) US (25%) Argentina (27%) Holland (45%)
Germany (10%) Others (24%) Others (25%) Argentina (9%)
a Production data from IBGE/Producao Agricola Municipal (www.ibge.gov.br). Data are average annual values for
1998-2002.
bData from Albuquerque (2001) and represent average annual value for 1995-1999. IBGE data not used since it
measures volume by "thousands of fruits" instead of tons for three out of the four crops considered.
c Employment data for SC from Boneti et al (1999) and for PJ from Damiani (1999). Data for RN based on an
estimated 3 jobs per hectare, according to Prof rutas (1996).
d Refers to share in total production of each crop in Brazil. For example, apple production in Santa Catarina
accounts for 51% of Brazil's total production of apples.
e Refers to share of total output in each case that is exported. For instance, 35% of the mangoes produced in PJ are
exported. Year to which information refers and source: mangoes: 1998 in Agland (1998); grapes: 1997 in Agland
(1998); melons: 1998 in Gomes (1999); apples: 2000 in FIESC (2001).
Refers to the share of exports from each case in total Brazilian exports of that crop. Year to which figures refer and
source: PJ:1997 in Damiani (1999); RN: 1998 in Gomes (1999); SC: 2000 in FIESC (2001).
g Data from Ministerio da Industria e Comercio, online at www.aliceweb.gov.br.
h Main buyers in 2000, as listed by Albuquerque (2001).
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Map 1. Location of cases
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RECIFE
These clusters started to grow in the 1970s and 1980s and have faced several
adverse conditions since the early mid 1990s: reduced government support compared to
that on which growers depended when they began producing in the 1970s and 1980s, an
influx of imports from the 1994 stabilization plan, and the rapid restructuring of food
retail. These pressures have contributed to the generation of the kinds of public and club
goods listed in Table 2. Resolving public good problems generally justify government
support - these problems thus raise the question of how growers have accessed the state,
how the state has responded (or led), and the distributional outcomes. Club goods, in
contrast, are a variation of private goods that lead to collective organizations.
Throughout this dissertation, the term collective good refers to both public and club
goods. The question that emerges then is why have some grower groups done better than
others?
Table 2. Examples of collective goods across cases
Case Public good Club good
SC - apples improved varieties, technology for more especially for small and medium growers:
homogeneous blooming, integrated consistent volumes, reliable supplies,
production quality control
PJ - mangos technology to control harvest, mediation consistent volumes, reliable supplies,
with USDA for pre-clearance program, fruit quality control
fly monitoring program, integrated
production
PJ - grapes seedless grape varieties, integrated consistent volumes, reliable supplies,
production quality control, and brand-name
RN - melons improved varieties, fruit fly monitoring consistent volumes, reliable supplies,
program quality control
Growers have thus faced a common set of pressures generating incentives for
collaborative responses. These collaborative responses, however, have varied
substantially across the cases. SC stands out for the convergence of uncommonly
effective state-grower relations across agricultural research and extension, and a well-
structured, representative, and capable growers' association, ABPM (Brazilian Apple
Growers Association). These arrangements reflect both a deliberate strategy of the state
government to engage with large and small growers in earlier decades, and the
commitment of the pioneering firms and other larger firms thereafter to developing SC's
16
apple industry. Among other achievements, the state agricultural agency, EPAGRI, has
worked closely with growers in making the apple sector the first in Brazil to develop and
implement integrated production practices.
Similar to SC, growers in PJ have also benefited from research partnerships with a
public sector agricultural research agency, in this case, an EMBRAPA regional center
located in Petrolina, CPATSA13 (Centro de Pesquisa Agropecudria do Tr6pico Semi-
Arido). Unlike SC, however, the public-private partnerships in PJ have generally been
limited to specific projects and to contacts between individual growers and researchers as
opposed to the broader scope and scale of such partnerships in SC. Additionally, these
partnerships have been less distributive in PJ than in SC in terms of their accessibility by
small and medium growers. These differences can be explained by the form of public
sector support in PJ, that focused on different crops for different growers, and a less
representative grower association in PJ relative to that in SC.
Lastly, RN has only a nominal growers association and no direct access to a
public sector agricultural research agency comparable to EPAGRI in SC or CPATSA in
PJ, yet has managed to surge ahead anyhow. This weak tie has been partly the outcome of
perverse policies that shaped a highly concentrated structure of production and promoted
private over public research. The relatively easier nature of melon production along with
the highly subsidized credit to the lead firms enabled growers to do much
experimentation without the kinds of public sector support required observed in the other
cases.
In short, particular market demands may generate incentives for growers to
collectively seek government support with research, implement a local pest monitoring
program, sell their products, or to enforce specific production guidelines, but may do
little in the way of inducing the kinds of lasting and developmental institutions that can
support growers' performance in the long run.
This dissertation argues that the arrangements growers have used in resolving
common problems reflect:
13 EMBRAPA recently renamed the Centro de Pesquisa do Tr6pico Semi-Arido (CPATSA) as EMBRAPA
Semi-Arido. I use the acronym CPATSA for the sake of brevity and to avoid confusion with the central
EMBRAPA.
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1) Institutional incentives embedded in public sector policies of the 1970s and
1980s that determined a) the number and size distribution of growers that
would make up the sector, and b) the nature of the relationship between
growers and public sector research and extension;
2) Incentives associated with particular crop and market characteristics; and
3) Among medium growers, incentives embedded in ethnic-based Japanese-
Brazilian production and marketing networks.
These factors are described below and summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Local factors affecting growers' responsiveness to buyer-driven demands
Case Form of government support in 1970s Production cycle and Japanese-Brazilian ethnic ties
1980s costs
Santa The state agricultural agency, Perennial crop, with 3-4 COTIA growers pioneered small
Catarina ACARESC, learned from pioneering firm years between planting scale production in Sao Joaquim.
apples and promoted apple production by and first harvest.
providing access to credit, agricultural Second only to grapes
extension and training, and highly rated in terms of production
apple research system. Thus created, costs.
from early on, institutional basis which
continues supporting growers' upgrading
efforts.
Petrolina- A federal engineering-based parastatal, Perennial crops, with 3- COTIA growers introduced table
Juazeiro CODEVASF, created irrigation projects 4 years between grapes in CODEVASFprojects.
mangos and including the provision of infrastructure, planting and first
grapes land, credit, water, agricultural harvest. Grapes are
extension, and support in forming most labor-intensive
growers association. Supported dual and expensive crop,
structure of production based on with per hectare
different mix of crops. production cost three
times as high as that for
mangos.
Rio Grande No single government agency Annual crop, harvested Japanese immigrants participated
do Norte coordinated the development of the as early as 60 days. in early melon trials and eventually
melons melon industry. Instead, development Lowest per hectare became medium growers.
banks provided substantial subsidized production costs.
credit to two large pioneering firms,
which invested in in-house capabilities
rather than those that could support
broader grower base.
The early policies and politics of modern partnerships
The variations across arrangements reflect incentives or disincentives resulting
from public sector policies in earlier decades when growers first began producing. More
specifically, the institutions which have supported growers' upgrading efforts today are
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largely a result of government policies in the 1970s and 1980s that influenced a) the
number and size distribution of firms that adopted fruit production, and b) the earlier
priorities and strategies of public sector agricultural research and extension agencies.
Together, these policies shaped which kind of growers produced and the relationship
between growers and the state.
The notion that the structure of production - the number of growers, their size,
and the relationships between them - shape economic behavior is central in the literature
on embeddedness and networks. 4 Locke (1995) argues that the divergent patterns of
dynamism and decline across Italy reflect "divergent sociopolitical networks [that] create
different mixes of resources and constraints that shape the strategic choices of local
economic actors" (p. 21). Across my cases, the structure of production is central in
explaining how growers have resolved collective good problems. Evidence from my
cases further suggest that the variations in the structure of production are a function of the
kinds of public support available in earlier decades. In other words, the state itself
provided incentives (or disincentives) for cooperative behavior, including in relation to
public sector research. 15
The common good nature of many norms and standards justify public sector
support through policy-making, and provision of information, quality control
mechanisms, infrastructure, and research for technologies to improve production and
post-harvesting practices.16 In Brazil as elsewhere, governments have restructured their
agricultural research and extension systems in the 1990s by reducing budgets, merging
research and extension, and occassionally shutting down state-level support altogether.1 7
As part of this restructuring, the federal and state governments have turned to forging
14 See, among others, Gertler and Wolfe (2002), Granovetter (1973, 1985), Kennedy (1999), Locke (1995),
Powell (1990), Pyke, Becattini, and Sengenberger (1990), and Streek (1992). Raynolds (1994), Whatmore
(1999), and Watts and Goodman (1997) discuss the role of embeddedness specifically in shaping the
competitiveness of agrarian sectors.
15 See Barzelay (1991), Evans (1996), Kenworthy (1997), Perez-Aleman (2000). For how the state itself
influences the impact of demand-side pressures on the responsiveness of public sector research, see Tendler
(1993), Hayami and Ruttan (1985), and Merrill-Sands and Collins (1994).
16 See Unnevehr (2001) and Henson and Loader (2001).
17 Expenditures by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Agency (EMBRAPA), Brazil's largest and most
important agency in the field, for instance, peaked in 1996 then fell by 17% by 1999 (Beintema et al 2001),
while federal expenditures on agricultural extension fell from 21% of total government spending in
agriculture in the early 1980s to less than 6% by the late 1990s (Gasques 2001). For a discussion of the rise
and fall of public sector agricultural extension in Brazil, see Olinger (1996).
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research partnerships with the private sector, through which the private sector shares in
defining, financing, and executing public sector R&D.
In theory, public-private partnerships in agricultural research benefit both
governments and growers. Public research agencies benefit from greater legitimacy and
representation before central government decision-making authorities, and often from
direct financial contributions from growers that compensate for budgets cuts. Growers, in
turn, benefit from public research that is more focused on growers' pending needs and
from increased engagement with public sector researchers that may help resolve other
production-related problems. Most of this literature, however, is prescriptive and does
not analyze the formation of these partnerships. Nor does this literature analyze the
conditions under which these partnerships are more likely to contribute to economic
performance or what makes them more or less inclusive.19 The stories that emerge from
my cases vary both in the process of building these partnerships and in their outcomes.
In SC, ACARESC first learned from the pioneering firms then aggressively
supported production by hundreds of small growers while also commiting to research. In
PJ, CODEVASF supported a dual structure of production, based on many large firms and
hundreds of small growers. It then provided direct financial and management support in
the formation of the growers association, VALEXPORT. The state thus supported many
like-sized firms, then institutionalized a forum through which they could collectively
pressure the state (Damiani 1999). In RN, government support in the form of subsidized
credit benefitted especially two very large firms. This direct access to highly subsidized
credit allowed these large firms to grow to many times the largest firm in PJ, allowing
them to invest in R&D, laboratories, etc, thus crowding out the development of local,
public institutional building.
Crops, markets, and their impacts on growers
The variations across the institutions supporting growers' upgrading also reflects
characteristics of crops and their markets, particularly crops' production cycle (perennial
18 See Alston, Pardey and Roseboom (1990), Echeverria (1998), and Hall et al (2001).
19 1 raise the issue of a constructive and inclusive public-private partnership in light of Tendler's (1999,
2001b) work questioning the assumptions behind the growing interest in these kinds of relationships
between the private sector and the state.
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versus annual cycle) and production costs, and the extent to which markets are actually
demanding. By their very nature, some crops are more complex than others (costlier,
riskier, more perishable, and so on), affecting how growers organize and which activities
they undertake collectively (Collins 1995, Tendler 1984). Likewise, some markets are
more demanding than others.
The idea that crop characteristics affects how growers organize and which
activities they undertake collectively is not new. Perry et al (1997) explain the variations
in the responsiveness of growers across five horticultural crops in New Zealand to the
implementation of quality standards as partly a function of the nature of the crop. They
argue that annual crops offer more opportunities for higher turn-over rates in comparison
to perennial crops, implying that growers of annual crops may be relatively less
committed to implementing more expensive quality control measures. 0
Within the literature on cooperatives, Tendler (1984) argues that crops present
particular characteristics that make problems they confront more or less complex to
resolve and, consequently, influence how grower cooperatives respond to these problems
and their outcomes. In particular, in explaining why a particular cooperative provided
greater support to its grape growing members than to those that produced the
comparatively lower-value potatoes or corn, Tendler notes that grapes pointed to a more
focused problem (equipment and technical assistance), and one that was easier to resolve
and more appropriate for donor financing than that associated, for instance, with the
difficult and costly task of supporting storage and marketing for potatoes. Similarly,
Attwood and Baviskar (1987) describe how the technical requirements of sugar
production in Maharashtra supported the alliance of large and small growers who may
otherwise by separated by caste, class, and power. In that case, the heavy industrial
machinery needed to process sugar would be underutilized if it were not for the supply of
cane produced by the small growers.
My argument extends this scope of analysis by considering the incentives or
disincentives for growers to collaborate associated with a) the difference between annual
20 Perry et al (1997), however, do not follow through with the implications of higher turn-over rates for the
responsiveness of growers. Rather, they proceed to explain how the "different levels of understanding" of
each crop, as reflected in the number of years which it has been growing locally, affects the responsiveness
of growers. "Where understanding is less [as in the case of squash], enforcement of quality systems is
harder."
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and perennial crops in terms of learning cycles, b) the varying levels and structure of
production costs, and c) the varying levels of competitive pressures across different crop-
specific markets.2 Apples, mangos, and grapes are perennial crops, with three to four
years between planting and the first harvest. Melons, in contrast, are an annual crop that
in RN is harvested in as few as sixty days. This means that within two short months,
melon growers in RN see the results of a new variety or the outcomes of modifications to
the production process, such as spacing, weeding, irrigation, fertilizer and pesticide use.
Growers of the other, perennial crops, in contrast, must wait at least three years to
observe any comparable results, making the learning process longer and more expensive
both in terms of the actual research costs as well as the opportunity cost of having to wait
years before arriving at some conclusion about improved production technologies.
Production costs also make a difference. Again, the annual versus perennial
distinction is substantial: the per hectare cost of producing melons in RN is just over half
the per hectare costs for apples in SC, and less than one-third that of grapes in PJ. This
means that growers of perennial crops have a lot more at stake than do melon growers.
This production cost also helps to explain the variations in institutional arrangements
between two perennial crops: mangos and grapes in PJ. Large grower exporters produce
about 60% of the mangos in PJ and are organized in the sectoral association
VALEXPORT, which focuses on lobbying the state for support with research, marketing,
and infrastructure. Sixty percent of grape production, in contrast, is produced mostly by
small and medium growers, who are organized around the Brazilian Grape Marketing
Board, which pools production and sells grapes under one brand name.
As for market characteristics, evidence from this study contrasts the commonly
held assumption that export markets are necessarily more demanding than domestic ones.
In fact, up until the mid 1990s, there was a negative association between how much of a
crop was exported and the extent to which growers invested in improved production and
postharvesting technologies. Conversations with European importers of Brazilian fruits
revealed that melon growers in RN, who have historically exported about half of their
production, have been the slowest to respond to the demands of buyers. Apple growers,
21 Although I recognized from early in my research that melons were somehow easier than the other,
perennial crops, I thank Richard Lester for explicitly noting the implications of crop cycle to the idea of
learning. The limitations of the foregoing analysis are, of course, my own.
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in constrast, who export only about 7% of their production, have outperformed growers
in the other cases in terms of gains in productivity, overall quality, and the institutional
arrangements that have supported this process. This difference is partly explained by the
fact that melon growers had an exclusive window to the European market for over a
decade (no competition), while apple growers from the very beginning had to compete
with apple imports.
Collective ties among medium growers
Among the striking features of my cases is the continued participation of
commercial medium growers (so defined relative to the range in farm size in each case,
as reflected in Appendix B), ranging from 30% to 60% of total production, as shown in
Table 4. The literature tends to emphasize the many reasons why all but the largest
growers should remain in the market, including access to resources, production and
marketing knowledge, postharvest transport and marketing services, and expertise in the
use of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals which are of rising concern for buyers.
These medium growers, moreover, necessarily need to pool their production to meet the
economies of scale involved with post-harvesting and marketing, as well as to meet
buyers' demands for continuous and reliable supplies. How have medium growers
resolved these collective good problems?
Emerging studies reveal several ways through which small and medium growers
have managed to remain in the market, but none of these explanations hold for Brazilian
growers. In some cases, growers remain in the market through sourcing arrangements
with smaller supermarkets or with dedicated wholesalers who contract out for
supermarkets (Faiguenbaum, Berdegui, and Reardon 2002). In other cases, medium
growers benefit from regulatory supports that ultimately protect them, such as the French
government's support of the French wholesale markets (Gibbon 2003), or the EU's
Banana Regime that provides preferential access to suppliers from African, Caribbean,
and Pacific nations. And still others benefit from fair trade arrangements (Page and
Slater 2003). In Brazil, larger supermarket chains already account for about 50% of fresh
fruit and vegetable retail, compared to 9% in Chile and 30% in Argentina and Mexico. In
addition, growers have not benefited from protected markets or privileged trade status,
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and have had limited participation in fair trade arrangements. Moreover, few (if any)
study analyzes the category of medium growers, focusing instead on the dichotomy
between large commercial growers and small peasant type farmers.22
Table 4. Participation of medium growers across cases
Case - crop Criteria' Share of medium growers
Santa Catarina - applesb < 40 hectares 30%
Petrolina-Juazeiro - mangos < 100 hectares 40%c
Petrolina-Juazeiro - grapes < 100 hectares 6 0%d
Rio Grande do Norte - melonse < 300 hectares 27%
Note: These data reflect the percentage of production of each crop that is produced by
medium (and some small) growers. For example, medium growers produce roughly 30%
of all the apples produced in Santa Catarina.
a The cut-offs for grower size are based on Boeing (1998) for SC, Alves da Silva (1996)
for PJ, and Gomes (1999) for RN.
b Data for 1996 from Santa Catarina State Census, as cited in Boeing (1998), which
established the cut-off line between large and medium growers at 1000 tons. The
transformation of tons to area planted was based on an average productivity of 27
tons/ha, the average productivity for 1997-1999 for the entire state according to data from
FIESC (2001). At 27 tons/ha, 1000 tons is equivalent to 37 hectares.
c Data for 2002 from interview with Director of EMBRAPA Semi-Arido.
d Data for 2002 from interview with grape consultant in Petrolina.
e Data for 1997 as presented in Gomes (1999).
Evidence from my cases suggest that whether or not medium growers are
excluded from the market depends not only on the more powerful actors along a chain
(including importers, buyers, and supermarkets), but also on the scale and scope of public
sector support that facilitated medium growers' participation in these chains in an earlier
phase. More recently, as federal and state government support for agriculture declined,
medium growers have also benefited from rising (but limited) private provision of
agricultural extension and, especially, from technological diffusion through
subcontractual ties with grower-exporters and through the continued engagement with
ethnic-based production and marketing networks.
2 Especially true within the literature on non-traditional agricultural exports, which draws heavily from the
Central American experience, including Brockett (1997), Carter et al (1996), and Thrupp (1994).
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This dissertation focuses especially on how ethnic ties have enabled groups of
Japanese-Brazilian medium growers to successfully overcome collective good problems
through the formation of cooperatives in SC and PJ, and a marketing group in RN. These
growers are former members of COTIA, an agricultural cooperative made up of Japanese
immigrants that at one point was the largest agricultural cooperative in Latin America.
These are undoubtedly the most cohesive grower groups across my cases, based on an
unparalleled collaborative ethic that motivate members to strive for collective quality,
share their knowledge, engage with each other, contribute to common good efforts, and
refrain from rent-seeking behavior. Although Japanese-Brazilian growers account for at
most 15% of total production across the cases, their technological and marketing
expertise have generated positive spillovers that extend beyond their communities and
benefit the clusters as a whole.
Studies that focus on how ethnic-based social networks impact economic
performance are few and generally focus on manufacturing. 23 A major exception is
Wells' (1991, 1996) study of Anglo, Japanese, and Mexican growers in California's
strawberry industry where she identifies specific attributes of ethnic-based groups that
explain variations in behavior and outcome.
Whereas Wells' analysis is focused on three ethnic groups producing the same
crop, this study focuses on a single ethnic group across three cases and crops. Two
patterns emerge from comparing these groups: First, the Japanese-Brazilian cooperatives
are the most well-endowed and well-respected cooperatives in the fresh fruit industry
compared to other medium grower cooperatives and marketing groups. And second, an
important distinction across between the Japanese-Brazilians and those ethnic groups
analyzed by Wells is the extent to which the Japanese-Brazilians generated positive
spillovers to other, non Japanese-Brazilian growers. In particular, Japanese-Brazilian
growers were the first small growers to produce apples in SC, introduce table grapes in
PJ, and carry out field trials in RN; they opened domestic and European markets for the
pioneering large firms in PJ and RN; and provided a model of collective action.
23 These studies stress the power of ethnicity in facilitating cooperative behavior among firms by
facilitating buyer-seller linkages (Rauch 1996), the sharing of information (Schmitz 1995), and the pooling
of resources to resolve common good problems (Kennedy 1999).
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Methodology
My research question naturally lent itself to the use of the comparative case
method since I defined, from the onset, the phenomenon being studied (the institutional
arrangements used to resolve collective good problems) and aimed to explain the
diversity (of institutional responses) within a particular set of cases (Brazilian fruit
growers).2 4
Case selection
My choice of cases was driven by my interest in analyzing the different
arrangements growers have used to resolve collective good problems and, in particular,
the role of public sector support in this process. I therefore chose three comparable cases
in the same industry that differed substantially in terms of the public sector support
growers received over time.
These three cases share the following common characteristics that make their
comparison fruitful, as summarized in Table 5. First, growers in all cases produce fresh
fruit for the domestic market and for export to the EU and/or the US. Melon growers
export about half of their output, followed by growers of mangos (35%), grapes (11%),
and apples (7%).25 Over half of all Brazilian mango, grape, and apple exports are
channeled to the EU, while half of melon exports go to the UK. The US is especially
important for mangos (about 25% of Brazilian exports), with only negligible shares in the
other crops. Second, commercial (versus backyard) production of these crops began in
the mid-i 970s, so growers had more than 20 years in which to learn different strategies
for upgrading, including to establish their relationship with each other and local support
agencies. Third, they all have large, medium, and small growers, allowing a comparative
evaluation of how efforts developed by grower organizations and public sector agencies
reach different size growers. Fourth, all cases include production by groups of Japanese-
Brazilian growers. And fifth, the problems facing the three cases are similar as growers
try to upgrade in light of increasing demands from buyers on the one hand, and tighter
profit margins on the other.
2 See Ragin (1994) for a description of the comparative method.
2 Year to which data refers and source: apples: 2000 in FIESC (2001); mangos: 1998 in Agland (1998);
grapes: 1997 in Agland (1998); and melons: 1998 in Gomes (1999).
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At the same time, these cases differ in at least three important aspects. First,
growers received very different forms of public sector support over time that ultimately
shaped the kinds of institutions that have helped growers resolve collective problems
today. In SC, government support was mostly in the hands of the state agricultural
agency, ACARESC, which was very active with research and extension, and in
facilitating access to credit beginning in the mid 1960s. Fruit production in PJ also
emerged as a result of strong political backing at the state level (through the influential
Nilo Coelho), but institutionally, it was coordinated by a federal parastatal, CODEVASF,
focused on the development of the entire San Francisco River Valley especially during
the 1970s and 1980s. CODEVASF provided land, irrigation infrastructure, selection of
firms, guidance on what was to be produced, and direct support in the establishment of a
grower organization. Unlike SC and PJ, public support in RN was limited primarily to
subsidized credit to two very large firms, disassociated from any kind of coordinating
agency.
Second, these cases also differ in the nature of the crops produced, with perennial
crops in SC (apples) and PJ (mangos and grapes), and an annual crop in RN (melons).
This crop based distinction allows for two comparisons. The first between the impacts of
annual versus perennial in shaping how growers organize. The second between perennial
crops across two cases (SC and PJ), thus having crop characteristics (and their "social
nature") constant while comparing the effects of state-level (ACARESC) versus federal-
level (CODEVASF) coordinating agencies on how growers resolve collective action
kinds of problems.
And third, another major difference is that two cases are in the Brazilian
Northeast (PJ and RN) and one in the South (SC), reflecting very different economic
conditions as well for different physical characteristics which influence production
practices. Compared to the Northeast, moreover, per capita income in the South is over
2.5 times higher, infant mortality rate is less than half that of the Northeast, and illiteracy
is one-third that of the Northeast.26 In addition to the economic disparities between both
26 All data for 1999 from IBGE. Raw data are as follows: per capita income for the South, US$3730, and
for the Northeast, US$1448 (converted from 1999 Brazilian reais); infant mortality rate (deaths per 1000
life births) for the South, 21, and for the Northeast, 53; illiteracy rate (percentage of population over 15
years of age that cannot read or write) for the South, 8, and for the Northeast, 27.
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regions, these regions differ physically, the Northeast region of PJ and RN being mostly
semi-arid and the South temperate. This means that crops in the Northeast can only be
produced under irrigation because of the scarce and erratic rainfall patterns in that region;
apples in the South are not irrigated and rainfall is adequate. This implies that access to
irrigation infrastructure is a critical factor determining who enters these markets in PJ and
RN, but is not an issue in SC. These differences are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5. Similarities and differences across cases
Similarities Differences
- Produce fresh fruits - Early government support: state agricultural
agency in SC, federal parastatal in PJ, no such
- Export to EU and/or US coordinating agency in RN
- Began production in late 1970s-early 1980s - Nature of crops: perennials in SC and PJ,
annual in RN
- Consist of large, medium, and small growers
- Location: PJ and RN in Northast, SC in South
- Include former members of COTIA, agricultural
cooperative formed by Japanese immigrants
- Face similar set of buyer-driven demands
Case studies
In order to look for patterns that may run across these cases regarding the
institutions growers create or draw upon in their efforts to upgrade, I developed detailed
case studies, life histories of growers, and of their relation to government agencies and
global buyers.
The majority of my data came from over 210 semi-structured, open-ended
interviews with growers, researchers and administrators from the Brazilian Agricultural
Research Agency (EMBRAPA) and the Santa Catarina State Agricultural Agency
(EPAGRI), state agricultural officials and technicians, the San Francisco River Valley
Development Agency (CODEVASF) administrators, Bank of the Northeast (a regional
development bank) rural credit officers, input suppliers, agricultural consultants, and
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university professors in these cases over nine months between 1997-2002.2 I also
interviewed US Department of Agriculture (USDA) technicians in Washington, DC and
inspectors in Petrolina, and importers of Brazilian fresh fruit in the UK and Rotterdam.
Selection of people to interview
In aiming to have a representative sample of growers, selection was based
primarily on size (from the largest firms to smaller growers) and years in the sector
(pioneers and later entrants). Substantial time was dedicated to interviews with four
particular kinds of growers: 1) the pioneering firms - those that first produced fruit crops
across the cases - to understand the incentives and constraints shaping the industry in its
formative years; 2) leading medium growers in terms of production and marketing
structure to understand their trajectories in the sector; and 3) specifically within medium
growers, those belonging to Japanese-Brazilian based cooperatives to understand how
they have excelled in both production and marketing relative to other medium (and even
some larger) growers; and 4) small growers to understand why some managed to expand
into medium growers and others not.
I also selected respondents from the main public sector agricultural agencies
across the cases, these being EPAGRI in SC, CPATSA in PJ, and ESAM (an agronomy
school) in RN. Within these agencies, the entry interview was generally with the lead
crop-based researcher or director, who then pointed to other staff members.
For each case I had key respondents with whom I had multiple meetings. These
were among the most knowledgeable and articulate respondents I came across, with 15-
30 years of experience in their given sector, very knowledgeable about the technological
trajectory and improvements in their sectors, the politics behind certain decision-making
by the growers' associations (and lead firms), and willing to meet with me on several
occasions. These included the technical directors of two of the largest apple firms in
Fraiburgo (one of whom had previously been a research in the state agency, EPAGRI)
and an EPAGRI extension worker in Sao Joaquim in the case of SC; a technical director
of VALEXPORT and a former director of CPATSA in PJ; and a technical director of the
27 Of these, I spent 5 1/2 months in Rio Grande do Norte over June-July 1997, January and August 1998,
March 2000, and October 2001; 2 months in Santa Catarina during June-July 2001; and 1 1/2 months in
Petrolina-Juazeiro between November 2000 and September-October 2001. Interview to importers were
done over 4 days in the UK in February 2001 and 4 days in Rotterdam during February 2002.
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pioneering firm, two leading medium growers (one of whom also owns a large
agricultural input store in Mossoro), and a university professor in RN. These
conversations were central in revealing the stories that I would eventually pursue through
additional interviews and research. Just as important, they allowed me to crosscheck my
information as I proceeded with the research.
Structure of interviews
The majority of interviews were with growers and public sector agricultural
research and extension agents (see Appendix C). Interviews were semi-structured and
lasted on average two hours. Interviews with growers usually took place on the farms,
with some interviews also held in the offices of associations and cooperatives. Interviews
with growers often extended entire mornings or afternoons during which I accompanied
their activities in the field or pack house, and focused mainly on the origins of the firm,
what motivated it to adopt fruit production, how it first established marketing channels,
and to what extent and on what matters growers engaged with other growers or public
sector agricultural research and extension agencies.
Interviews with agricultural researchers in EPAGRI (SC), CPATSA (PJ), and
ESAM (RN) were held at the research centers (and school, in the case of ESAM) and
generally focused on two broad issues: the development of production technologies for
each crop and the historical relationship between researchers and growers. I aimed to
identify key technological improvements and focused on understanding what brought
them about, including the development of integrated production practices in SC, a major
shift towards fruit research in CPATSA in PJ, and the evolution of irrigation technologies
for melon production in RN.
Sample bias
As reflected in the distribution of interviews across cases and professions
(Appendix C), I had three times as many interviews in RN (134) as I did in either SC (33)
or PJ (43). This reflects that fact that I began my query into Brazilian fresh fruits through
RN during my first year as a graduate student at MIT (Gomes 1999), having the
opportunity to return there on four occasions over a five-year period. Additionally, there
were simply no other studies on RN when I began my research and very few have
emerged even since. Absent empirical information on RN, the analysis of that case more
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than the others relies almost entirely on my primary field data. I picked up the other
cases three years and benefited tremendously from the work of others, especially Octavio
Damiani's (1999) work on PJ for that case and EPAGRI's books, papers, and documents
on the apple sector in SC (Boneti et al 1999, Hentske 1994, EPAGRI.
Technical and market data
Interviews with growers generally involved a visit to the field and a tour of the
packhouses through which explanations about production, quality control and selection,
packaging, pest management, and worker supervision were given. Most of the interviews
with medium growers were in their offices, generally strategically located to allow
continuous supervision of the packhouse. The longer 2-3 hour interviews were especially
good opportunities to observe how growers interact with other growers through walk-in
visits or phone conversations.
Research on markets involved interviews with European importers of Brazilian
fresh fruit, including five in the UK, four in Rotterdam, and a phone interview with an
importer in Hamburg. In addition to meeting these importers in Europe and observing
how fruits were received and prepared for distribution, I also benefited from meeting with
two of these importers during their visits to melon growers in RN, allowing me to
observe their direct interaction.
Quantitative data
Production data were mainly obtained from the Brazilian Institute for Geography
and Statistics' (IBGE) municipal-level agricultural production database (great, user-
friendly database, but limited to 1990-2002), the United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) agricultural statistics database (also user-friendly, with data dating
back to the 1970s and earlier, but national-level data, which is problematic since crops
from my cases represent from 8% [PJ grapes] to 51% [SC apples] of total national
production), EPAGRI (SC) and growers' associations (ABPM in SC and VALEXPORT
in PJ). Export data from FAO and the Brazilian Secretary of Commerce's online trade
database (www.desenvolvimento.aliceweb.gov.br).
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Scope and structure of dissertation
This dissertation does not attempt to address all the questions relating to how
growers have upgraded to remain in the market. Issues concerning infrastructure (energy
distribution, port facilities) and services (transportation logistics, management), although
indispensable to growers as they contend with the new market environment, are beyond
the scope of my study. I focus almost exclusively on how growers have overcome
collective good problems associated with production and marketing.
With this focus in mind, this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2
provides a general description of each case and explains why growers are facing
unprecedented competitive pressures. It argues that early government support shaped the
organization of growers and consequently, the kinds of institutional arrangements
growers could create or draw upon in resolving collective good problems. Chapter 3
extends this early public policy argument by analyzing the development and outcome of
public-private collaboration in agricultural research, especially in SC and PJ. Next,
Chapter 4 discusses how crop and market characteristics affect why and how growers
organize. It argues that crop and market characteristics help explain the "success" of
melon growers in RN despite the absence of the kinds of public-private collaboration in
agricultural research seen in SC and PJ. Crop characteristics also help explain the
varying arrangements between mango and grape growers in PJ. Chapter 5 then focuses
on the role of ethnic ties in resolving collective action problems by analysing the case of
Japanese-Brazilian growers across the cases. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the argument
and discusses implications for policy formulation.
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CHAPTER 2. GROWERS, THE STATE, AND THE MARKET
Recent explanations of how firms respond to market-driven pressures for cost and
quality tend to emphasize growers' relationships with their buyers. The importance of
buyers in shaping opportunities and generating constraints for developing country
suppliers has been a major contribution of the literature on global value chains.28 While
recognizing the increasing influence of global buyers and supermarkets, this dissertation
argues that growers' participation in the market for fresh fruits does not always hinge on
the decisions of these global buyers and retailers. Instead, evidence from this research
suggests that whether growers can respond to market demands for quality, consistency,
and improved varieties often reflects their underlying relationships with each other and
with government agencies. More specifically, this chapter argues that early government
support directly shaped the organization of growers in each case, their number, their size,
and the relationship between them and, consequently, the kinds of institutions growers
could create, or tap into, to support their upgrading efforts.
The organization of growers matters in terms of upgrading since upgrading,
defined as changes in production and post-harvesting technologies and the institutions to
support these innovations, often requires collective action among growers because of
scale economies of research, and the shared risks of poor quality control. And, as is well
documented, firms in a more horizontal structure of production, with many like-sized
firms, are more likely to "share information, form alliances, build trust, and resolve
conflicts through negotiations," than are firms in more hierarchical and fragmented
networks, where decision-making lay instead in the hands of more powerful firms
heading the value chains (Locke 1995:25).29
While scholars recognize the importance of egalitarian structures in explaining the
likelihood of public-private partnerships, I further argue that the state itself shapes this
underlying structure. This argument resonates with Evans' (1996) discussion of the
"constructability" of synergy, whereby the state can promote the formation of local ties
28 See, in particular, Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) and Nadvi and Schmitz (1999).
29 Locke argues that polycentric systems - characterized by dense networks of associations and interests
groups with stronger horizontal ties among each other than vertical ties to the central government - have
been especially effective in resolving collective problems compared to more hierarchical or "polarized"
systems.
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that may facilitate public-private interactions aimed at developmental ends. The
difference is my focus on the nature of the structure itself - whether more or less
concentrated - in addition to the forms of organizational ties the bind local firms to each
other.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section analyzes the above
proposition above the three cases, aiming to draw out the precise ways early government
support influenced growers' subsequent upgrading strategies. Underlying this analysis is
a general description of each case aimed at providing the reader with a background for
the remainder of the dissertation. The second section then describes whey the pressures
to upgrade are so relevant now and less so in the past. In particular, it briefly describes
the impacts of macroeconomic changes and the restructuring of food retail in the 1990s
on growers and their incentives to upgrade.
Early public sector support and the organization of production
The nature, scale, and scope of early public sector support varied widely across
the cases, each leading to a unique organization of production. The different forms of
government support and the resulting structure of production are summarized in Tables 6
and 7. The remainder of this section tells each of these stories and their implications for
how growers would respond to the wave of upgrading pressures in the 1990s and
thereafter.
In SC, the state government aggressively promoted apple production across the
state beginning in the late 1960s by facilitating access to credit, agricultural research and
extension among growers of all sizes. As a result, the structure of production was almost
evenly divided among 10 large firms (52% of output) and about 700 small and medium
growers.
In PJ, a federal parastatal established six public irrigation projects in the 1970s
and 1980s with areas designated to large firms and small growers, and facilitated access
to credit and technical assistance. As will be discussed below, growers in PJ did not
initially produce mangos and grapes, but rather tomatoes, onions, beans, and, to a lesser
extent, melons. Growers only began producing mangos and grapes towards the mid
1980s and, when they did, larger firms adopted mango production and small and medium
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growers grape. The result in reflected in Table 7, where about five mango firms
produced 95% of mangos and 40 small and medium growers produced 85% of grapes.
Finally, in contrast, in RN there was no state or federal support similar to that in
SC and PJ. Instead, public sector support was mostly in the form of highly subsidized
from regional and national development banks (Bank of the Northeast, BNDES) to two
very large firms. This lead to a very concentrated structure where two firms accounted
for almost all of the state's melon production through the early 1990s and which,
moreover, eventually went bankrupt in 2000/2001.
Table 6. Early government support and resulting structure of production across the cases
Case Form of government support in 1970s Structure of production
1980s
Santa The state agricultural agency, Ten like-sized large growers and hundreds
Catarina ACARESC, collaborated with pioneering of SMEs began producing during the same
apples firm and promoted apple production period.
among SMEs by providing access to
credit, agricultural extension and
training, and highly rated apple research
system accessible to both large growers
and SMEs.
Petrolina- The federal parastatal, CODEVASF, The majority of firms and growers in PJ
Juazeiro created its irrigation projects based on a initially produced tomatos, onions, beans,
mangos and dual structure of production. Large firms and other annual crops. Mango and grape
grapes received facilitated access to credit; production began in the 1980s. By the mid
SMEs benefited from irrigation-ready lot, 1980s, five large firms produced about
agricultural extension, guidance on what 95% of mangos and 40 medium growers
to produce, and support with marketing produced about 85% of grapes.
channels.
Rio Grande No single government agency Pioneering firms produced nearly 100% of
do Norte coordinated the development of the melons up through the early 1990s, when
melons melon industry. Instead, development dozens of SMEs began entering the
banks provided substantial highly market as large firms began
subsidized credit to two large pioneering subcontracting.
firms. SMEs benefited from piecemeal
projects and programs.
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Table 7. Estimated number of growers and share of production by size, selected years
Case 1980s late 1990s
Large growers SMEs Large growers SMEs
No. Share No. Share No. Share No. Share
Santa Catarina" 10 52% 700 48% 14 60% 700 40%
Petrolina-Juazeiro
mangoesb 5 95% 100 5% 30 70% 300 30%
grapesb 3 20% 40 85% 25 41% 200 59%
Rio Grande do Norte 3 100% 0 0 6 73% 120 27%
Source: Unless otherwise notes, data on shares of production from Annex A and estimated number of growers based
on own fieldwork. Note that numbers of growers are estimates; precise data on size distribution of growers are not
available.
a SMEs in SC refer to growers with less than 60 planted hectares, as defined by the Santa Catarina census cited in
Boeing (1998). Data for 1985 and 1996 from Boeing (1998), data for 1991 from Hentske (1994).
b Data for shares of production for 1990s from Alves da Silva (1996); all others estimated from own field work. The
estimates for grapes in the 1980s, for instance, reflects the COTIA members who first introduced and began producing
grapes in the mid 1980s.
Apples in Santa Catarina
Santa Catarina was the birthplace for Brazil's apple industry, where today over
700 growers produce 14,000 hectares of apples, accounting for half of national
production and 96% of exports, as shown in Table 1. 30 Production in Santa Catarina is
spread across two main growing regions centered on the cities of Fraiburgo and Sio
Joaquim (Map 1), as described in Table 8.31 Both areas have soils and climate favorable
for apple production, but differ in their terrain and, consequently, pattern of occupation.
Fraiburgo and its surrounding areas have vast expanses of gently rolling hills, allowing
for large scale production. The surface in Sao Joaquim, in contrast, is mountainous and
rocky, favoring smaller scale production instead.
These cities share the title of "Brazilian Apple Capital" and, since the 1970s, have
had in the apple sector their main source of income and employment. Apple production
in Fraiburgo contributes roughly 23% of the municipality's revenue and directly employs
38% of its labor force, while accounting for over 60% of the revenues in Sio Joaquim
30 According to data from IBGE, average annual production of apples in Santa Catarina between 1999-2002
was 51 % of national production.
31 According to data from IBGE, the municipalities of Fraiburgo and Sao Joaquim account for 42% and
24% of the state's apple production (in hectares planted), respectively. Production in over twenty other
municipalities make up the rest.
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and surrounding municipalities (Peres and Lacowicz 2001, Globo Rural 1999). The
importance of apple production for both cities is also evident throughout its public
spaces. Street signs, public phone booths, and trash bins in Fraiburgo are all apple-
shaped, while Sdo Joaquim has an enormous concrete apple in its main town square and
apple designed benches and planters along its commercial boardwalk.
The state's rise as a major apple producer was a direct result of a deliberate
strategy of the SC state government to support the production of apples and other
temperate fruits in the state. Several factor contributed to this early support: the SC state
government's long-standing commitment to small scale enterprises; its timely search for
an agricultural activity to reverse the rural exodus beginning in the early 1960s; and the
successful experience of one pioneering firm in Fraiburgo in producing apples.
The state's interest in promoting fruit production emerged as rural-urban
migration increased in the state in the 1960s as a result of falling returns from traditional
smallholder crops like corn and beans. In response to this situation, the state governor
demanded an alternative strategy for small growers in order to reverse this rural-urban
migration and strengthen small rural establishments which made up 90% of the state's
landholdings.32 Although the concern over rural-urban migration is typical in the
political discourse throughout Brazil, and especially in the Northeast, the commitment of
the SC state govenrment was radically different from that of the states in PJ and RN in
several ways.
Personal conversation with Glauco Olinger, former president of ACARESC, and Olinger (1996).
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Table 8. Basic characteristics of apple production in Fraiburgo and
Sao Joaquim, Santa Catarina
Fraiburgo Sao Joaquim
Tons produceda 231,822 120,420
Area planted (ha)b 8,586 4,460
% of total production SC 67% 34%
No. of growersc 85 506
<100 tons 69 (1%)c 395 (10%)
100-1000 tons 5(3%) 111 (21%)
>1000 tons 11 (65%) 0
Average area (ha) 77.3 5.9
Range area (ha) 1-3576 1-150
a Estimated based on 27 tons/ha, the average productivity for 1997-1999 for the entire
state, according to data from FIESC (2001). IBGE data not used for volume because
IBGE measures volume of apples produced in number of fruits, not tons.
b Area planted is annual average for 1998-2002 from IBGE. Fraiburgo includes
Fraiburgo, Agua Doce, Lebon Regis, and Monte Carlo. Sao Joaquim includes Sao
Joaquim, Bom Jardim da Serra, Bom Retiro, and Urubici.
c Estimate from data available through EPAGRI/Fraiburgo and Boneti et al (1999).
Number of growers presented first, followed by share in state production in parentheses.
First, the state's decision to include apples as part of its development strategy was
based on the proven success of a pioneering firm in Fraiburgo. This pioneering firm,
SAFRA, first experimented, then collaborated with the state in opening its gates to state
researchers, eventually donating its plant collection. This kind of relationship between the
pioneering firm and the state is strikingly different from those that emerged in PJ and RN.
Inspired by SAFRA's success with apples, in 1968 the SC state government
established an uncommonly well-structured program targeted at promoting the
production of apples and other temperate fruits. The Programa de Fruticultura de Clima
Temperado (PROFIT), administered through the state's Association of Credit and Rural
Assistance (ACARESC), first mapped out regions within the state apt for fruit production
and established several regional technical extension offices. By the mid 1970s, apples
accounted for over 70% of the are planted under PROFIT (ACARESC 1977). Through
its support, PROFIT enabled small growers to adopt apple production through a
combination of support policies for credit, marketing, research, training, and extension.
This early state support was striking in its aggressive outreach and research efforts
that established a link between small and medium growers and the state agricultural
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agency that persisted well into the 1990s. Beginning in the mid 1960s, ACARESC
established extension offices in each of the regions determined favorable for apple
production, providing at least one agronomist specialized in temperate fruit production
for every 20 growers. This ratio is high compared for example, with that in
CODEVASF's largest project (Senador Nilo Coelho) which had an average of one
agronomist for every 144 growers during its first four years of operation between 1984-
1987." ACARESC also offered training courses and seminars for growers held in
ACARESC Training Centers throughout the state, and helped small growers organize
into cooperatives that could enable growers to process and market their apples
collectively. Even today, growers recognize the effectiveness of this early support in
getting them started.
In addition to agricultural extension, the state's agricultural research system also
assured that all growers, independent of their scale of production, had access to
appropriate public sector research. ACARESC distributed the responsibility and
resources for apple research across two state research experimental stations, one near
Fraiburgo, and the other in SJ. This structure allowed state researchers to tailor their
work to the particular characteristics of each region with differ in terms of climate,
terrain, and soils, and to the different varieties, with emphasis on Gala in Fraiburgo, and
Fuji in SJ. And since large firms are located in Fraiburgo and small and medium growers
are concentrated around SJ, this allocation of research across these two locations had
direct benefits easily accessible by each class of grower.
Apple growers also benefited from support through the federal government,
which promoted domestic production of apples to reduce Brazil's dependency on
imported apples. According to Glauco Olinger, former president of ACARESC, the
federal government supported apple production at that particular moment as part of the
federal government's broader import substitution industrialization strategy. Brazil in the
1970s was among the world's leading world importer of apples, moslty from Argentina.
In 1980, therefore, the Ministry of Agriculture implemented the first of two programs to
support apple production, the Programa Nacional de Produgdo e Abastecimento de Magd
33 Miranda's (1989) evaluation of the Senador Nilo Coelho project stresses this inadequate coverage by
agronomists (p. 50).
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(PRONAMA). PRONAMA I (1980-1984) aimed to: a) increase the participation of
domestically-produced apples in the national market; b) assure the distribution of
domestic apples, increasing its presence in volume and season; and c) progressively
reduce apple imports.34
Apple growers thus benefited from a targeted federal program, unlike the growers
of other crops in PJ and RN, who benefitted from federal support in other ways, including
CODEVASF's role in PJ and the subsided credit in RN. PRONAMA did not provide
direct credit, but rather structured the lending priorities for the municipalities in which
apples were produced, serving as a catalyst for investments in apple orchards. Despite
increased domestic production, Brazilian consumers in the early 1980s still preferred the
Argentine apples to which they were accustomed. With continued interest in substituting
Argentine apple imports, the Ministry of Agriculture implemented PRONAMA II (1987-
1990) which included, in addition to production-related measures, guidelines for the
establishment of classification and standardization norms. As a result of these policies,
apple production almost tripled between the late 1970s and late 1990s, as shown in Table
9.
Table 9. Number of growers and apple production in Santa Catarina, 1970-2000
Year No. of growers Total area (ha)
1970 117a n.a.
1977 1207a 5,287
1980 1,448 8,031
1990 1,296 13,483
2000 1,600 17,177
Source: 1970,1977 from ACARESC (1977); 1980 from CEPA/SC as cited in Bleicher
(1984); 1990 from Hentske 91991); 2000 from EPAGRI (2001).
a These data are proxy since they reflect the number of growers receiving assistance
from ACARESC to produce temperate fruits, in general, not just apples. These are
reliable proxy, however, since most apple growers counted on ACARESC during these
years and apples accounted for over 70% of the area planted under PROFIT during the
1970s.
The growth of the apple sector was based on the dual structure of production the
SC State Government supported from early on. As mentioned, large firms were separated
34 Ministerio da Agricultura 1987 as cited in Dotti Cesa (1998).
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by region from smaller growers. Apple production in Fraiburgo dates back to the 1960s
when a family of German immigrants, the Freys, took advantage of a federal fiscal
incentive program for reforestation (FISET) and planted hundreds of acres of apple
trees.3 5 Prior to producing apples, the Freys had harvested timber in the surrounding
areas of Fraiburgo since the 1940s. They looked to apples as an alternative for the
diminishing timber. The Freys, along with two French partners, established the
pioneering firm, SAFRA, which subsequently split between the Freys and the French
partners into two of the largest firms still in the sector.
The Freys were followed by several other entrepreneurs who established most of
Brazil's larger apple firms, as listed in Annex D. The largest of these, Fischer, belongs to
an entrepreneurial group which is among Brazil's top producers and exporters of orange
juice concentrate. It alone produced an average of 20% of the state's annual apple
production between 1990-1999, reaching 30% of the state's apple production in 1999.
The two firms that emerged out of SAFRA, together with Fischer, account for about half
of state level production. The other firms in Fraiburgo make up about 30% of state
production.
Whereas European immigrants pioneered apple production in Fraiburgo, Japanese
immigrants led the process in Sio Joaquim. These Japanese were members of the large
Japanese agricultural cooperative COTIA, established by 70 Japanese immigrants in Sao
Paulo in 1927.36 As COTIA expanded - by 1957 it had 5,000 members - it established a
system of Grower Groups (more popularly know as "colonies") which it supported
throughout Brazil.37 Interested in expanding into apple production, COTIA sent several
scouts to Santa Catarina in the early 1960s to investigate the best region for apple
production and in 1964 established a colony of six families in Sio Joaquim. Unlike their
European counterpart in Fraiburgo who at the time were already highly capitalized
through their timber industry, COTIA growers arrived in Sio Joaquim with very little
capital and old machinery. In their favor, they had COTIA as guarantor for bank loans,
access to well established COTIA marketing channels and brand name recognition, and
3 See Freitas (1978).
36 Japanese farmers first migrated to Sao Paulo in 1908 as a result of an accord between the state of Sao
Paulo and the Japanese Government and initially worked across the state's coffee plantations (Marcovitch
1996).
37 See Marcovitch (1996).
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an ethnic-based work strategy that enabled this group of growers to succeed even once
COTIA shut down in 1994.
Other small growers, with the support of ACARESC, followed the example set by
COTIA in SJ. The better off among these smaller growers are agronomists or
agricultural technicians and belong to one of three main grower cooperatives or have
established long term working relationships with one of the firms that subcontract
production from Sio Joaquirn. These growers tend to have apple production as their only
activity, produce among the best quality apples in the state, and have strong informal ties
with other growers and public sector researchers and extension workers. Alongside these
are hundreds of growers who produce a couple hectares of apples and have other fruit
crops and small animals.
The SC state, supported by the federal government, thus transformed the
landscape throughout the regions surrounding Fraiburgo and Sio Joaquim through its
targeted support in promoting apple production. More than a catalyst, the state propelled
the production of apples and other temperate fruits among smaller growers, while also
continuously interacting with larger growers, paving the way for the dual structure of
production which remains up to today, with larger growers concentrated around
Fraiburgo and small and medium growers in SJ. Despite falling support over the years
(as discussed in Chapter 5), this early period established ties that have persisted well into
the present.
Mangos and grapes in Petrolina-Juazeiro
PJ is Brazil's largest fresh fruit cluster, situated in the heart of the semi-arid
Northeast region, characterized by recurring drought-related social and economic
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maladies. The bordering cities of Petrolina (in the state of Pernambuco) and Juazeiro
(in the state of Bahia) are divided by the San Francisco River, the largest and only
perennial river in the Northeast, and are the center of an area covering about 20,500
square miles (Map 1).39 Prior to the introduction of irrigation in the 1970s, this area was
best known as a commercial entrepot and for its traditional industries of leather, plant-
38 See Carvalho (1988), Hirschman (1963), and Kutcher and Scandizzo (1981) for the impacts of droughts
in the Northeast.
39 This region includes the municipalities of Petrolina, Santa Maria da Boa Vista, and Lagoa Grande in the
state of Pernambuco, and Juazeiro, Curaqd, Casa Nova, and Sento Se in Bahia.
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based chemicals, and minerals, while its agriculture consisted mostly of onions and other
rainfed crops. The advent of irrigation first allowed growers to complement rainfed crops
with a mix of irrigated annual vegetable crops, then subsequently with permanent fruit
crops, especially mangos and grapes (Alves da Silva 1996). Today, the production of
mangos and grapes alone employ over 29,000 workers in producing 90% of Brazil's
mango exports, and 30% of its table grape exports (see Table 1).4
The booming fresh fruit cluster in PJ is the result of support by the San Francisco
River Valley Development Agency (CODEVASF), a parastatal dedicated to the
promotion of navigation, irrigation, agricultural and industrial development in the San
Francisco River Valley.41 In PJ, CODEVASF expropriated land and implemented six
projects in PJ containing lots ranging from 6 to 200 hectares, covering a total of 38,000
hectares (CODEVASF) to be distributed to small and large growers. CODEVASF built
the irrigation infrastructure to channel water from the Sobradinho Dam to each individual
lot, hand-picked who would produce, facilitated credit to get production started and, for
small growers, also facilitated their initial access to the market.4 2 In addition,
CODEVASF supported the creation of a grower association, VALEXPORT, which
remains the strongest voice for growers in PJ, as discussed below.
As did ACARESC in SC, CODEVASF thus established a structure of production
based on many like-sized large firms and hundreds of smaller growers. The nature of
these early growers in PJ and the support they received, however, differed substantially
from that of growers in SC in ways that had lasting impacts on how growers in both cases
upgraded later on. Without exception, all of the larger growers in PJ were from outside
PJ, in contrast to the pioneering apple firms in SC that had been established in the local
economy since the 1940s. Once CODEVASF established its projects, it sought out
entrepreneurs who would invest in large scale production (100-400 hectare farms) in the
40 Data from Damiani (1999). Employment figure for 1996, export figure for 1997. Other employment
estimates range from 33,121-42,666 direct jobs and 46, 169 indirect jobs associated with irrigated
agriculture (small growers 1999).
41 See Chapter 2 in Damiani (1999), "An Overview of Early Government Supports," for a discussion of the
role of CODEVASF in the development of the San Francisco River Valley.
42 This was especially so for tomato growers. In return for subsidies, CODEVASF obliged the tomato pulp
processing firms to source locally from growers in the irrigation projects.
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region and provided them with subsidized land, 43 access to irrigation water channeled
from the San Francisco River, and subsidized water fees. These growers belonged to
economic groups mostly from Sao Paulo, and from the capitals of Pernambuco and
Bahia, that had investments in sectors as diverse as construction, engineering,
metalworking, and banking. Among them were politically influential businessmen,
including the brother of a state deputy who became a leading force in organizing
exporters and representing them before government agencies.
This group of firms is credited with having introduced new crops and
technologies necessary to produce them, along with the domestic and export marketing
channels, supporting the transformation of agriculture in PJ (Damiani 1999). By the late
1980s, each of about 15 firms produced anywhere from 100-450 hectares of mango.
Mango exports were concentrated in about 10 of the largest firms, with five of these
having the necessary post-harvesting infrastructure to export to the US, Brazil's main
market.
As outsiders moving into newly opened irrigation projects in the semiarid
Northeast in the late 1970s and early 1980s, these firms benefited from substantial public
sector incentives with credit, infrastructure, and so forth. The pioneering firm in SC, in
contrast, were from Fraiburgo and had already begun producing apples even before the
state government began its support of the apple industry. The state did not need to attract
large firms in SC; rather, it was the pioneering firm in SC that first guided the state in its
support of the industry by sharing with the state its research findings the proving the
viability of apples in the state.
Similar implications also hold for small growers across these cases. In PJ,
CODEVASF "colonized" its irrigation projects by providing roughly 1,500 small
growers with irrigation-ready lots (with on-farm pumps, canals, and drainage system
installed and ready for use), training in crop and irrigation technologies, and agricultural
extension. CODEVASF initially encouraged small growers to produce tomatoes, and to
facilitate this process, it enlisted several tomato pulp processing firms to the region, all
obliged to purchase their tomatoes locally. Although the majority of these small growers
4 Government incentives for large farms in Petrolina-Juazeiro included subsidizing 50% of their irrigation
infrastructure and assuring investment capital for the remainder 50% through the Bank of the Northeast and
the Bank of Brazil (Damiani 1999).
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were locals, they were generally new to irrigated agriculture, its technologies, and
markets. The tomato pulp processing industry eventually shut down in the early 1990s
and, with them, went most of the small growers in the projects who never manged to
diversify beyond tomatoes. In SC, the state promoted apple production among small
growers that had already been in agriculture, many even producing other temperate fruits.
The one group of small growers that produced fruits in PJ from early on was that
of COTIA growers. Thirty-five growers had on average 21 irrigated hectares - twice as
much as most small growers yet only a fraction of the large firms' landholdings. What
differentiated COTIA from other growers was their collective nature, where together they
produced and marketed, counting on their well established Sao Paulo-based network of
agronomists and market specialists.
In sum, CODEVASF (a federal agency) molded a dual structure of production in
PJ similar to that which EPAGRI (a state agency) supported in SC. Yet early state-
grower relationship across these cases differed in important ways. In SC, the state
government agency, ACARESC, coordinated the development of the apple industry,
while the federal parastatal CODEVASF did so in PJ. ACARESC worked closely with
the pioneering firm in early apple research in SC; CODEVASF, in turn, had to provide
incentives for large firms to move to the region and begin production. ACARESC
emphasized agricultural extension and research from early on, providing the basis for
institutions that would sustain the sector's growth over time. CODEVASF also
coordinated agricultural extension and research, but its main focus was heavy-duty
irrigation infrastructure and tax incentives for colonization of its projects. And finally,
ACARESC facilitated apple production by small growers alongside larger growers, while
CODEVASF promoted a different mix of crops among larger growers and small and
medium growers. These differences had implications for the formation and outcomes of
public-private partnerships (Chapter 3) and the possibility of medium and small growers
to participate in the fresh fruit industry (Chapter 5).
Melons in Rio Grande do Norte
Also in the semi-arid is Brazil's main melon producing cluster, located in the state
of RN. The production of melons in Rio Grande do Norte is concentrated in the
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northwest municipalities of Mossord and Barauna, with some production also in Assd',
Carnaubais, and Ipanguagu (Map 3). The introduction of melon production transformed
the income generating activities of many rural communities in the region by
complementing the traditional production of livestock, cotton, corn, and beans. Today,
melon production employs about 14,000 workers,'" accounting for about 40% of Brazil's
melon production and 70% of its melon exports in 2003,4 as shown in Table 1.
In contrast to the concerted government support via EPAGRI in SC and in
Petrolina-Juazeiro through CODEVASF, government support in RN was instead limited
to the more conventional provision of highly subsidized credit during the 1980s, a
reflection of the regional development strategy undertaken by SUDENE, the BNB and
Bank of Brazil.46 Although firms in the other cases also benefited from subsidized credit
when they began producing, the form in which this credit was allocated in RN led to a
very different structure of production. Instead of a deliberate policy promoting a dual
structure with growers large and small, SUDENE, the Bank of Northeast, and the Bank of
Brazil channeled credit to two very large firms. As a result, while CODEVASF reduced
the possibility of land concentration by establishing limits to land size, inducing the
creation of several 100-200 hectare firms, with only a few larger firms (with up to 400
hectares), these federal agencies created a highly concentrated structure in RN.
The pioneering and largest firm in RN grew as a result of these targeted subsidies
and also by FISET, the same federal government program to support reforestation of
44 The association of fruit growers in RN, PROFRUTAS (1996), estimates that one hectare of melon
generates three direct jobs per year and two indirect jobs per year. Therefore, based on an annual average of
4,544 planted ha in RN between 1998-2002, approximately 13,632 people are directly employed in melon
production and 9,088 are indirectly employed. These estimates are consistent with Pedrosa's (1991)
estimate that in 1991 the melon industry generated between 15,000 and 20,000 direct jobs. Indirect jobs
associated with packaging, marketing, transportation, and input providers would have further increased
Pedrosa's estimate. I do not know, however, what share of these workers (in my own estimate as in
Pedrosa's) is permanent or seasonal.
45 According to data from IBGE, the average annual share of melons produced in RN in total melon
production in Brazil between 1997-1999 was 39.8%. Export share from own fieldwork, as presented in
Gomes (1999).
46 In the case of the western municipalities surrounding Ass6, growers also benefited from the construction
of the Armando Ribeiro Dam. The majority of melon production is concentrated around the eastern most
municipalities in the state, around Mossor6, where irrigation water is drawn from underground aquifers and
not from the dam. It's important to note, however, that DNOCS did not build the dam as part of a strategy
for irrigated agriculture. Instead, it built this dam as part of its broader strategy to distribute water through
the semi-arid Northeast. Without it, however, irrigation in Assd would have remained limited to the Assd
River banks, prone to periodic flooding.
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native species that favored the pioneer apple growers in SC. MAISA used FISET to
purchase its lands, covering over 30,000 hectares across the Rio Grande do Norte and
Ceari border, on which it planted cashew trees, among the accepted crops under the
FISET program. It only switched to melon after the 1983 drought, when it lost much of
its cashew production. 47 At its peak in 1997, it produced 2,500 irrigated hectares of
melons, representing 56% of the total area planted with melons in RN (4,741 ha) and an
estimated 18% of total area planted with melons in Brazil (13,715 ha), over six times as
much as the irrigated area in the largest firm in PJ (see Annex D). This in addition to
hundreds of hectares of other fruits, including acerola, mango, dwarf cashew, grapes,
passion fruit, and twenty other crops, a cashew nut processing plant (which employed up
to 500 workers), and a fruit pulp processing facility.
In addition to generous sums of subsidized investment credit from development
agencies and banks, MAISA also diverted funds for collective goods to private goods. In
the late 1980s, it convinced the federal government to build a public housing project
within its properties: the 600-house complex, originally destined for the city of Mossor6
(about 25 miles from MAISA), sits near the front gates of MAISA, facing RN's main
interstate. MAISA touts the village as one of the many ways it looks after the welfare of
its workers. Critics cite it as one of the many ways MAISA bribed the state. Likewise,
individuals familiar with the early years of the cluster claim that MAISA only discovered
it was sitting atop a large aquifer when the Brazilian Petroleum Enterprise (Petrobras)
drilled several deep (700-1000 meters) wells throughout its properties in search of oil.
Instead of oil, Petrobras tapped the aquifer which enabled MAISA to irrigate. Until then,
it had depended on the region's sparse and erratic rainfall, allowing it to produce
cashews, but not melons.
Inspired by the early success of MAISA, an entrepreneur from Sao Paulo bought
10,000 hectares in Assdi when the federal government was just about to complete the
construction of the Engenheiro Armando Ribeiro dam. He began producing melons and
became the second largest grower in the state, FRUNORTE, eventually producing up to
900 irrigated hectares of melons, in addition to mangoes and hearts-of-palm.
47 The firm decided to focus on melons because several varieties of the melon family (concurbitacae), such
as pumpkins and squash, grew naturally in the Mossor6 region, reflecting the region's national endowment
for melon production.
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These pioneers tested new varieties of melons and learned the best production
practices for the local conditions, established domestic and export channels, and built a
recognized name for locally produced melons. These early investments undoubtedly
explain the subsequent growth of this cluster since these pioneers proved the viability of
melon production and trained hundreds of workers that subsequently created a labor force
skilled in the production of melons. Their success in terms of producing and exporting
melons attracted other firms and growers to invest in melon production in the region.
MAISA and FRUNORTE, however, in no way directly facilitated the entrance of
other growers into the sector, like did SAFRA in SC. It was only beginning in the mid
1990s, as they both faced mounting financial burdens, that these firms increasingly turned
to subcontracting production from small and medium growers. These included growers
from the Mossor6 region, neighboring states, and from Sio Paulo. Those from the region
previously produced other crops, were involved in other agricultural related businesses
(input stores, marketing), or worked as agronomists for the lead firms. Outsiders moved
to the region specifically to produce melons drawn by the success of the leading firms.
Most of the medium growers are trained agronomists, many with university or technical
school degrees, who make all the production decisions and monitor and supervise the
entire production process themselves.
Medium growers also included at least six Japanese-Brazilians (nissei) that moved
from Sio Paulo to produce melons in Mossord. The first nissei moved to Mossord in the
late 1970s to experiment with melon production in MAISA. Although his ties with
MAISA were short-lived and he returned to Sao Paulo, his son remained in Mossor6 and
worked at the Fazenda Sio Joio from 1981-1990, leaving then to start his own farm. This
nissei subsequently helped at least two other nissei farmers settle in the region by first
allowing them to work on his farm and, with the collapse of COTIA in 1994, other nissei
moved to RN to pursue melon production.
Moreover, where the pioneering firm in SC encouraged the state to support apple
production among smaller growers, and in PJ they formed VALEXPORT, the pioneering
firms in RN in no way facilitated inter-firm relations that could benefit the entire cluster.
To be fair, these firms were key in first attracting ships to the port of Natal and, at one
point, organized a short-lived shipping pool. In addition, they collaborated in creating
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and maintaining the fruit fly monitoring program, COEX, and the growers association,
PRFRUTAS, as demanded by the USDA. But, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, these
organizations were neither as representative or as effective as grower organizations in SC
and PJ.
To summarize, in contrast to the concerted federal government support in PJ
which included support with infrastructure, credit, mediation among growers, and
research and extension, public sector support in RN was mostly limited to highly
subsidized credit channeled to a few large growers. These firms undoubtedly paved the
way for what eventually became a cluster of melon firms. However, the concentration of
production between two very large firms was not conducive to collaboration among
growers, leading instead to a fragmented and weak sectoral association, and
comparatively limited public-private partnerships.
Rising volumes, falling prices, and the supermarket revolution
Production across the cases gradually increased since the early and mid 1980s
(Figure 1). By the early 1990s, growers had well-established production technologies,
domestic and export marketing channels, and a network of input suppliers. Yet Brazil's
economy underwent several major events in the 1990s that radically transformed the
scenario in which growers operated, including increased liberalization, the 1994 Real
Plan, the 1999 crises, and the increased consolidation of food retail. The causes and
consequences of these events are analyzed elsewhere.48 Here I simply summarize the
main impacts of these events on fruit growers in terms of production, exports, and prices,
and ultimately their incentives to collaborate with each other and with public sector
agricultural research agencies in their efforts to upgrade.
48 Rigolon and Giambiagi (1999) present a succinct description of these macroeconomic events and
Langley (2000) and Langley and Bolling (1999) discuss their implications for Brazilian agriculture. Farina
(2002) and Reardon and Berdegud (2003) describe the consolidation of food retail in Brazil.
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Figure 1. Area planted with apples, mangos, grapes, and melons across the cases, 1987-
2001
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Source: IBGE, except for the following: apples 1975-1989, estimated from data on tons
produced from FIESC (2001) and average tons/ha for 1988-1990 (17 tons/ha) from Boneti
(1999); grapes 1987 from Alves da Silva et al (1996); melons 1987-1989 from Carraro and
Cunha (1994).49 Data is for state level. This means that mangoes and grapes in PJ represent
the aggregate values for the states of Pernambuco and Bahia.
Following a decade of hyperinflation, modest growth rates, and falling rate of
investment, the federal government implemented the 1994 stabilization plan (Plano
Real), based on the introduction of a new currency, the Real, along with an exchange rate
anchor to stabilize the Real with respect to the US dollar that led to an appreciation of the
Brazilian exchange rate by over 30% between 1993-1996.50 Brazilian goods thus became
costlier abroad and imports cheaper. As a result, fruit exports were constrained, while
imports soared, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. Rising fruit imports meant greater
competitive pressures on growers. Consumers accessed to a wider variety of and higher
quality fruits at competitive prices, raising consumer awareness of and demand for better
quality in the domestic market as well (Albuquerque 2001).
49 Data is for state level. This means that mangos and grapes in PJ represent the aggregate values for the
states of Pernambuco and Bahia.
50 See Homen de Melo (1997).
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The unfavorable market situation facing growers was somewhat reversed in early
1999, when the federal government devalued the Real in an attempt to revert capital
outflow associated with the international financial crisis that began in Thailand in 1997
and subsequently spread to other countries. The devaluation in early 1999 improved the
competitiveness of fruit exporters by giving growers higher prices in terms of the Real
abroad, inducing growers to increase production and exports, and raising the prices of
imported fruits, thus reducing the volume of fruit imports (Figure 3). However, increased
production over the years was accompanied by a generalized fall in domestic and export
prices. This downward trend in prices has persisted until now, as shown for mangoes,
melons, and grapes in Figures 4 and 5. By the late 1990s, growers thus had increasingly
tighter profit margins, and unprecedented pressured to improve their efficiency.
Figure 2. Brazilian exports of apples, mangoes, grapes, and melons, 1980-2001
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Figure 3. Brazilian imports of fresh fruits and vegetables, 1980-2001
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Figure 4. Average domestic annual prices for melons, mangos, and grapes, 1992-2001
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wholesale fresh fruit market, as listed at www.irriqar.orq.br [accessed 7/18/03]
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Figure 5. Export prices for Brazilian mangos and melons in selected countries, 1996-2001
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In addition to the rising pressures for greater efficiency, the 1990s also brought
mounting norms and standards by which growers need to abide, a direct result of the
global restructuring of food retail. Food retail is much different today than that which
prevailed when growers first began producing as global retailers have gradually
substituted national retailers and local vendors. This process has been especially rapid in
Latin America, where the consolidation of food retail in the past decade mirrors that
which occurred in the United States over a period of five decades (Reardon, Timmer, and
Berdegue 2003). In Brazil, this process picked up following the stabilization plan of
1994 when foreign direct investment by multinational supermarket chains, including
Carrefour, Ahold, and Walmart (Farina 2002). As a result, the share of supermarkets in
national food retail increased from about 30% in 1990 to 75% in 2000 (Reardon, Timmer,
and Berdegue 2003). For fresh produce in particular, supermarkets in Brazil now account
for about 50% of national sales (Reardon, Timmer, and Berdegue 2003).
The restructuring of food retail has been accompanied by an increase in buyer-
driven standards as large retailers seek to differentiate their products on the basis of
quality and consumer safety, thus generating additional sources of rent (Reardon and
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Farina 2001). This product differentiation has led buyers to gradually shift from
demanding product quality standards alone, to also imposing a series of process standards
(Reardon et al 2002).
The rising competition in the fresh fruit industry and the need to impose these
norms and standards has meant a changing relationship between growers and buyers.
Whereas previously this relationship was generally segmented with an intermediary,
retailers are increasingly shifting away from middlemen and wholesalers to alternative,
more direct forms of procurement. These alternative strategies include formal and
informal contracts directly with growers and the establishment of their own distribution
centers, practices which allow the supermarkets greater leverage in enforcing their quality
and safety norms and standards (Farina 2002). All of this means that growers must now
be much more than just price-competitive - they must now meet the mounting demands
for better fruits, "better" being whatever the supermarkets define as better: varieties,
production methods, postharvesting technologies, packaging and labeling specifications,
and acceptable environmental impacts and working conditions.
In addition to conforming to norms and standards imposed by foreign buyers,
importing country regulations and standards which have also been on the rise in the
1990s. Aside from the standard regulations on minimum requirements (appearance,
texture, cleanliness, etc), classification (Class I, II, etc), presentation (uniformity,
packaging), labeling (identification, specifications, etc), and maximum allowable levels
of pesticide residues, both the EU and the US have imposed more norms to which
growers have had to respond by adjusting their production and post-harvesting
technologies. Particularly important for my cases was the EU's introduction in 1993 of a
program to harmonize maximum pesticide residue levels (MRLs) on food sold in the EU
and their announcement that it would only import fruits that were produced under
integrated production practices.5 1 Brazilian growers of fresh fruit have thus been living a
51 Integrated production is defined as the "economical production of high quality fruit, giving priority to
ecologically safer methods, minimizing side effects and use of agrochemicals, to enhance the safeguards to
the environment and human health" (www.iobc.ch). In practice, integrated production entails continuous
monitoring of plant health as the basis on which agrochemicals are then used. This implies a more targeted
and reduced use of agrochemicals compared to the conventional methods where growers would apply x or
y chemical on day z of the production cycle.
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scenario of higher production, lower prices, increased competition, and rising demands
from buyers and industrialized country governments.
The next three chapters analyze the institutions growers have created or counted
to resolve collective good kinds of problems associated with the new market
environment. More specifically, Chapter 3 examines the varying role of public-private
partnerships in helping growers upgrade, especially in SC and PJ. Chapter 4 then
explains how the nature of the crop also influences these arrangements. Finally, Chapter
5 focuses on how medium growers have overcome these problems, especially the
influence of Japanese-Brazilian ties in this process.
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CHAPTER 3. UPGRADING THROUGH PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
Increased competitive pressures have generally raised Brazilian growers' interest
in and committed to collaborating with public sector agricultural research agencies in
resolving research-based problems. Meanwhile, in seeking to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of public sector agricultural research, the Brazilian federal government has
instituted competitive grant programs and other funding mechanisms that promote
partnerships between government researchers and growers, where both collaborate in
defining, executing and funding research. Despite the well-accepted notion of the state's
importance in promoting innovation in agriculture and increasingly through partnerships
with growers, the actual process leading to this greater public-private interaction is rarely
analyzed nor are the conditions under which this public-private collaboration is more
likely to occur or be constructive and inclusive. 52
This chapter analyzes the formation of public-private partnerships across the
cases, explaining how, in light of very similar circumstances of tightening market
pressures and changing public sector funding, they vary so much in terms of what they
accomplish and whom they benefit. In comparison to the more conventional way
governments have done research, public-private partnerships are more consultative and
growers actually contribute to funding public research either via contributions to their
sectoral association, which are then passed on to public sector agricultural centers and
researchers (as happens in ABPM in SC) or in-kind contributions such as land, inputs,
and labor to carry out field operations in experimental plots.
In principle, the government's new funding mechanisms based on public-private
partnerships should increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public research. These
gains are achieved by involving growers in the defining the government's research
agenda, making it more applicable and useful for growers, while at the same time
providing additional funding for public sector agencies. 3 There are, however, at least
two problems with this logic.
52 raise the issue of a constructive and inclusive public-private partnership in light of Tendler's (1999,
2001b, 2001e) work questioning the assumptions behind the growing interest in these kinds of relationships
between the private sector and the state.
53 See Alston, Pardey, and Roseboom (1998) Echeverra (1998), and Portugal and Contini (1997).
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First, this effectiveness is based on the assumption that the private side of these
partnerships, in this case the grower associations, are actually representative of a majority
of growers involved in a given activity. While these associations may in effect represent
the majority of volume produced, they do not always reflect the voices (and therefore
needs) of the majority of growers.5 4 In fact, powerful grower associations may even
crowd out public sector support for segments of smaller, less powerful growers, who
could potentially benefit relatively even more from public sector support because of their
difficulty in coping with global buyer driven demands (Tendler 1999, 2001e). These new
funding mechanisms may even worsen this crowding out problem since they essentially
increase the attraction of public sector agencies to larger, more modern firms which are
55more likely to secure funding for public research than the medium-sized newcomers.
And second, the efficiency expected from these partnerships assumes that public
sector research will have the ability to continuously move its knowledge frontier, helping
growers resolve problems that tend to become more complex and costly. However, since
these partnerships pressure the state to pursue short-term problem-oriented research
almost exclusively, longer-term basic research tends to be marginalized, much of what
may be needed for innovations down the road (Jarvis 1994, Echeverria et al 1998, Alston
and Pardy 1999).
In practice, these alternative mechanisms for funding research have had mixed
outcomes, ranging from the strengthening of public sector research capabilities and to
successful implementation of new laboratories and improved fruit research, to
accusations of corrupt misallocations of funds implicating public officials and grower
associations alike.56 In the least, this mixed experience reflects that the effectiveness of
these grant programs in fostering public private partnerships depends on 1) the mission
and structure of the public sector agricultural research agency in each case that makes it
more or less responsive to these changes in incentives to forge closer relations with the
private sector, and 2) the representation, transparency, and accountability of growers'
5 See Biggs and Smith (1998), Locke (1995), and Tendler (1999).
5 Tendler (2001e) notes a similar attraction between professionals in training and technical assistance
centers, including agricultural research and extension workers, to their more "modern" clients.
56 See CNPq (1995) for a general listing of BIOEx projects and ESAM/NEP (2000) for a listing of such
projects in RN. Despite these achievements, several sources reported how officials from the Ministry of
Agriculture and several growers' association, including VALEXPORT and PROFRUTAS, misallocated
research funds.
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associations, which holds the public sector agency and its members accountable for the
appropriate use of these funds.57 The effectiveness of these associations, in turn, reflects
the extent to which the lead firms in each cases deliberately generate positive
externalities that benefit other growers in the sector, including lobbying of public sector
support for infrastructure, credit, research, and other ways that reduce the risks and costs
associated with adopting fruit production.58
The stories that emerge from my cases vary both in the process of building of
public-private partnerships and their outcomes. I label the formation of public-private
partnerships as collaboration "by design" in Santa Catarina (SC), "by coercion" in
Petrolina-Juazeiro (PJ), and "almost by accident and ad hoc" in Rio Grande do Norte
(RN). That is, public-private collaboration in SC today is the result of the state's
deliberate approach to apple research over a period of three decades which relied heavily
on continuous interactions between researchers and growers. Apple growers, in turn,
have been effectively organized through the Brazilian Apple Growers Association
(ABPM).
In PJ, I label this interaction "by coercion" to reflect how greater public-private
partnerships emerged as a result of strong lobbying by the growers association,
VALEXPORT. In this case, the main source of agricultural research for growers is
CPATSA, one of EMBRAPA's 37 centers and units, located in Petrolina. In the late
1990s, VALEXPORT successfully pressured EMBRAPA to substitute CPATSA's
former director with one more supportive of fruit production. Although the process is
richer than that captured in one single event, I focus on this event since it was a major
57 These findings resonate with Hayami and Ruttan's (1985) classical model of technological change in
agriculture. They argue that the "dialectic interaction" between farmers and researchers is central in
explaining the agenda of public sector research. Moreover, they argue that this interaction is likely to be
most effective when farmers are organized into politically effective associations and the agricultural
research system is decentralized.
58 Tendler (2001 c) questions the commonly-held assumption that lead firms necessarily support upgrading
and suggests, alternatively, that this lead firm impact on upgrading can be quite mixed, with positive effects
in one stage and negative in another, or even both positive and negative at the same time. It is in light of
her insights that I analyze the impact of the lead firm, trying to understand what makes some lead firms
more "developmental" than others. I emphasize externalities that lead firms "deliberately generate" to
differentiate them from the kinds of passive externalities that emerge from large-scale production and
exports, including a trained pool of workers, attraction of agricultural input stores and services, and the
formation of a reputation for locally-produced fruits.
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push behind increased public-private partnerships in PJ and also reflects the power of
VALEXPORT in influencing policymaking that ultimately impacts the entire cluster.
Finally, RN contrasts SC and PJ in its relative absence of public-private
collaboration in agricultural research, limited to a few sporadic and ad hoc projects,
combined with a poorly-representative and largely ineffective growers' association. The
outcomes of these partnerships vary accordingly across the cases, ranging from a more
constructive and distributive pattern in SC, where partnerships have resulted in concrete,
tangible improvements in production and post-harvesting technologies that have spread
across growers, to a less constructive and more exclusive one in RN, where outcomes
have been few and mostly in the hands of a few very large growers.
This chapter is organized as follows. Parting from the premise established in
Chapter 1 that growers have faced increased competitive pressures to upgrade their
products and production processes, the first section discusses the instances under which
growers need to resort to public rather than private research in their efforts to upgrade.
The second section then describes the concomitant changes in the state apparatus for
research in Brazil, particularly its tendency towards alternative funding mechanisms
which draw on greater public-private collaboration. We are thus left with a situation in
which public and private agents have greater incentives to collaborate and the
institutional means through which to collaborate. Having the incentives and the
institutional means for behaving in a particular way does not, however, on their own
insure agents will do so. The third section presents the case studies which demonstrate
how other factors, especially the organization and political voice of growers, and the
nature and structure of the local public sector research agencies, also shape how growers
and public sector agencies interact. Finally, the last section discusses the implications of
the empirical evidence for the debate on public-private partnerships in agricultural
research.
When responding to the market requires public sector support
Growers can upgrade in many ways without any input or guidance from public
sector research agencies. Growers can turn to buyers themselves or to importing country
governments for information and guidance on the use of particular inputs, production
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practices, or post-harvesting technologies. This would be the case when a UK melon
importer suggests a new variety for his suppliers to experiment with, or when a USDA
field inspector in Brazil recommends changes in the organization of the sorting and
packaging system in a packinghouse used for US-bound mangos. In other cases, growers
may obtain the necessary skills and knowledge from in-house technical expertise,
consultants, local input suppliers, or conversations with each other. Input suppliers
across all the cases host numerous seminars and field days to disseminate varieties and
agricultural inputs, while the use of consultants by growers, many of them producers
themselves, is also prevalent.
There are, however, a host of activities that have public good attributes that
demand government support, including adaptive research, biological control of pests and
pathogens, and particular improvements in farming practices and management. As such,
results from research, once disseminated, become freely available (i.e., nonexcludable),
and one grower's use of this knowledge does not reduce its supply to others (i.e., non-
rival). Public sector involvement in these activities is also justified on the grounds of risk
and uncertainty associated with research, as well as in its economies of scale, both which
would keep the private sector from taking on these kinds of activities itself.:9
Growers across my cases, and especially in SC and PJ, have sought public sector
support for a wide range of public good type of activities aimed at upgrading fruits and
their production processes, including the following:
e Design and implementation of integrated production, a production method which
minimizes the use of agrochemicals by combining traditional (e.g., chemical
fertilizers) and alternative production techniques (e.g., use of natural predators) to
resolve problems of fungi, insects, and diseases. In contrast to the purely
traditional production method, under integrated production, growers only treat
their crops when necessary, at the right time, and using the appropriate doses, all
based on continuous and detailed field monitoring and evaluation.
" Improvements in production practices, such as floral induction which enabled
growers to control the harvest season in SC (apples) and PJ (mangoes). Floral
induction in SC enabled apple growers to overcome the problem of variable
59 See Pray and Umali-Deininger (1998) and Hayami and Ruttan (1985).
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blooming by forcing a more homogeneous bloom and, consequently, harvest. In
the case of PJ, floral induction enabled mango growers to take advantage of the
region's favorable and relatively stable climatic conditions by producing mangos
year-round.
* Development of new varieties, including seedless grapes in PJ, which allowed
growers to participate in this growing market segment.
* Pest and pathogen control, such as that for fruit flies in PJ and RN, and a fungal
disease by the name of black spot or apple scab (sarna) in SC. Fruit fly control in
PJ and RN depends on a field monitoring program involving growers and public
sector researchers. As for the black spot problem in SC, the state established
Phytosanitary Alert Stations to inform growers of the probability of the
occurrence of black spot, allowing growers to reduce losses through early support.
* Implementation of quality control system for classification and packaging
standards in SC.
My analysis focuses on how growers and public sector agricultural researchers
collaborated in designing, funding, implementing, and disseminating these kinds of
research-based activities. While these challenges increased growers' incentives to seek
public sector support, the public sector research itself has undergone a series of changes
since the 1970s which have shaped its response to these demands, as discussed below.
The changing state apparatus for agricultural research
The Brazilian public sector agricultural research system is very different today
than that which prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s, when these fruit clusters were just
beginning to consolidate. This section describes this changing state apparatus and its
implications for grower-state relations.
The development of the national agricultural research system as it is today dates
back to the 1970s with the establishment of Brazilian Agricultural Research Agency
(EMBRAPA).0 EMBRAPA is the leading public agricultural research agency in Latin
60 EMBRAPA, in turn, is the product of a long chain of institutional arrangements for agricultural research.
Among its precursors, the National Service of Agronomic Research (SNPA) established several research
and experimental centers throughout Brazil in the 1930s and 1940s. Another reorganization in the late
1960s led to the formation of the Department of Agricultural Research and Experiment (DPEA), which
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America in terms of expenditures, alone accounting for over half of the region's total
expenditures by national agricultural institutions.61 It is roughly the size of the USDA in
number of scientists (2,300), 40% of which holds PhDs mostly from US and European
universities, and is based on a network of 37 research centers and units spread across the
country (Reifschneider and Lele 1998). Among its research centers are the EMBRAPA
Tropical Semi-Arid (formerly known as CPATSA) in PJ; the EMBRAPA Grapes and
Wine in Bento Gongalves (CNPUV), Rio Grande do Sul, which does some apple
research; and the EMBRAPA Tropical Agroindustry in Fortaleza, Cear6' which does
some melon research.
EMBRAPA was a product of its time: a centrally planned and managed agency in
an era of heavy state support in all areas of the economy. Decisions on what to research,
where, and for whom were taken centrally (Silva and Flores 1993). This top-down
approach worked well in making EMBRAPA a well-endowed and well-respected
research agency, central to much of Brazil's agricultural growth. It established a national
research network, trained a cadre of researchers, built research infrastructure, coordinated
research nationally, established linkages with extension agencies, and formed
institutional ties with foreign research agencies. To date, EMBRAPA has developed a
reputable portfolio of technologies, including those for animal feed and production,
agroindustry, grains, fruits and vegetables, biological control, natural resource
management, and information sciences.62 In addition, EMBRAPA has been a leading
voice among Brazilian researchers focusing on a wide range of areas, including advanced
agricultural technologies, family agriculture, food safety, and agribusiness.
According to an evaluation by Beitema, Avila, and Pardey (2001), EMBRAPA's
total expenditure more than doubled between the late 1970s and late 1980s, but has fallen
continuously since 1996, as presented in Figure 6. This fall in expenditure is reflected in
a substantial decline in spending by most EMBRAPA centers. In fact, EMBRAPA's
National Center for Soil Research (CNPS) was the only center to have increased its total
spending in recent years - expenditures by all the other centers decreased substantially,
included the establishment of six regional institutes. By the early 1970s, DPEA, now renamed National
Agricultural Research and Experiment Department (DNPEA), had altogether nine regional units and 75
experimental stations, all of which were transferred to EMBRAPA upon its creation (Beintema et al 2001).
61 Estimated from ISNAR data for 1991/1992, as presented in Echeverria (1998).
62 See www.embrapa.br/eng~lish/techno/index.htm for complete portfolio listing.
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with several centers down by more than 35% between 1996-1998. EMBRAPA also
reduced its financial and technical support to state agencies. In response to these tighter
budget constraints, EMBRAPA implemented a series of institutional reforms seeking
greater participation of its own professionals in its planning and management, increased
interaction with research beneficiaries and partners, and greater efficiency in delivering
its goods and services (Silva and Flores 1993).
Figure 6. EMBRAPA's spending on agricultural research, 1976-1999
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Source: EMBRAPA and several authors, as cited in Beintema et al (2001:57). Expenditures in
constant 1993 international dollars.
At the same time, the federal government devised new mechanisms to secure
continued funding for public research, including private funding of public research and
public funding of private research through competitive grant funds. The National
Research Council (CNPq), in coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture, implemented
several competitive grant programs in the 1990s for researchers from state and federal
research agencies and universities working on fruit research. These programs included
the Biotechnological Program to Support the International Competitiveness of Brazilian
Agriculture (BIOEx, 1995) and the Agronegocio (1997), aimed at training and the
acquisition of laboratory research equipment, and based on "partnerships" and "joint
action" between federal and state governments and especially of sectoral associations.
These programs sought to make the private sector "use its political force in defense of the
R&D sector, especially in its participation of state and federal budgets which would no
longer be exclusive of public sector scientists and researchers" (CNPq 1995).
63
EMBRAPA also established its own competitive grants program, PRODETAB, in
1996, open to any Brazilian institution, including grower organizations, as long as it was
in conjunction with a public agricultural research agency. The primary objective of
PRODETAB is to improve the integration of national agricultural research through
collaborative research with the private sector (Beintema et al 2001:35). Although
initially accounting for less than one percent of total national research expenditures, the
program seeks to eventually allocate 30% of the national agricultural research system's
budget (Reifschneider and Lele 1998).
In short, growers now contend with a reduced and different form of support
compared to the monumental investments of the 1970s, when the federal government had
a full-fledged agenda of building its research competencies by training its researchers,
expanding its scope, and strengthening its laboratories and research infrastructure,
especially as reflected in the establishment of EMBRAPA. Today, the federal
government faces tighter budget and political constraints, which have among other things
propelled it to forge closer ties with the private sector as a source of funding. The
remainder of this chapter explores the implications of these partnerships for growers and
for public sector agricultural research in general.
Case studies
In this section, I present the case studies through which I try to understand what is
it about public sector agencies that make them more or less responsive to growers and
what makes growers more or less demanding of public sector agencies, and the
contribution of public-private partnerships to growers' upgrading efforts. For each case, I
describe the state-grower relation over time, aiming to show how the organizational and
political voice of growers and the nature and structure of public sector agricultural
research agencies shaped the public-private relationship dominant today. I begin with the
most effective public-private collaboration in terms of scope and distribution which was
in SC, then use it to judge what has emerged in PJ and RN.
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Collaboration by design in Santa Catarina
Public-private collaboration in agricultural research is strongest in SC, as
reflected in the scope of activities in which growers and state researchers interact and
support each other and in the extent to which these partnerships benefit large and small
growers. The effectiveness of this partnership can be explained by 1) the form of support
provided by the state agricultural agency, with its emphasis on research and extension
and outreach to both large and small growers over time; and 2) a well-organized and
representative growers association, ABPM, backed by large firms that have historically
engaged with the state in ways that generated spillovers to the entire cluster.
In comparison to the other cases, government support in SC stands out for its
uncommonly strong sense of mission in providing growers with agricultural research and
extension.63 According to Olinger (1996), the absence of any other public sector agency
anywhere near growers, the novelty of the extension methods used (slide shows and
movies, in addition to the more traditional demonstrations), and the above average wages
of extension workers contributed to ACARESC's "sprit d'corps." Not only did the state
help growers adopt the production of apples and guide them in apple production
technologies, but it did so in such a way that growers continuously interacted with state
researchers and extension workers. In particular, there are at least three attributes of
policy support in SC that differentiates if form the other cases in fostering these kinds of
partnerships:
First, the state agency ACARESC from early on established an institutional venue
through which to engage with growers. It reached out to large growers especially via the
state's Research Center in Videira, which had research plots in the large firms in
Fraiburgo, as early as 1972. The state later transferred its apple expertise from Videira to
Cagador, also in the vicinity of Fraiburgo. Smaller growers in Sio Joaquim benefited
from the research coming out of the Sdo Joaquim Experimental Station.
Second, the state became a leading expert in apple research, earning growers'
respect and lasting support. Especially during the 1970s and early 1980s, the SC state
government formed a highly trained group of researchers specializing on apple
63 Tendler (1997) explains the good performance among public workers across several programs in Ceara
as a result of the state's creation of a "strong sense of 'calling' and mission around particular programs and
their workers" (p.14).
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production. 64 It also sought technical expertise and financial resources from
industrialized country agencies with extensive experience in apple production, including
the Japanese Agency for International Development (JICA), the German GTZ, Cornell
University, the Israeli Volcani Center, and the Experimental Station in East Malling,
UK." Collaborative efforts with JICA were particularly impressive: the first consortium
spanned 25 years (1971-1996) during which at least one Japanese apple expert worked
out of the Experimental Station in Sio Joaquim at any given time, several EPAGRI66
researchers were trained in Japan, and EPAGRI made substantial improvements to its
research infrastructure and equipment. That such a small state mobilized such
international support reflects the state's financial and technical commitment to promoting
excellence in apple research.
These efforts and contacts enabled state researchers to identify and resolve some
of the main problems hampering apple production, including low productivity associated
with problems in pollination, the uneven break in dormancy across orchards resulting
from insufficient cold hours in the winter, the occurrence of black spots, and high
incidence of virus infestation that plagued the main greenhouses that initially supplied
growers with apple tree seedlings. This in addition to its own research leading to
improvements in soil fertilization, grafting, spacing, pruning, harvesting, and storage.
And third, just as impressive as its commitment to apple research was the state's
well-structured and funded agricultural extension service. As mentioned in Chapter 1,
the state established extension offices throughout the apple producing areas, supplying
one extension worker for every 20 growers.67 ACARESC's extension workers visited
growers often, guiding them in their production practices and providing growers a direct
and reliable liaison to state research. The marvel and gratitude with which growers today
speak of the state's earlier extension service starkly contrast the complaints one usually
64 The SC state government created is Agricultural Research Agency, EMPASC, in 1975. Before then, the
state supported research done through the federal government's several experimental stations spread
throughout the state.
65 Kurtz (1999) provides a brief description of these consortia.
66 The SC state government merged ACARESC and EMPASC into EPAGRI in 1991. See Chapter 4 for
further details.
67 As mentioned in Chapter 2, this ratio is high especially in comparison to that of the irrigation projects in
PJ, where in the early years (for which data is available) the ratio averaged one extension worker for every
74 growers (Miranda 1989:51 cites that between 1984-1987, for growers in the Nilo Coelho project, the
ratio of agronomists to growers was 1:144 and for agricultural technicians, 1:74).
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hears of extension workers "not having anything to extend" or of overextended extension
workers struggling to serve an impossible number of growers.68 The very approach of
the SC state government in promoting apple production thus ushered the possibility of
public-private partnerships from early on, welcoming growers to engage with state
extension workers and, in the process, and earning growers' lasting respect.
That growers were so responsive to these opportunities reflects the nature of the
pioneering firms in SC, as well as of the growers' association, ABPM. In contrast to the
pioneering firms in the other cases, the pioneering large firm in Fraiburgo, SAFRA
(Sociedade Agricola Fraiburgo), deliberately sought government support that promoted
the production of apples throughout the state. At the federal level, the Freys successfully
lobbied to include apples in the FISET, a fiscal incentive program that supported the
production of fruit trees native in each region.69 At the state level, the Freys encouraged
the state government to focus PROFIT on apples. According to Mr. Glauco Olinger, then
SC State Secretary of Agriculture (1969-1976), Rene Frey personally convinced him of
the promises of apple production by estimating on paper that one hectare of apples would
enable growers to obtain as much returns as from ten hectares of corn.
In addition to mobilizing federal and state government support for apple
production, SAFRA also gave the state a jump-start on apple research by sharing its own
extensive experimentations with state researchers. SAFRA began its apple research in
1962, four years before the state even established its program to support apple production
(PROFIT), and almost 13 years before the state formed its own apple research program
through the state agency for agricultural research, EMPASC. As part of its research
efforts, SAFRA imported thousands of apple and other temperate fruit seedlings from
France, along with a French agronomist, who dedicated 12 years (1962-1974) to
searching for the most suitable fruits, varieties, and production methods for the region. In
addition, SAFRA obtained federal support to invite a leading French apple export,
68 See Rolling (1982) for a critique of agricultural extension programs.
69 FISET was administered by the Brazilian Institute for the Development of Forests (IBDF), the precursor
to today's Brazilian Environmental Institute (IBAMA). FISET was originally aimed at assuring the needed
volume of timber for industrial production by expanding areas with species of higher productivity, as well
as restoring the natural vegetation in areas where deforestation had caused irreparable environmental
damage. Soon after its implementation, however, IBDF included fruit trees as part of FISET, giving
priority to those fruits which Brazil could potentially produce to substitute imports or to fruits produced in
the underdeveloped North and Northeast regions (Freitas 1978).
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Georges Delbard, to visit Brazil to guide the federal government's support of the apple
sector (Frey 1990).
The development of public-private partnerships in SC is also explained by the
effectiveness of apple growers in establishing a growers association representative of the
sector and capable of voicing their needs to the state. Apple growers in SC first created
an association, named Catarinense, along with growers of other temperate fruits in SC
and the neighboring state of Rio Grande do Sul in 1978 to defend their interests in the
federal government's fiscal incentive program (FISET). With the end of the FISET
program, and growing importance of the apple industry, apple growers established the
Brazilian Association of Apple Growers (ABPM).
Meanwhile, apple growers in Fraiburgo established the Fraiburgo Fruit Growers
Association (AFF) in 1982, dedicated exclusively to introducing new technologies to the
apple sector, including phytosanitary alert stations, hail control system, and research
projects with EPAGRI. According the present director of ABPM, the effectiveness of
AFF in generating tangible benefits to its members raised the interest of apple growers
beyond Fraiburgo to also adopt a similar strategy and, as a result, the ABPM incorporated
the AFF in 1992 by using it as a basis for its own research program.
ABPM is striking for its political voice despite the absence or weakness of certain
factors or conditions that explain political strength of growers elsewhere: its leaders have
no direct political affiliation as in the other cases, the participation of apple revenues to
the state is less than that of the other cases and, at a national level, the value of apple
exports is less than that of other crops, exceeding only grapes (Table 1).
These organizations have had collective successes as well as failures, though even
some of the failures reflect an uncommon level of willingness and commitment to
collective efforts. Among such failures was the establishment of a system to reduce the
impacts of hail which can result in the loss of up to 20% of apple production. In 1990,
AFF established a grower-funded hail control system consisting of radars, radio
transmission, rockets, and launch pads, altogether "protecting" an area of 130,000
hectares. The impact of this system was debatable and, as several firms suffered hail-
related losses in 1994 and other were cash-strapped and unable to pay their dues, AFF
abandoned its program. The severity of hailstorms in 1995 once again revived growers'
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interest in and commitment to a hail control system, this time using a less expensive
system, which instead of rockets uses a network of ground-based generators that emit
gases in the atmosphere capable of inhibiting the formation of hail over 350,000 hectares.
The state's seven largest firms (accounting for over 62% of the state's production)
initially covered the costs of this system, yet by 2000 only three remained. 70 The others
dropped out, some out of disbelief in the effectiveness of the system, others as free-riders.
Growers unsuccessfully attempted collaborating in other activities, including a
common shipping pool. As the European demand for Brazilian apples increased
beginning in the mid 1980s, the lead firm in Fraiburgo, Fischer, coordinated the
formation of a shipping pool among the ten largest firms in 1989. Three years late,
however, these other firms decided to break from Fischer and form their own pool to try
an alternative marketing channel. This second pool lasted for two years, at which point
each firm began shipping independently. According to a director from Fischer, the first
pool split up because Fischer did not trust the alternative marketing channel proposed by
the other firms. The second pool, in turn, disbanded because firms were, as a group,
unprepared to meet the buyer-driven demands for regularity in volume and quality.
In contrast, growers have been especially effective in collaborating with each
other when joint action requires public sector support. As a director from one of the lead
firms put it, "If EPAGRI or EMBRAPA mediate, then we (growers) collaborate because
we cannot do it alone." The earliest example of this was the establishment of a
phytosanitary alert station. AFF, along with EPAGRI, built a phytosanitary alert station
in Fraiburgo in 1986 to provide growers with information on the probability of
occurrence of a particular fungal disease, black spot. Growers can drastically reduce
black spot if they treat their orchards within 24 hours of infection. Beyond that time
frame, treating black spot requires more expensive, systemic, inputs. Upon verifying the
likelihood of black spot on a given day, the technicians at the alert station call AFF
members and provide warnings via local radio stations.
More recently, growers stepped up joint action as they faced rising volumes,
falling prices, stricter buyer-driven norms and standards, diminished federal funding of
state agricultural research resulting from the 1988 Constitution, and the need for better
70 See Appendix B for an estimate of the share of the largest firms in total state production.
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representation at Mercosul negotiations. In response to these events, growers re-
organized the ABPM, creating a Board of Directors to increase the association's
participatory management and decision-making, and to formulate and fund its own
research program. As part of its strategy, the ABPM designed measures that would allow
for even closer ties between growers and EPAGRI researchers. It did this locally by
incorporating EPAGRI in its own research agenda and at the federal level, by securing
additional funding for fruit research. The latter was especially important in generating
spillovers to growers elsewhere who ultimately also benefited from these federal funds.
As conventional transfers of federal funding for the state's agricultural research
system fell, ABPM developed its own research program funded through member
contributions (about US$8/ha/yr), formed its Technical Council and invited a leading
EPAGRI researcher to coordinate its activities. The ABPM research program accepts
research proposals once a year which are reviewed by its Technical Council, consisting of
technical directors from the member firms and the lead EPAGRI's leading apple
researcher. Throughout the year, members of the Technical Council repeatedly contact
the researchers, keeping up to date on any findings and difficulties along the way. At the
end of season, researchers circulate their project finding among members of the
Technical Council and hold a seminar open to all ABPM members. Through this
process, ABPM has funded 30%-50% of EPAGRI's local research station's (in Caqador)
annual research costs, in addition to in-kind contributions from growers including access
to orchards and technical labor to follow up on scientific measurements and monitoring.
Just as important, ABPM effectively sought alternative sources of federal funding
to supplement EPAGRI's budgets. ABPM lobbied the CNPq to establish a competitive
grants program to finance training and laboratory equipment for research on Brazilian
fruit exports. As a result, CNPq created the first of a series of funding programs to
support fresh fruit exports. This program required researchers to submit proposals
endorsed by grower associations, which EPAGRI did repeatedly with the support of
ABPM. Among other things, EPAGRI used these grants to setup a laboratory for soil
71 Apple growers were left out of a Mercosul negotiation on fruit classification norms because of an
oversight by the ABPM president who had failed to inform growers of the pending meeting.
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analysis, carry out field tests on pulverizers, and purchase equipment for nutrient
measurement.
Growers' increased interest in and management of research has contributed to the
strength of EPAGRI's program on apple research in ways other than funding, including
by raising the morale of state researchers who welcome the recognition of their work and
are encouraged by the usefulness of their findings.72 Additionally, growers have also
backed the demands by EPAGRI researchers to the state for necessary research
equipment and infrastructure. As an EPAGRI researcher commented, "When ABPM
solicits (reinvindica), we get results," referring to ABPM's role in supporting EPAGRI's
proposals to CNPq.
Among the most outstanding outcomes of the greater public-private collaboration
in research in SC is the Integrated Production project, which was the first in Brazil and
has subsequently served as a role model for the development of IP technologies for other
crops. The EMBRAPA Grape and Wine Center (CNPUV), in the state of Rio Grande do
Sul, initiated this project in 1997 even before the EU demanded that growers adopt
integrated production by requesting growers for experimental areas in their farms.
Growers, through ABPM, readily selected several plots throughout Fraiburgo for the
experiments, which are carried out by researchers from EPAGRI in SC,
EMBRAPA/CNPUV, the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, and the Instituto
Bioldgico in Sao Paulo, each focusing on particular subprojects. EPAGRI coordinates
the subproject on Plant Management and Nutrition, under which ABPM administers
production. As for concrete results, the IP project resulted in the establishment of IP
guidelines for apples; 8,600 certified hectares by 2002, with an additional 5,000 hectares
going into quarantine; the training of field supervisors across the farms; and the
certification of field inspectors.
The above demonstrates several attributes of this state support that reflect an
underlying "social arrangement" of research unique to this case.73 First, the SC state
7 Drawing from several cases in Northeast Brazil, Tendler (1997) demonstrates how positive recognition
of public front line workers (agricultural extension workers, health agents, and nurse practitioners) can be
associated with their better performance.
J I draw the notion of social arrangement of research from Fitzgerald's (1990) discussion on the centrality
of social arrangements between farmers, researchers, and research administrators in explaining the
development of scientific ideas in her study of hybrid corn in Illinois.
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government from the very beginning relied on the support of the large firms as it
promoted apple research among small growers. Second, the continuous grower-state
interaction was possible because of the state's commitment to apple research and its
dedication of Experimental Stations in both Fraiburgo and Sao Joaquim towards apple
research, each focusing on the particular apple varieties produced in each subregion.
This approach provided each set of growers with customized production technology,
while avoiding the problem of appropriation of research by the larger, more powerful
growers. At the same time, this case is also remarkable for the effectiveness of its grower
organization in representing its members and in collaborating with the state in promoting
research and other efforts that benefit the cluster.
Finally, in contrast to the other cases, the large firms generated positive
externalities to the cluster as a whole. They have proprietary knowledge, of course, but at
the same time engage in efforts that have wide-spreading benefits, including those
through ABPM that resulted in improved pest management, integrated production
practices, and apple marketing campaigns. What makes these firms more developmental
than the large firms in the other cases? One possible explanation is the realization by the
pioneering firm since the 1960s that it, alone, could not produce enough apples to
compete with Argentine imports. Instead, a domestic apple sector would necessarily
entail many growers competitively producing quality apples. This was not so in PJ or
RN. By the time the large firms began producing fruits in these other cases, there were
already growers of the same crop elsewhere. Mango production in Sao Paulo dates back
to at least the 1960s and Sao Paulo remains the largest producer state, with about 25% of
area planted, mostly for the domestic market (Ministerio da Agricultura 2000). And
melon production had already peaked and subsided in PJ. The pioneering firms in PJ and
RN therefore did not need other growers in the cluster as did the pioneers in SC.
Another difference between the large firms in SC and those in PJ and RN that
helps explain the comparatively "developmental" nature of those SC is their origin. In
SC, the main family behind the pioneering firm SAFRA, the Freys, had been traditionally
important to local economic development through other productive activities, dating back
to sausage production in the 1920s and a woodmill in the 1940s. The Frey family had
also been important politically, by leading community efforts to obtain government
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support for the construction of roads, bridges, and energy infrastructure for their growing
village. In fact, as a result of their leadership, the Freys managed to convert their small
village of mostly German and Italian immigrants into the municipality of Fraiburgo ("the
city of the Freys") in 1961.
In RN, MAISA began producing cashews to take advantage of the FISET
incentives through which it acquired about 30,000 hectares. Despite the scale of cashew
production, its owners remained dedicated primarily to other economic activities
elsewhere, including construction and transportation companies in the state of Ceari. In
PJ, the large firms were entirely new to the region.
Collaboration by coercion in Petrolina-Juazeiro
Similar to SC, growers in PJ have also benefited from research partnerships with a
public sector agricultural research agency, in this case, an EMBRAPA regional center
located in Petrolina, CPATSA7 4 (Centro de Pesquisa Agropecudria do Tr6pico Semi-
Arido). Although CPATSA has always maintained some kind of exchange with fruit
growers through field days, open seminars, and phone consultations, these interactions
have in recent years materialized in a series of research partnerships that draw from
CPATSA expertise and in-kind contributions from growers in the form of plant material,
land, inputs, and labor to carry out the recommended practices by public researchers.
These have included projects on integrated production, seedless grapes, and general
improvements in fruit production and post-harvesting technologies.
Unlike SC, however, the public-private partnerships in PJ have generally been
limited to specific projects and to contacts between individual growers and researchers as
opposed to the broader scope and scale of such partnerships in SC. Additionally, these
partnerships have been less distributive in PJ than in SC in terms of their accessibility by
small and medium growers. These differences can be explained by 1) the form of public
sector support in PJ, that focused on different crops for different growers, and 2) a less
representative grower association in PJ relative to that in SC.
7 EMBRAPA recently renamed the Centro de Pesquisa do Tr6pico Semi-Arido (CPATSA) as EMBRAPA
Semi-Arido. I use the acronym CPATSA for the sake of brevity and to avoid confusion with the central
EMBRAPA.
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Government support early on seemed very similar in SC and PJ where a
government agency helped growers adopt fruit production through a combination of
policies facilitating growers' access to credit, land, inputs, and agricultural research and
extension. Yet there are several features of the form in which this support was provided
in PJ that led to different implications for the formation of public-private partnerships.
First, the different nature of the coordinating agency - ACARESC in SC and
CODEVASF in PJ - shaped the formation of the resulting partnerships. In SC,
ACARESC was a state rural development agency, with a clear and focused mission of
promoting apple production among large and small growers throughout the state to
strengthen its rural economy. Reaching out and engaging with growers was part and
parcel of its strategy. In contrast, CODEVASF is a federal parastatal agency, with the
mandate of developing the entire San Francisco River Valley. As an engineering-based
agency, it specialized on building dams and irrigation infrastructure, along with
electricity and transportation networks to support its public irrigation projects. Its
mandate was thus much broader than ACARESC's and focused more on physical
infrastructure and less so on the kinds of soft institutional infrastructure that characterized
ACARESC.
Second, CODEVASF's early support of irrigated agriculture in PJ included a
strong component of research, mostly done by CPATSA, but this research did not focus
on fruit production as did ACARESC in SC. Instead, its agenda focused on improving
the production of tomatoes, melons, onions, garlic, and pepper, crops that had been
identified by a CODEVASF- commissioned study by FAO as the most promising crops
for the region, along with rainfed agriculture, small husbandry, and other traditional
activities for the semi-arid region.
Even as large growers began producing mango and grapes in the late 1980s,
drawing heavily from the expertise of private agronomists from other regions in Brazil
and from abroad, CPATSA remained true to its original mandate, all fields of expertise in
which its cadre of researchers had been well trained, including many with doctoral
degrees from US universities. Despite informal interactions early on between fruit
growers and CPATSA, a growing disconnect between CPATSA's original mandate and
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fruit growers' research needs left growers discontented, as reflected in the disdain with
which growers spoke of CPATSA until very recently.
This is not to say that CPATSA did not experiment or research with fruits. It did
in fact, especially with mangoes and melons. This early work served subsequent
developments, but was not part of a concerted strategy or agenda on fruit research as was
apple research in ACARESC. As early as 1979, CPATSA had planted over twenty
mango varieties in their experimental station in the Mandacaru project in Petrolina to
analyze the behavior of mango production under local agroclimatic conditions. Even
though it would be at least another decade before commercial mango production began in
the region, CPATSA had already envisaged its potential and thus can be credited with
proving to growers that mango production was viable in the region. There was not,
however, any continuity to this research, as CPATSA remained true to its original
mandate and incorporated the irrigated crops most widely produced in PJ until the late
1980s.
Likewise, research on melons dates back to the 1980s. Melon had been widely
produced in PJ between 1982-1987, mostly produced by medium and small growers. It
was an extremely rudimentary activity however, in which there were no guidelines for
production or transportation, and no varieties developed for the region, since existing
varieties had been developed for other, more temperate parts of the world. In the late
1980s, CPATSA introduced the El Dorado 300 variety, better adapted to local conditions
and resistant to a common leaf disease and virus. Though problematic for exports
because of its high perishability, the El Dorado nevertheless became a pre-breeding
variety, used for the development of commercial varieties done subsequently by private
seed companies.
A third and final way in which the form of government support differed between
SC and PJ that had lasting implications for the formation of public-private partnerships
concerns the provision of agricultural extension. In comparison to SC's strong
agricultural extension service, CODEVASF's provision of agricultural extension was
marked by periods of good and bad performance, reflecting the resources and capabilities
of its many providers: CODEVASF until 1980; the state level agricultural extension
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agencies EMATER (1980-1986); multiple providers contracted by the associations and
cooperatives (1986-1992); and other providers subcontracted by CODEVASF since 1992.
Growers throughout PJ voiced their frustration with the fluctuating quality of
agricultural extension services. As one grower in the Nilo Coelho project put it,
"EMATER had no idea how to produce fruits - they came to learn from us." Another
grower, this one originally from Rio Grande do Sul, contrasted the variable quality of
extension in PJ to that of Southern Brazil, "in the South, the EMATER extension worker
is as important as the pastor."
For the above reasons, fruit growers and CPATSA researchers rarely interacted
for decades, generating a rift and sense of disdain with which growers spoke of
CPATSA's "useless research." This scenario finally changed in the late 1990s as large
growers lobbied EMBRAPA to play a bigger role in fruit research. In the case of melons,
CPATSA resumed its research in the late 1990s largely in response to one of the lead
firms in RN that pressured for this research through EMBRAPA headquarters in Brasilia.
In the case of mango research, growers in PJ went even further and lobbied in Brasilia for
the replacement of CPATSA's former director - an outstanding agronomist and research
manager committed to CPATSA's original mandate - with one who is familiar with and
committed to supporting the expansion of fruit production in the region. The new
director had previously been assistant director since 1994, at which point he began
working on a fruit research agenda. This new director is an insider among the larger fruit
growers, as reflected in their close professional and social ties.
CPATSA's new director opened the way for a renewed relationship between its
researchers and fruit growers. Among this first activities as director, he visited each of
the large mango firms to personally discuss the kinds of technical problems they were
having that CPATSA could help resolve. These and other conversations led to a series of
collaborative projects between VALEXPORT and CPATSA, including improvements in
fruit fly control, postharvest technologies, and integration production.7 5
That growers lobbied in Brasilia enough to replace CPATSA's former director
reflects their loud political voice, especially through VALEXPORT, whose composition
and structure has also influenced the formation of partnerships in PJ. According to apple
7 For a complete listing, see "Trabalhos desenvolvidos, parcerias e convenios" at www.valexport.com.br.
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growrs in SC, VALEXPORT is more politically powerful in Brasilia than ABPM. At the
same time, VALEXPORT is relatively less representative of its members. This means
that VALEXPORT has obtained much government support, but which generally has been
more exclusive and less easily accessible by small and medium growers.
Evidence of VALEXPORT's political clout which often goes distorted in temrs of
beneficiaries was its effectiveness in lobbying the federal government for the
construction of cold storage and the extension of the runway at the Petrolina airport to
allow the fruit exports via cargo planes. The runway was built, and so was the storage,
yet both remain idle since no one ever figured out what the cargo planes would bring into
PJ.
VALEXPORT's political power can be traced back to its creation, volume of
production, and insertion in the semi-arid region, historically associated with drought-
related social and economic maladies. Faced with the prospects of exporting and the
realities of a highly heterogeneous supply of fruits in terms of quality, growers, with
CODEVASF's guidance and financial support, formed VALEXPORT in 1988 to
represent them before government agencies (Damiani 1999). Its main objective was to
establish ties with public and private institutions, both domestic and foreign, that could
contribute to the improvement of fruit production, post harvesting, storage,
transportation, marketing, exports, and promotion in the region (VALEXPORT 2003).
CODEVASF thus helped growers organize to pressure the federal government itself.
This direct liaison to the federal government is unique to this case.
The power of VALEXPORT also comes from its numbers. VALEXPORT
consists of about 55 members, including two grower cooperatives (with about 150
members), and altogether accounts for 80% of total fruit production in PJ, and 90% of its
exports. This meant that, in the 1999-2001 period, production by VALEXPORT
members represented upwards of US$ 57 million in export revenues annually, about one
76quarter of the value of Brazil's total fresh fruit exports. These figures are much higher
than those for associations in SC and PJ.
In addition, according to apple growers in SC, VALEXPORT has a much louder
voice in Brasilia than ABPM because of VALEXPORT's appeal to the "causa
76 Estimated from data from CODEVASF, VALEXPORT, and SECEX, as cited in VALEXPORT (2002).
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Nordestina," the Northeastern discourse for public sector support on the basis of drought-
related economic and social maladies. This implies that growers in PJ have an easier
battle to fight than growers in SC, who have no option than to jointly effectively present
themselves to the state.
VALEXPORT has been central to many of the developments in PJ contributing to
the growth of fruit production, including the expansion of research on irrigated fruit,
improvement of the infrastructure at the ports and the Petrolina airport fruit transport and
storage, coordination of USDA monitoring, and creation of an electronic marketing
system (VALEXPORT 2002). For all its accomplishments, however, I was struck by
how unrepresentative VALEXPORT is of growers in PJ. Aside from the largest five
firms, growers criticize its complete lack of transparency and accountability, including
the refusal to hold elections.77 In fact, the two largest mango growers in PJ have directed
and co-directed VALEXPORT since its creation. The problem is that VALEXPORT has
not kept up with the changing composition of growers.
With the incoming newer firms and the growing participation of medium growers
producing mangoes and grapes beginning in the late 1990s, the sector has begun
questioning and challenging VALEXPORT. Most growers continue to participate in
VALEXPORT (in so far as they pay their dues) because they have no other alternative.
No other grower association in the area has similar visibility, political power, and
effectiveness in obtaining government concessions and, at least in terms of R&D. In
recent years, however, growers have sought alternative means of organizing outside the
auspices of VALEXPORT.
One of these is the Brazilian Grape Marketing Board (BGMB). Grape growers
within VALEXPORT created the BGMB in 1992 to organize the marketing of grapes
from the region. The BGMB unites all of VALEXPORT's grape exporters, including
CAJ. Through the BGMB, growers enforce quality standards and production quotas and
collective transport and market their grapes.78 They are now trying to break away from
VALEXPORT because of its bias towards mango growers and continued lack of
transparency.
77 See Appendix D for an estimate of the share of the largest firms in total state production.
78 See Damiani (1999:120).
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Another group that growers have formed independent of VALEXPORT is the
grower cooperative APROVALE, consisting of 30 medium mango growers who exported
altogether 2,000 tons of mangoes to the EU in 2003 (or 2% of PJ's exports 79). These
growers established APROVALE in 1999 mainly to collectively meet the demands of
buyers for higher volumes. Members share a packhouse in Petrolina and a brand name in
the domestic market. They initially exported through one of the large grower-exporters
in PJ and, beginning in 2002, started negotiations directly with an importer in Rotterdam.
In addition, and central to my argument, APROVALE successfully sought to establish a
partnership with CPATSA to help its members adopt integrated production practices.
This partnership was challenging because until then, CPATSA had only established
similar partnerships with VALEXPORT which required growers to pay their monthly
dues to VALEXPORT in order to benefit from the work done by CPATSA.
In sum, VALEXPORT's political power has promoted the rise of public private
partnerships observed in PJ. At the same time, these partnerships have generally been
more exclusive that those in SC because of VALEXPORT's structure which has become
less and less representative of the cluster as the newer firms and medium growers begin
producing and as it sustains its biased support of mango growers despite the rising
importance of grape production in the region.
Mango growers are now full of praise for CPATSA, yet often more so on this
individual level than at the cluster level. One of the largest firms, located a few miles
from CPATSA, for instance, claimed that it is practically an experimental field for
CPATSA. "They do everything here, both by their demand and our own." This same
firm went on to describe how responsive CPATSA is every time it calls on them with
particular questions which their own technical staff cannot resolve.
Another example of how CPATSA now engages with growers in solving firm-
specific problems comes from an interview with the technical director of one of the
newer mango firms. During our conversation on the farm, a CPATSA researcher arrived
to discuss the technical problems behind a poor shipment of mangoes that had arrived in
the US. The CPATSA researcher, having analyzed a series of photos taken from the
mangoes that been unloaded from the ship, was impressively familiar with the quality and
79 Based on 93,359 tons exported by PJ in 2002, according to VALEXPORT (2002).
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problems of the mangos produced by each firm. That same afternoon VALEXPORT was
having a meeting to discuss the problem and, although CPATSA had not yet been invited,
this researcher was going to attend as representative of this particular firm.
Ad hoc collaboration in Rio Grande do Norte
In contrast to multi-crop pattern in PJ, growers in RN have produced mostly
melons since the pioneering firm, MAISA, first began commercial production of melons
in the mid 1980s. At first glance then, one may expect to find a pattern of public-private
partnership more similar to that in SC, where the focus on a single crop (apples) enabled
growers to interact with public sector researchers and extension workers over several
decades. Yet for the most part, public sector agricultural research and extension have
remained marginal in the development of the melon industry in RN. Collaborative efforts
between growers and research agencies have been few, sporadic, and mostly in the hands
of two very large growers.
Several are the factors underlying this comparatively weak pattern of
partnerships, including 1) the absence of a public sector development or research agency
comparable to that in SC and PJ, coupled with a perverse policy that undermined public
good aims by promoting private sector research instead, and 2) a skewed structure of
production where two very large firms did not favor collaborative efforts which could
have had more distributive outcomes.
Two public sector institutions could have potentially supported melon growers:
the federal school of agronomy in Mossor6 (Escola Superior de Agricultura de Mossord,
ESAM), located at the heart of melon country in RN, and EMBRAPA Tropical
Agroindustry, an EMBRAPA research center located in the neighboring state of Ceari, a
two-hour drive from Mossor6. When I first visited Mossord, and learned of ESAM there,
I figured it could help explain the growth of the melon industry there as opposed to
somewhere else, such as the Ceari side of the Chapada do Apodi, which has practically
the same growing conditions for melons as does RN and is within a two-hour radius from
ESAM and EMBRAPA Tropical Agroindustry.80 I expected to find the kinds of
80 Melon production has now expanded to the Ceard side of the border as a result of aggressive support
policies by the Ceari State Government beginning in the late 1990s that included expanded irrigation
infrastructure, and technical and marketing support. Before the late 1990s, production in this region was
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spillovers one could associate with an agricultural school, including laboratories and
research infrastructure, and trained labor in the form of agronomists to work in the farms
and of professors who could provide continuous guidance to their graduates and also
provide technical assistance themselves directly to growers. Although ESAM graduates
are indeed pervasive throughout the melon farms, and informal networking amongst them
no doubt contributes to the dissemination of technologies throughout the cluster, growers
generally complain of ESAM's poorly trained graduates (which they end up hiring
anyhow), and the uselessness of whatever melon research it does.
As for the EMBRAPA Tropical Agroindustry in Ceari, its original mandate was
for cassava and cashews, not fruits, similar to CPATSA's early focus on dryland
agriculture in PJ. It was only the mid 1990s, that EMBRAPA renamed and reoriented this
center toward research on tropical fruits. Nevertheless, as in ESAM, contacts between
melon growers and EMBRAPA researchers have been minimal over the years. This
distance endured even though the owners of the two largest melon farms were on the
technical council of this center, meant to provide EMBRAPA with input from private
end-users.
One possible explanation for this lack of coordination between these agencies and
growers is that growers never believed in EMBRAPA's and ESAM's capabilities for
research on melons and thus never expended any effort in that direction. In support of
this argument is the view - held by at least one ESAM professor as well as some growers
- that EMBRAPA invests so little in melon research that it cannot compete with
multinational seed companies that have the resources to experiment with several varieties
at once. Whatever results EMBRAPA comes up with are therefore of minimal value to
growers, who already have access to the continuous experimenting done by the
multinationals.
As for ESAM, the relative absence of collaborative work between its researchers
and growers lies in a perverse incentive system which discourages ESAM faculty from
seeking private consultancy. ESAM's system of payment establishes that faculty can
receive either full salary for exclusive dedication to ESAM, or receive 45% of their salary
limited to a few medium growers and to MAISA, whose property overlapped the Rio Grande do Norte-
Ceard border.
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and provide outside consultancies. Most faculty opt for the stability of the exclusive
dedication option. The EPAGRI in SC and EMBRAPA in PJ, in contrast, are solely
research agencies and not schools. In SC, ACARESC built its reputation on a
commitment to excellence in research, earning growers' respect and support. In PJ,
despite the initial disconnect between the needs of fruit growers and CPATSA's original
mandate, CPATSA nevertheless had the core capabilities in terms of researchers and
physical infrastructure for fruit research. It was because of these core capabilities that
VALEXPORT eventually lobbied for greater fruit research by CPATSA by changing its
director.
Another possible explanation is that the two large firms in RN had no interest in
the widespread dissemination of production practices that could facilitate the entrance of
other melon growers into the market. This was unlike the situation of the pioneering
firms in SC, who needed production by other growers to make the apple industry a viable
one. And in PJ, CODEVASF itself facilitated the entrance of many large firms, the
largest of which was only a fraction of the size of the largest firm in RN. At the same
time, the easy access to highly subsidized credit enabled the two pioneering firms in RN
to bring melon experts from around Brazil and from abroad to work directly in their
farms.
In addition, growers in RN never organized into an effective and representative
association as did growers in the other cases. Even in PJ, where VALEXPORT has
become increasingly less representative of the sector as new pack houses and growers
enter the market, it nevertheless was representative for at least a decade, during which
period it attained improved infrastructure, marketing, and research efforts that contributed
to the development of the mango and (to a less extent) grape sectors.
In RN, the pioneering firms formed a growers association, PROFRUTAS, in 1990
as they sought to break into the US market and had to form an association as required by
the USDA, parallel to the same process facing mango growers in PJ. Although
collaborating on a common problem often builds the basis for further collaboration
(Barzelay 1991), PROFRUTAS did not subsequently develop other activities as did
ABPM in SC and VALEXPORT in PJ.81 Instead, PROFRUTAS never developed the
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81 See Gomes (1999) for details.
administrative personnel and structure, or the many promised efforts to improve fruit
production in the region. It remained but a weak and unreliable attempt to organize
growers, with little or no credibility among growers, buyers, and public sector officials
and agencies.
Growers are so divided in RN that, upon the creation of the federal grants
program for fruit research, FRUNORTE created another association, VALEFRUTAS, to
capture this federal funding independent of PROFRUTAS. VALEFRUTAS was
essentially FRUNORTE and fifty or so of its workers who were also producing melons
and beginning to supply them to FRUNORTE. VALEFRUTAS successfully backed
ESAM's proposal to BIOEx for funding the construction of computerized refrigerated
chambers to facilitate research on post-harvest handling and shelving of melons,
laboratory equipment, and research fellowships. Yet most of this project was based in
FRUNORTE, located in Assu, where few growers besides FRUNORTE and its workers
produce melons. In fact, once FRUNORTE closed down in 2001, melon production in
Assu fell from about 50% of state output in the early 1990s to less than 3% by the early
2000s. 82 VALEFRUTAS thus represents not only a break among growers in RN, but also
how misrepresentative associations can be.
Despite the distance between melon growers in RN and public sector research
agencies, over the years I sensed an improved view of ESAM by growers, beginning with
the return of a young and energetic professor who had left to pursue his doctorate training
at the Federal University in Lavras, one of Brazil's leading agronomy schools and
returned to ESAM determined to implement a research program on melon production (his
specialization was on post-harvesting technologies). Upon his return, this professor
became a liaison between ESAM and growers. Informally, he visits growers upon their
request and offers whatever technical advice they may need at no cost. Formally, he
collaborates with growers in submitting research proposals to the federal research grants
program and supervises field studies on experimental plots across several farms. ESAM
benefits from these experiences by having access to land, inputs, and labor to assist
82 Based on IBGE municipal-level data for Ass6 and the neighboring municipalities of Carnaubais and
Ipanguacu, which altogether made up the Assid subregion of melon production within RN. Shares based on
annual averages for 1991-1993 and 2000-2001.
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ESAM researchers in the field, while growers benefit from technical assistance
researchers provide during the course of each experiment.
Although ESAM is now more responsive to the needs of growers in terms of
research, this responsiveness seems dependent on this single individual. I am not
convinced that ESAM has changed institutionally in any fundamental way to facilitate the
interaction and collaboration between ESAM faculty and growers. As a result,
collaboration has been limited to the few projects for which growers have obtained
federal funding.
Growers' relationship with EMBRAPA Tropical Agroindustry has also improved
recently, as reflected in EMBRAPA's responsiveness to helping growers cope with a
particular infestation (amareldo) and in establishing guidelines for integrated production.
For both of these challenges, EMBRAPA held a series of seminars for growers and, for
integrated production, has also begun field experiments in several farms. What has lead
to these closer ties? At least one grower suggested this tighter relationship between
EMBRAPA Tropical Agroindustry and melon growers emerged because of the rise in
melon production in Ceara, where the state government began an aggressive program to
support fruit production beginning in the late 1990s, which, among other things, attracted
the multinational DelMonte to produce melons and pineapples.
What is it about melon production in Ceari versus that in RN that has led to this
greater responsiveness of EMBRAPA Tropical Agroindustry? In the least, melon
production in Ceari is backed by a politically effective and technically qualified State
Secretary of Irrigated Agriculture, with a concrete mandate and sense of mission rarely
found in similar state agencies in the Northeast. Just as important, the recent investments
by the Ceari State Government in promoting fruit production has meant a very concrete
agenda for this EMBRAPA center in evaluating the most promising areas for fruit
production and the most appropriate production technologies for hundreds of growers.
This delimitation of tasks and beneficiaries, tied to a timeline, has been shown to
facilitate good performance among public sector agencies (Tendler 1993).
To summarize, the public private partnerships in RN have been far from those that
emerged in SC and PJ. This weak tie has been partly the outcome of policies that shaped
a highly concentrated structure of production and promoted private over public research.
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The next chapter explains how the melon industry in RN managed to grow over the years
despite these relatively weaker collaborative institutions.
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CHAPTER 4. THE SOCIAL NATURE OF CROPS AND THEIR MARKETS83
The different arrangements growers have used to resolve collective good
problems area also a function of the characteristics of their crops, especially production
cycle (annual versus perennial) and production costs, and their markets (more or less
demanding). By their very nature, some crops and markets are more demanding than
others, affecting how growers organize and which activities they undertake collectively. 84
These market and crop characteristics help explain two patterns that emerge from my
cases: 1) why melon growers have succeeded despite collective inaction and "no state"
relative to SC and PJ, and 2) the strikingly different arrangements among mango and
grape growers in PJ despite their access to similar kinds of policy based incentives and
other public sector support.
If I explain the success of growers in SC and PJ in terms of the strengthening of
local institutions and the responsiveness of the public sector, how can I explain the
apparent success of melon growers in RN albeit the comparatively weak grower
association and the relative absence of public sector agencies? By apparent success, I am
referring to the fact that growers have expanded production over time, increased exports
to the UK (a considerably more demanding market than those of continental European
countries and the US), and are gradually adopting improved melon varieties and other
fruit crops. Moreover, the structure of production has gradually become less
concentrated, with medium growers gradually increasing their share in the market to 27%
by 199785. These medium growers have thus entered the market precisely when global
demands are expected to exclude them.86 The answer to this puzzle lay in at least three
variables which differentiate melon production in RN from the other cases: its "easier"
market at least during an earlier phase, shorter production cycle, and relatively lower per
83 1 arrived at the notion of "crops and their social character" through Tendler's (1984) work on Bolivian
cooperatives in which she analyzes the interaction of elite control and structural crop-based factors in
shaping cooperative behavior.
84 Attwood and Bavishkar (1987), Collins (1995), Perry et al (1997), and Tendler (1984) present variations
of this crop-based argument in defining the organization of growers.
85 See Gomes (1999).
86 See Farina (2002), Gibbon (2001), and Reardon et al (2002) for discussions on how current trends in
food retail are associated with higher barriers to entry for small growers. Although most of this literature
concerns small farmers, I claim this argument also holds for medium growers because of the substantial
differences between medium growers and larger growers in terms of investment capacity, access to
technology, volumes of production, postharvesting infrastructure, and marketing channels.
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hectare production costs. Differences in markets and production costs also help explain
the variations in arrangements among two perennial crops - mangos and grapes - both
produced in PJ.
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section begins by analyzing the
differences in the markets for melons compared to those of the other crops as a source of
pressures to upgrade. It argues that an easier market for melons in an earlier phase
ultimately "cursed" melon growers by not forcing them to upgrade earlier on. The
second section then analyzes how production cycle and production costs help explain the
variations in how growers respond to collective good problems, first comparing melons
(the only annual crop) versus the other, perennial crops, then comparing the case of
mangos and grapes (both perennials) in PJ.
The nature of the market: cursed by an exclusive export window
The experience of RN melon growers reflects a fallacy of the commonly held
assumption that the export market is necessarily demanding of quality products. What
the RN story reveals instead is an export market that was quite undemanding during an
earlier phase of melon exports spanning two decades (1975-mid 1990s), then increasingly
demanding during a more recent phase, beginning in the mid 1990s. This earlier phase
helps explain how growers in RN, who export the most compared to growers in the other
cases, have also been the ones who historically had the fewer investments in upgrading,
including as reflected in collective efforts via the association or with public sector
agricultural agencies, such as the federal agronomy school in Mossoro (ESAM) and the
EMBRAPA research center located in the neighboring state of Ceari.
Likewise, when I began this research, I expected to find foreign buyers
profoundly concerned about and vigilant of growers' performance because of the rising
scrutiny of retailers and consumers. What I found instead was a wide spectrum of buyers.
On one end were the large UK importers, who, according to several European importers,
are the "thermometer" for what will be happening in Rotterdam five years from now in
terms of demands for quality.87 UK buyers are committed to fully complying with
87 The UK is more demanding than the other markets because of its comparatively higher concentration of
supermarkets, along with the emergence of "category managers," importing firms who coordinate imports
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norms and standards regulating everything from fruit quality; to the establishment of cold
storage on-farm; packing facilities that comply to minimum construction standards on
materials (such as concrete floors and walls) and facilities (restroom, sorting area,
storage); use of specific varieties; auditing and monitoring procedures to assure
traceability; environmental impacts; and the welfare of farm workers.88
On the other extreme were the smaller UK buyers and those in Rotterdam in
general, who were surprisingly "flexible" in their demands. Even if concerned about
environmental and labor implications of their fruit imports, rarely do these buyers
imposed such demands on their suppliers, being more concerned instead about providing
their customers with continuous supplies of competitively priced fruits. In the end, the
extent to which buyers demanded their suppliers to comply with norms and standards
reflected the importance of these suppliers to the buyer-importer. Where growers were
the sole suppliers at any given period, buyers tended to be more lenient. Where growers
were one of many suppliers, buyers were at their most demanding.
In contrast to the other cases, melon exporters enjoyed an exclusive four-month
window to the European market for about 15 years, from when they first began exporting
in the mid 1980s until the late 1990s. The possibility of Brazilian growers to produce and
export during Northern Hemisphere winters was central in explaining how growers
managed to break into exports in the first place. Brazilian melons entered the European
market in October as the Spanish melons began phasing out and withdrew as lower-cost
and sweeter melons from Honduras and Costa Rica began entering in February. From
October to February, melons from RN were the only ones on the European table.
and distribution from multiple suppliers for specific supermarket chains. These category managers are
increasingly liable for the quality of the products they source and distribute and consequently demand that
their suppliers (growers) abide by a series of norms and standards to help ensure consistency of quality.
These demands include the establishment of cold storage on-farm; packing facilities that comply to
minimum construction standards on materials (such as concrete floors and walls) and facilities (restroom,
sorting area, storage); use of specific varieties; and auditing/monitoring procedures to assure traceability.
88 To ensure growers' compliance with their standards, UK supermarkets and their importers conduct
yearly and seasonal field visits to their suppliers. During their visits, they inspect the entire production
process, observing field practices, auditing field reports, and inspecting the cleanliness and safety of the
working environment in the packinghouse. They are concerned about workers washing their hands upon
leaving the restrooms and about the possibility of any type of foreign particle accompanying the melons.
For instance, supermarkets require that all the fluorescent lamps in the packinghouses be covered by a
mesh-type net just in case a lamp accidentally breaks and falls over the fruits.
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Although the exclusive European window enabled Brazilian growers to become
established in the market, it also reduced growers' incentives to upgrade. Growers had
no competition and, despite a single variety (Yellow melon) and one that was more bitter
than sweet, importers bought whatever melons reached their shores since the availability
of melons during the North Hemisphere winter was, at least initially, an exclusive and
exotic product, with uncommonly high margins. Even as late as 2000, melon importers
in the UK (Brazil's main melon importer) complained that growers in RN were only
slowly responding to several of their requirements, including:
e The establishment of cool chains from farm to supermarket. Although by that point
the shipping company Lauritzen had already built a storage facility in the port of
Natal (RN's main outlet for melons), many growers still failed to have on-farm pre-
cooling systems.
* Improvement of packinghouses, including concrete floors and walls, and the
availability of on-site restrooms and wash basins for workers.
* Improved varieties. RN growers opted to focus on yellow melons because of their
long shelf life. The problem is that melons present a trade-off between shelf life and
sugar content: the sweeter the melon, the shorter its shelf life.89 Importers urged
growers to do trials with medium-life varieties and cool them on-farm, yet growers
continued focusing on yellow melons, which do not require on-farm cooling, and
have longer shelf life.
This rather lax export market was very different than that facing mango and apple
growers as they first began producing and exporting. Mango growers targeted the US
market since early on and, in order to even enter the US, growers had to abide by pre-
clearance policies of the USDA. These included the production in areas certified to be
free of fruit flies and the use of thermal bath treatment targeted at eliminating fruit fly
larvae. The USDA also required that each exporting firm have a USDA inspector on-site
to verify the thermal bath procedure and to assure that growers were following the
quarantine procedures established by the USDA. Given the importance of the US market
for mango growers - exports to the US have accounted for about one quarter of all of
89 Melons are non-climataric fruit. Contrast to the banana, for example, in which, even after harvesting,
starch converts into sugars. Melons have no such sugar reserves.
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mango exports - the USDA imposed norms had a much greater impact on mango
growers in PJ than on RN melon growers.
Apple growers, in turn, began producing at a time when Brazil was among the
world's leading importers of apples.90 Growers therefore had to produce to compete on
the domestic market with imports, especially of Argentine apples, which were by then
already well established in the Brazilian market. So here was a group of growers who
from early was forced to be competitive in price and quality, not because of the export
market (as tends to be emphasized in the globalization literature), but because of demands
within the domestic market.
The unresponsiveness of melon growers had its price. Despite the advantages to
UK buyers of maintaining long-term relationships with growers, 91 importers scoped the
globe for other potential suppliers. As a result, melon growers saw their "exclusive"
four-month window reduced as growers from Costa Rica, Peru, Sudan, and South Africa
began exporting during this same period beginning in the late 1990s, and the share of
Brazilian melons in total UK melon imports gradually fell from 23% in 1993 to 13% in
1998, as shown in Figure 7. That Brazilian share of UK melon imports once again rose
after 1997 and especially after 2000 reflects increasing production from outside RN,
especially in Ceari the neighboring state which has invested heavily in irrigated "poles"
and, among others, attracted Del Monte investments in melon production. So, although
the share of Brazilian melons in total UK melon imports has once again picked up, melon
growers in RN have reduced their overall participation in these exports, as shown in
Figure 8.
Melon growers in RN are now well aware that they can only remain in the market
if they upgrade. And many growers have done just that by harvesting more mature,
sweeter melons, instead of the premature, rather bitter melons, which growers harvested
in the earlier phase. And since sweeter melons are more susceptible to fungus and
spoilage, growers have also made the necessary improvements in general handling
practices and on-farm infrastructure, including in pre-cooling systems and controlled
90 According to FAO, as cited in Kurtz (1999), Brazil was the world's fourth largest apple importer in 1975,
accounting for 6.8% of total imports
91 Egan and Mody (1992) stress the importance of mutual obligation, learning, and trust that favor longer-
term buyer-seller relationships.
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temperature storage. However, the failure to upgrade earlier on hurt the reputation of
melons from RN. The UK has turned to buyers in other countries and, within Brazil,
increasingly to melons from Ceari.
Figure 7. Share of Brazilian melons in UK melon imports, 1993-2002
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Figure 8. Share of RN melon exports to UK as share of total Brazilian melon exports to UK
(D
(0
100
80 -
60 -
40 -
20 -
0--L-- r j'L4 r
Source: Ministerio da Industria e Comercio via www.aliceweb.gov.br
The nature of the crop: easier crops and the organization of production
While markets are a source of incentives or disincentives for collective action
among growers, crop characteristics help explain why and how growers respond to these
incentives. This study reveals that crop cycles and production costs are especially
relevant in affecting growers' organizations.
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rip,
Annual versus perennials: Why melons are an "easier" crop
The RN story also stresses the impact of product characteristics on firm
organization - of why upgrading in certain sectors or products requires more collective
action or public sector support than in others. 92 This is even true for public good kinds of
support, such as with varietal research. In principle, growers cannot usually undertake
these investments on their own because they do not have the necessary research material
and laboratories, and because of the usually long waiting periods to obtain results. Even
when growers are capable of doing their own research, they often refrain from doing so
because of the ease with each this information is subsequently spread throughout the
cluster - this would occur as growers draw from a common labor pool, with workers
transiting from one farm to the next, and as agronomists, input suppliers, consultants, and
agricultural extension workers exchange information. In practice, however, the nature of
the crop, including its production cycle, production cost, and labor intensity, determines
the costs associated with upgrading and growers' incentives to go at alone or collectively
with each other and the state.
The production of melons in RN differs from that of mangoes, grapes, and apples
in the other cases in an important way: melons are harvested in 60 days; mangoes, grapes,
and apples in three years for the first crop. This means that within two short months,
melon growers in RN see the results of a new variety or the outcomes of modifications to
the production process, such as spacing, weeding, irrigation, fertilizer and pesticide use.
Growers of the other, perennial crops, in contrast, must wait at least three years to
observe any comparable results, making the learning process longer and more expensive
both in terms of the actual research costs as well as the opportunity cost of having to wait
years before arriving at some conclusion about improved production technologies.
Melons are also "easier" because they require considerably less capital to produce
than apples, mangoes, and grapes. As shown in Table 10, the per hectare cost of simply
establishing these crops, covering the first 3-4 years during which they do not bear fruit
(and not the cost of once they are actually producing), range from about $3,000 for
mangoes to $15,000 for grapes. The production of melons, from laying out the drip
92 For other discussions on the impacts of crop characteristics on how growers and which they activities
they undertake collectively, see Attwood and Bavishkar (1987), Perry et al (1997), and Tendler (1984).
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irrigation system to harvesting, is $4,710 per hectare. 93 This means that the risks
involved in trying something new with the production of melons is considerably lower
than that involved with experimenting with the other crops.
The lower cost of melon production is partly attributed to its lower labor-intensity
compared to the other crops, especially grapes and apples. Labor cost per hectare
accounts for 20% of the total production cost for melons, whereas it accounts for up to
26% in the case of apples, and 43% in the case of grapes. Producing grapes and apples
requires the meticulous task of thinning, the removal of flower bud clusters to promote
better quality fruits, maintain plant vigor, and eliminate over-production. Workers use
nail scissors or special thinning scissors to remove individual grape berries or reduce
apple clusters at an early stage of production.
Table 10. Estimated costs for apples, mangos, grapes, and melons (US$/ha/yr)
SC apples PJ mangos PJ grapes RN melons
Cost of implementing crop (US$/ha)a 8,700 3,050 15,330 -
Production cost (US$/ha/yr)b 4,300 3,010 9,110 4,710
Labor costc 1,118 181 3,917 942
Share of labor costd 26% 6% 43% 20%
Post-harvesting and transportation coste 2,849 7,310 14,068 4,615
a For perennial crops, this reflects the costs associated with planting and maintaining fruit trees and
vineyards during their first three to four years during which they do not bear fruit. This cost is irrelevant for
melons since they are an annual crop.
b For fruit-bearing years. From Carvalho (1996).
c Estimated by multiplying the share of labor cost obtained from data in Albuquerque (2001) by total
production cost.
d Estimated from data in Albuquerque (2001).
e Estimated by multiplying share of post-harvesting and transportation costs in total cost by total cost.
Based on data in Albuquerque (2001).
From Albuquerque (2001).
As a result of these differences, growers are more likely to act collectively and in
collaboration with the state when they produce perennial crops (such as mangoes, grapes,
and apples), whose upgrading often calls for complex and long-term R&D, too costly for
individual growers to undertake. Growers of annual, short-term crops (such as melons),
in contrast, can usually carry out much of the R&D independently or with guidance from
93 Note that irrigation is not a one-time investment cost for melon growers in RN since the drip irrigation
system is laid out each cycle, in contrast to a fixed irrigation system.
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local input suppliers, consultants, and their buyers, thus having fewer incentives to
collaborate with other growers or government agencies. An especially illustrative
example here is how melon growers have engaged repeatedly with their global buyers
and input suppliers in carrying out field trials for melon varieties (described in Chapter
5).
The disincentives for inter-firm collaboration embedded in the comparatively
"easier" production of melons thus helps explain the absence of the kinds of collaborative
institutions that have helped growers upgrade in the other cases. One could argue that the
melon industry is really the success story among my cases because growers have
managed to upgrade without the costly collective arrangements and public support
present in the other cases. The evidence, however, reveals a comparatively more
vulnerable sector. In fact, growers' failure to collaborate in RN has led to several
collective failures, including the widespread infestation with white flies beginning around
1999 which could have at least been diminished through a joint monitoring system, and
the depletion of the water table in 2001 resulting from the uncontrolled exploration by too
many growers in the Mossoro region. The once leading, pioneering firms, have all gone
out of business. And, as shown earlier in the chapter (Figure 8), growers from RN have
gradually lost much of their market share in the UK to growers from the state of Ceari.
Different arrangements across two perennial crops: Mangos and grapes
Crop characteristics also help explain the different arrangements across two
perennial crops: mangos and grapes in PJ. As the two main fresh fruits produced in PJ (in
terms of value), mangos and grapes share a common history of access to similar public
sector support. Growers first began producing mangos and grapes in the region as a
result of CODEVASF's transformation of the region's infrastructure, establishment of
irrigation projects, facilitated access to credit, and guidance and initial funding of the
sectoral association, VALEXPORT. Yet the very different production and marketing
requirements between mango and grapes generated distinct structures of production and
collective good problems.
Visiting mango and grape farms readily reveals their different production and
marketing requirements. Mango plantations are generally extensive, with countless rows
of mango trees separated by just enough room for trucks and tractors to drive by with
94
farmworkers armed with large pruning shears and agrochemical sprayers. Somewhere in
the property stands the packhouse, which for the larger grower-exporters, includes the
USDA-certified thermal bath and quarantine infrastructure in addition to sorting and
packaging systems. Vineyards, in contrast, are much smaller and structured so as to
permit farmworkers to reach each and every bunch. The trellises are just above head
height, permitting workers to painstakingly remove excess growth with manicure
scissors.94 Once grapes are harvested, growers take them to a packhouse and, within
hours, to a refrigerated warehouse.
The differences in mango and grape production are also reflected in their different
cost structures. According to the data presented in Table 10, grapes cost about three
times as much to produce per hectare than mangos. Much of this difference is explained
by the greater labor-intensity of grapes: per hectare, labor costs for grapes are more than
twenty times as much as labor costs for mangos.
These distinct crop-based demands naturally led to different structures of
production. Although precise data on the distribution of production by crop and by
grower size are not available, interviews with mango and grape researchers and
consultants in PJ are consistent with Alves da Silva's (1996) earlier estimates that large
grower-exporters produce about 60% of the mangos in PJ, while medium growers
produce about 60% of grapes.
This size distribution has direct influence on the kinds of problems growers have
to resolve collectively and how they go about in doing it. In the case of mangos, large
growers first organized when faced with the prospective of exporting to the US and its
strict import regulations. Large mango growers, with initial financial and managerial
support of CODEVASF, formed VALEXPORT in 1988 (Damiani 1999). Among other
objectives, growers designed VALEXPORT to represent them and grape growers before
federal agencies, carry out market studies, and organize and manage the USDA-required
fruit fly monitoring program. VALEXPORT has 55 members (including two
cooperatives), accounting for 70% of all the fresh fruit production in the San Francisco
River Valley and 80% of its mango and grape exports (VALEXPORT 2002).
94 Collins (1995) provides an excellent description of grape production and postharvesting practices in PJ.
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As discussed in Chapter 3, VALEXPORT has been the most powerful grower
association in PJ, responsible for coordinating research and marketing programs along
with federal and state government agencies. At the same time, all but the largest mango
growers resent VALEXPORT's lack of transparency and participation, where the same
co-directors have essentially governed VALEXPORT since its creation. Medium mango
growers complain about VALEXPORT's bias towards "big firm interests" and at least
one medium grower association has begun to collaborate directly with CPATSA in
research projects independently of VALEXPORT. Grape growers are also discontent
with VALEXPORT because of its bias towards mango production despite their ongoing
financial contributions to VALEXPORT.
Having the additional challenge of pooling production, grape growers are mostly
organized around the Brazilian Grape Marketing Board (BGMB). Grape growers within
VALEXPORT created the BGMB in 1992 as a division of VALEXPORT to "overcome
the high cost of shipping individually by bulking produce, and to avoid competition
among producers" (Collins 1995:1109). To this end, members collectively purchase
inputs, enforce quality standards, coordinate timing of harvests, contract shipping, and
sell under one brand-name. The BGMB has 22 members, including one cooperative (that
of the Japanese-Brazilian growers, CAJ), and is responsible for about 80% of the grapes
produced in PJ.
This chapter shows how specific characteristics of crops and their markets
influence whether and how growers organize to resolve collective good problems. The
mango-grape comparison in PJ reflects that crop characteristics first and foremost affect
the structure of production of each crop: the substantial labor-intensity of grapes makes it
a more suitable crop for medium and not large-scale production. The next chapter
focuses precisely on how medium growers in PJ and the other cases have overcome
collective good problems.
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CHAPTER 5. RESILIENT MEDIUM GROWERS
The literature tends to emphasize the many reasons why all but the largest
growers should remain in the market, including access to resources, production and
marketing knowledge, postharvest transport and marketing services, and expertise in the
use of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals which are of rising concern for buyers.
These medium growers, moreover, necessarily need to pool their production to meet the
economies of scale involved with post-harvesting and marketing, as well as to meet
buyers' demands for continuous and reliable supplies. 95 In light of this exclusive
tendency and associated concentration of production, I was struck by how production by
commercial medium growers, in particular, has remained substantial even in recent years,
accounting for 30% to 60% of the fruits produced in each cluster (Table 11). Given that
medium growers channel most of this production via larger growers or directly to buyers,
these data raise questions about how medium growers have been resilient and
responsiveness to the pressures for upgrading.
This chapter explains how medium growers first entered the market and how they
have managed to upgrade and transform their production and post harvesting practices
accordingly. It makes two sets of arguments. First, the nature of public sector support
which varied between the cases influenced the adoption of fruit production by medium
growers in earlier decades by shaping a) the structure of production in each case,
influencing the possibilities for medium growers to adopt fruit crops, and b) the kinds of
public sector support available for medium growers, especially access to credit, and
agricultural research and extension. And second, medium growers have more recently
managed to remain in these high-value markets through a) increased (but limited)
interaction with local input suppliers and consultants that have served as sources of
technical assistance and innovation; b) subcontracting relations with large grower-
exporters; and c) ethnic-based cooperatives.
Before proceeding, it is important to clearly define who are these medium
growers - what differentiates them as a group and across the cases - and to provide
evidence of their participation in producing these crops. The medium growers in this
95 See Farina (2002), Gibbon (2001), Reardon et al (2002), and Thrupp (1994).
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study are so defined relative to the range in farm size in each case, as reflected in
Appendix B. As such, a grower producing 50 hectares may be considered large in the
case of grapes, but small in the cases of melons, since the financial, management,
production, and post-harvesting requirements per hectare are much greater for grapes
than for melons. For SC and PJ, I use the cut-offs between grower sizes and data on firm
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structure from available studies. Data for RN are from my own field research.97
Table 11. Participation of medium growers across the cases
Case - crop Criteriaa 1985 1988/1991 1996/1997 2002
Santa Catarina - applesb < 60 ha 48% 35% 30% n.a.
Petrolina-Juazeiro - all cropsc < 200 ha 81% 66% 61% 56%
mangos < 50 ha n.a. n.a. 30% 40%d
grapes < 20 ha n.a. n.a. 59% 60%e
Rio Grande do Norte - melonsf < 300 ha 0 9% 27% n.a.
Note: These data reflect the percentage of production of each crop that is produced by medium (and some
small) growers. For example, by the late 1990s, medium growers were producing roughly 30% of all the
apples produced in Santa Catarina.
a The cut-offs for grower size are based on Boeing (1998) for SC, Alves da Silva (1996) and own estimates
for PJ, and Gomes (1999) for RN.
b Data for 1985 and 1996 from Santa Catarina State Census, as cited in Boeing (1998); data for 1991 from
Hentske (1994).
c The first row is the share of small and medium growers in the total irrigated area in PJ, not just for
mangos and grapes. These data are included since no time series are available that pertain specifically to
mangos and grapes. Data are for Senador Nilo Coelho Irrigation Project, the largest among CODEVASF's
six projects in PJ. Unless otherwise noted, data for 1985 and 1988 from Miranda (1989), 1996 from Alves
da Silva (1996), and 2002 from www.codevasf.gov.br/produtos/prosenadorniocoelho.htm.
d Data from interview with Director of EMBRAPA Semi-Arido.
e Data from interview with grape consultant in Petrolina.
SMEs refer to growers with less than 300 planted hectares. Data from own fieldwork, as presented in
Gomes (1999).
Generally speaking, medium growers differ from larger growers not only in terms
of area planted or produced, but also in terms of the levels and kinds of fixed capital
equipment (such as storage and processing plants), administrative strategy (self-managed
versus professionally-managed), and the use of labor (self-supervised versus
hierarchically-supervised). Large growers, in turn, undertake agricultural production as a
96 See Hentske (1994) and Boeing (1998) for grower size and distribution in SC, and Miranda (1989) and
CODEVASF (2003) for PJ.
97 See Gomes (1999).
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secondary activity to construction, transportation, or banking and many are from
traditionally wealthy and politically connected families. Medium growers, in contrast,
are usually agronomists or agricultural technicians, fully dedicated to their farms, which
tend to focus almost exclusively on fruit crops. Small growers range from well-qualified
growers with the means to eventually expand into medium growers, to others who remain
focused on lower-value crops, with only minimal investments in fruits.
As for the participation of medium growers across the cases, the available data
may seem contradictory to my claim about medium grower resiliency since the share of
medium growers has actually fallen since the 1980s in both SC and PJ, as shown in Table
11. These data deceive, however, since they do not capture the transformation of most
medium growers across these cases. Generally speaking, medium growers originally
produced fresh fruit with minimal technology and rudimentary post-harvesting
infrastructure, resulting in low quality fruits until the early 1990s. Medium growers
producing by the mid 1990s, in contrast, were producing crops of comparable quality to
that of larger growers, often adopting the same production and post-harvesting
technologies. Even when medium growers have not had modern pack houses, cool
storages, and processing equipment (in the case of thermal bath for mangos), they have
had enough infrastructure and know-how to deliver quality fruits to larger growers, good
enough for larger growers to then turn around and sell these fruits under their own brand
names.
I present my arguments in light of work that analyzes the social and economic
impacts of non-traditional agricultural exports (NTAEs) on farmers. NTAEs are crops
that were not traditionally produced in a particular country or region, or was traditionally
produced for domestic consumption but now is exported (Thrupp 1995). Drawing mostly
from the Central American experience, this literature argues that the introduction of
NTAE often excludes smaller growers because of their limited resources, limited
production and marketing knowledge, insecure access to postharvest transport and
marketing services, and lack of expertise in the use of pesticides and other agricultural
chemicals which are of rising concern for buyers.98 These are among the "size biases"
which favor larger scale production of NTAE, including fresh fruit, and which ultimately
98 See Carter et al (1996), Collins (1995), Murray (1994), and Thrupp (1994).
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override the advantage smaller growers may have because of certain diseconomies of
scales in production. 99
In addition to the above mentioned constraints, more recent work on the
restructuring of food retail argues that medium growers are also at a disadvantage under
the new market conditions because they are less likely than larger growers to make the
needed technological and organizational improvements to ensure quality, consistency,
and timing as defined by their buyers.' 00 This means that, if medium growers are to
produce fruits with comparable quality to those produced by larger growers, investments
in technology and management must ensure traceability and the reduction of transaction
costs associated with monitoring of a many smaller sized growers.
Emerging studies reveal several ways through which small and medium growers
have managed to remain in the market, but none of these explanations hold for Brazilian
growers. In some cases, growers remain in the market through sourcing arrangements
with smaller supermarkets (Faiguenbaum, Berdegud, and Reardon 2002) or with
dedicated wholesalers who contract out for supermarkets (Alvaro and Charmel 2002). In
other cases, medium growers benefit from regulatory supports that ultimately protect
them, such as the French government's support of the French wholesale markets (Gibbon
2003), or the EU's Banana Regime that protects suppliers from African, Pacific, and the
Caribbean. And still others benefit from fair trade arrangements (Page and Slater 2003).
In Brazil, larger supermarket chains already account for about 50% of fresh fruit and
vegetable retail, compared to 9% in Chile and 30% in Argentina and Mexico. In
addition, growers have not benefited from protected markets or privileged trade status,
and have had limited participation in fair trade arrangements.
Evidence from my cases suggest that whether or not medium growers are
excluded from the market depends not only on the nature of actors along a particular
supply chain (including importers, buyers, and supermarkets), but also on the scale and
scope of public sector support that facilitated medium growers' participation in these
chains in an earlier phase. More recently, as federal and state government support for
99 Diseconomies of scale associated with fruit production arises from 1) smaller growers having cheaper
labor, and 2) particularly for management-intensive crops, like grapes (Barry and Cline 1979, Binswanger
and Elgin 1990, Collins 1995).
1m See Dolan and Humphrey (2004), Faiguenbaum, Berdegu6, and Reardon (2002), Farina (2002), Gibbon
(2003), and Reardon and Berdegud (2002).
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agriculture declined, medium growers have benefited from a rise in private provision of
agricultural extension and, especially, from technological diffusion through
subcontractual ties with grower-exporters and through the continued engagement with
ethnic-based production and marketing networks.
To be fair, much of the work noting how high-value crops marginalize medium
growers focus on very smallholders alone - those with at most 1-2 hectares. The growers
that are squeezed out of the market then are many times smaller than those included in
my category of medium growers. Likewise, some of these studies draw upon cases of
fresh vegetables, which have more complex processing and logistics problems that those
of fresh fruit.10 That being said, I hold to my claim of small and medium grower
resiliency because these growers are indeed many times smaller than the larger growers
in each case, as described above.
A caveat before proceeding: Brazil's large domestic market may seem enough to
explain why smaller growers have managed to participate in the market, assuming as we
often do that domestic markets are less demanding than export markets, thus providing
medium growers with a niche for lower-quality fruits. Although Brazilian growers may
not be under as much pressure for quality standards as growers in other almost
exclusively export-dependent countries in which fresh fruits have been analyzed
(including Chile, Peru, Guatemala, Zimbabwe, and Kenya), they are nevertheless under
pressure to upgrade because: 1) even if exports are only a small share of production
(apple growers in SC export only 7% of their production), exports are important
complements to the domestic market; 2) growers faced increased competition in the
domestic market from imports especially in the mid 1990s, a factor less significant in
small countries with small domestic markets; and 3) large domestic food retailers in
Brazil are becoming as demanding as global buyers.' The large-domestic-market-low-
quality argument, therefore, is insufficient to fully explain the participation of small and
medium growers in the Brazilian fresh fruit industry.
This chapter is organized as follows. The fist section begins by describing how
early public sector policies supported small scale production of fruit crops. Given the fall
101 Such as Dolan and Humphrey's account of the Kenyan vegetable exporters to the UK.
102 See Farina (2002), Reardon and Berdegud (2002).
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in public sector support over the years and the rising pressures for upgrading, the second
section then argues that, although the increase in private sources of agricultural extension
accessible to medium growers has been important, it has been insufficient to "fill the
gap" left by the fall in public extension. At the same time, medium growers have more
recently benefited from the rising tendency of larger firms to subcontract production as a
cost-reducing strategy, and from the endurance of an ethnic based network of medium
growers.
Medium growers and the state
Government policies were central in enabling or facilitating the participation of
small and medium growers across the cases in an earlier period. Much of this support
was paternalistic and unsustainable, including the high per grower investment in SC's
agricultural extension and training programs, and the debatable selection of program
beneficiaries in PJ that eventually resulted in high turnover rates. But to simply dismiss
these earlier policies altogether would be to miss out on aspects of this support that, in
addition to stimulating agricultural development, also enabled medium growers to enter
the market, modernize, improve their livelihoods, and contribute to the generation of
local employment and income.
In what follows, I illustrate how public sector support influenced the adoption of
fruit crops by small and medium growers in the early years of each cluster, especially
through its impact on the structure of production and the relationship the state established
between medium growers and public sector agricultural research and extension agencies.
Among the differences that emerge between the cases, the mission and structure of the
coordinating agency is especially strong in explaining the degree to which the public
sector intervened in favor of medium growers and the varying levels of state-grower
relations.
Instituting a small firm bias: The small-firm tradition in SC
Over 600 medium growers in SJ produce about 30% of the state's apples,
supplying to large firms in Fraiburgo and in Vacaria (in the neighboring state of Rio
Grande do Sul), or marketing directly through cooperatives. That medium growers in SC
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have managed to participate in the apple market is explained by the pioneering efforst of
members of the agricultural cooperative COTIA and, especially, by state government
policies that supported small-scale production alongside larger growers from early on in
the formation of the sector.
As the Frey brothers pioneered apple production in Fraiburgo, COTIA growers
led the way for small-scale production in Sao Joaquim. COTIA growers initially had very
limited knowledge about apple production technology and lived through years of trial and
error, even with guidance from ACARESC and the Japanese International Development
Agency (JICA) researchers.' By the early 1990s, these same medium growers were
producing high quality apples and investing in modern pack houses and storage facilities.
The transformation of the COTIA group of growers, although unmatched by any other
group in the cluster, reflects the general trend of improved production by medium
growers in Sao Joaquim.
At the same time, medium growers benefited from SC state government's long-
standing commitment to small scale enterprises. Inspired by the successful apple
production by the lead firm in Fraiburgo, in 1968 the SC state government established an
uncommonly well-structured program targeted at promoting the production of apples and
other temperate fruits. The Programa de Fruticultura de Clima Temperado (PROFIT),
administered through the state's Association of Credit and Rural Assistance
(ACARESC), first mapped out regions within the state apt for fruit production and
established several regional technical extension offices. Through its support, PROFIT
enabled small growers to adopt apple production through a combination of support
policies for credit, marketing, research, training, and extension, as described in Chapter 1.
In addition to helping growers adopt apple production, early state support also
established a link between growers and the state agricultural research agency that
persisted well into the 1990s. This lasting impact was the result of the structure of the SC
state's agricultural research system which benefited medium growers in two particular
ways.
103 Their initial choice of varieties, for example, was heavily based on the experience of other countries. As
a result, growers toiled with several varieties which ultimately turned out to suffer from pollinization
problems, low productivity, and low quality.
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First, the structure of the state's agricultural research system facilitated access of
small growers to public sector research. The state did this by distributing the
responsibility and resources for apple research across two state research experimental
stations, one near Fraiburgo (in Cagador), and the other in Sio Joaquim. 0 4 The state
spread apple research across two of its experimental stations to enable state researchers to
focus on the particular characteristics of each region which differ in terms of climate,
terrain, and soils, and to the different varieties, with emphasis on Gala in Fraiburgo and
Fuji in Sio Joaquim. As an unintended consequence, this structure avoided the
appropriation of research by the larger, more powerful growers in Fraiburgo, since larger
growers are located in Fraiburgo and medium growers mostly in Sio Joaquim. This set
up avoided the kind of "fatal attraction" Tendler (2001e) notes can occur as a result of
proximity between large firms and nearby public institutions that result in limiting
spillovers to other potential beneficiaries. Instead, the smaller growers in Sio Joaquim
had direct and easy access to their own station, located within walking distance of
downtown Sio Joaquim.
Second, the state's long-standing research consortium with the Japanese
International Cooperation Agency, JICA, was also crucial to consolidating the lasting
relation between state researchers and medium growers, particularly those associated
with COTIA. This consortium dates back to the early 1970s when, as part of PROFIT,
the SC state saught technical assistance from apple experts from countries with tradition
in apple production, including Japan. The EPAGRI/JICA consortium provided generous
funding for the acquisition of laboratory equipment and training to Brazilian agronomists
in Japan, while also supporting a residency program where Japanese researchers spent
from one to five years stationed at the Experimental Station in Sio Joaquim. Among the
contributions of JICA researchers to growers in Sio Joaquim was the introduction of the
Fuji variety, brought to Sao Joaquim from Japan by JICA researcher, Dr. Ushirozawa,
who subsequently remained in Sio Joaquim. JICA researchers became an integral part of
104 Prior to apple research , the Experimental Center in Cagador focused mostly on corn, beans, and cereals.
It was only in 1983 that the SC state government transferred apple research to Cagador from its center in
Videira, which had done apple research since the 1940s (Santos 1994). As for the Experimental Station in
Sao Joaquim, ACARESC established it as part of its PROFIT program.
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the COTIA community in Sdo Joaquim, forming long-lasting professional and personal
ties with growers, and providing them a privileged liaison to state research.
Although this privileged relationship to JICA researchers was limited to COTIA
growers, who traditionally exclude non-Japanese from their communities, other small
growers in the state benefited indirectly from the technology transfer via JICA and from
the state's impressive agricultural extension service. As described in Chapter 1, the SC
state government's agricultural agency, ACARESC, had a well-trained and well-
equipped cadre of extension workers dedicated to helping growers learn how to produce
apples and other temperate fruits. ACARESC's extension workers visited growers
weekly, "almost too much," according to some growers, reflecting a strong sense of
mission. ACARESC also sponsored field days in demonstration units, andoffered
courses in their training centers, providing transportation to and from the centers, and
lodging and meals for the duration of each session.
ACARESC helped growers beyond the production phase by helping them
organize into marketing cooperatives. In the 1970s, ACARESC assisted medium
growers in forming about seven cooperatives dedicated to temperate fruit production by
providing growers with technical assistance and access to storage chambers. ACARESC
also administered the Fund for Cooperatives, a state fund that allowed these newly
created cooperatives to obtain investment capital at favorable rates and conditions
(Olinguer 1996). Despite ACARESC's success in other efforts, all but one cooperative
closed down because of administrative failures and technical problems, including the
choice of locations with inappropriate agroclimatic conditions for apple production.
Only one of these, COOPERSERRA, remains active, uniting 90 medium growers,
each producing between 3-5 hectares, or together about 3% of the state's production.106
The cooperative has its own pack house with storage, selection, classification, and
packaging infrastructure, and provides technical assistance to its members, who often
attribute their successful production to this very assistance., The survival of
COOPERSERRA can be attributed at least in part to its location - SJ turned out to be
among the best apple producing areas in the state. Members of COOPERSERRA thus
105 See Tendler (1997).
106 Based on cooperative data from Dotti (1999) and state production from IBGE.
107 Globo Rural (1999) June 26-30.
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not only benefited from the very favorable agroclimatic conditions, but also from the
dense network of growers, ACARESC extension workers and state researchers that
congregated in SJ.
These early efforts by the state government agency established a lasting network
between growers and state researchers and extension workers, which outlasted the demise
of ACARESC (more details later in the chapter). By the late 1980s, the state reduced its
budget for agricultural research and extension and, in a move consistent with that
observed throughout Brazil, in 1990 merged its research (EMPASC) and extension
(ACARESC) agencies into one, the Empresa de Pesquisa Agropecudria do Estado de
Santa Catarina (EPAGRI). At the same time, the 1988 Constitution decentralized
several responsibilities from the federal government to state governments, including the
administration of myriad rural and agricultural programs, such as those dealing with the
land bank and reforestation. Extension workers, now fewer in number, had to substitute
their time in the field with time in the office administering these projects. As one
extension worker put it, "EPAGRI gradually lost its identity with fruit production. What
remains is a 'shadow' of those of us who had 'lived' fruit production." In another
account, a former director of ACARESC blames the merger for the "loss of identity" for
both EMPASC researchers and ACARESC extension workers.
Apple growers no longer count on the resources, political commitment, and esprit
d'corps which defined ACARESC and gave it the impetus to implement PROFIT as
successfully as it did. Even so, the ties the SC state generated with medium growers
early on taught growers to seek the state and promoted a mutual familiarity between
growers and state workers that continues to benefit growers as they seek the state for
support in improving their crops and production practices. In particular, the state's initial
strategy has endured in its outreach to medium growers through medium growers'
continued interaction with researchers at the Experimental Station in Sao Joaquim and
with former ACARESC extension workers now based in municipal-level offices. This
kind of lasting government commitment to medium growers was not found in the other
cases.
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Redistribution and diversification: The changing nature of medium growers in PJ
While medium growers in SC benefitted from a state government historically
committed to supporting smallholder production, medium growers in PJ benefited from
CODEVASF's explicit policies favoring their incorporation in the irrigation projects
along the San Fransisco River Valley. Through its development strategy, CODEVASF
directly shaped the structure of production in PJ to include smallholders, redistributing
exppropriated land, of which it originally designated 60% to smallholders, mostly in 6
hectare lots. That CODEVASF managed to expropriate so much land in the PJ area is
partly explained by the backing of the politically influential Coelho family, who
supported the construction and expansion of the projects in PJ because of its potential to
develop the region, not only through irrigation itself, but also through the related
provision of roads, electrification, and construction of schools and housing for project
beneficiaries (Damiani 1999:61). CODEVASF's emphasis on smallgrowers also reflects
the current of the time in promoting irrigation in the Northeast as a means of
transforming the livelihoods of the population of the semi-arid. The idea was to settle
families in these projects and provide them with whatever was necessary for them to
produce irrigated crops, including subsidized inputs and credit, access to irrigation,
electricity, road infrastructure, and agricultural research and extension.
The state-small grower relationship in PJ differed from that in SC in at least three
inter-related aspects that influenced the long-term viability of smallholder production.
Whereas in SC, medium growers have continuously produced throughout the years,
medium growers in PJ have exited and entered, with high turn-over rates among original
settlers and a high influx of new, medium sized growers from other states. This
substitution of small growers by medium growers has accompanied the expansion of
perennial crops observed in the projects since the mid 1990s.
First, the distinct nature of the involved agency in each case led to tighter
relations between growers and state agencies in SC and weaker ones in PJ. CODEVASF
was an engineering-based agency, focused on constructing massive irrigation and
productive infrastructure along the entire San Fransisco River Valley, including the
establishment of public irrigation projects. ACARESC, in turn, was a rural development
agency, focused on agricultural extension, training, and credit and which, at the particular
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moment in time, promoted the production of temperate fruits, and especially of apples,
among the state's smallholders.
CODEVASF also instituted a link between public sector agricultural research and
extension and growers. This link was far from the tight focused and lasting relationship
of ACARESC and growers in SC, but also served to provide growers a source of know-
how and skills. CODEVASF from early on coordinated research among federal and state
agencies, namely CPATSA and IPA, tailored to the needs of growers in the irrigation
projects. Most of this research focused on identifying the optimal water schedules and
other production technologies for those crops CODEVASF had identified as priority for
the region: mostly a combination of annual crops, led by tomatoes, onions, and peppers.
IPA played an especially important role in the tomato industry, identifying a variety
particularly suitable for local production and supplying growers with a planting manual.
CPATSA meanwhile focused on smallholder crops, including several rainfed crops,
which were expected to complement growers' irrigated production.
CODEVASF also provided agricultural extension to growers throughout the
1970s and 1980s. Although there were extension workers in offices throughout each
irrigation projects, this extension turned out to be problematic because it was highly
focused on infrastructure and maintenance, being less qualified for technical support with
irrigated crops. In fact, in a survey of tomato growers as late as 1995, many growers
mistrusted these extension workers on technical grounds (Gomes 1996). Extension
workers were also often at odds with growers because extension workers were also the
collectors of user fees among growers. According to a director of the Senador Nilo
Coelho Irrigation District, "CODEVASF only really offered technical assistance
beginning in 1992; until then we were collectors (cobradores)."
Second, CODEVASF's selection criteria for smallholders to settle in the irrigation
projects had serious consequences and remains debatable.'08 As a general rule, maximum
priority was given to farmers who had been displaced through CODEVASF's land
expropriations for irrigation projects and works. Second in line were the small growers
residing locally, then in the local region, and so forth. Other factors accounted for were
the candidates' experience with agricultural activities, the household labor force, and an
108 See Alves da Silva et al (1996) and Gomes (1996).
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interest in irrigated agriculture.' 09 Though the latter criteria are more critical for success
in irrigated agriculture (experience, technical aptitude), the former criteria were dominant
in the selection process (loss of land from CODEVASF appropriation). Consequently,
many of the growers initially settled in the projects tried producing tomatoes and other
annual crops as guided by CODEVASF, but ultimately were unable to pay their water
fees or diversify when the market called for it because were completely unprepared to
work with irrigated agriculture.
What further exacerbated the situation for many of these growers was
CODEVASF's decision to begin enforcing water fees in the early 1990s - until then,
most growers had never paid for their water use.' 10 More importantly, CODEVASF
began requiring growers to purchase their lots beginning in 1995. Although growers had
been aware of this provision since their initial occupation, most were unable to pay up
and, already in a dire situation, "sold" their farms. (Growers settled in the projects are
not landowners, but rather legal occupants of their farms, yet they can sell their land
entitlements in the market).'
And third, while early on medium growers in both cases benefited from abundant
support with credit, training, research, extension, and marketing (cooperatives in SC, link
to agroindustries in PJ), in SC, medium growers produced the same crops as the larger
growers, while in PJ, medium growers focused initially on different crops and only
switched to fruits in the 1990s. As a result, medium growers in SC benefited from the
learning process of large firms along the way, while those in PJ did not. CODEVASF's
choice of crops for medium growers also had its mixed results. While many medium
growers successfully adopted tomatoes then subsequently diversified into other crops,
including perennial fruits, many medium growers learned to produce tomatos, but failed
to diversify when the tomato pulp processing industry closed down in the late 1980s.
Tomato production was initially a safe activity for growers: they received technical
assistance, advanced inputs, and a minimum price through contracts with the processing
firms, which were mediated by CODEVASF's Office of Technical Assistence (ATER).
im See CODEVASF (1987).
110 According to Cavalcanti (1999), when CODEVASF began enforcing water tariffs, 72% of growers in
the projects were late in making their payments, including some growers who were late as many as 20
payments, totaling over R$ 15,000.
"11 See Gomes (1996).
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The dependence on the processing firms as buyers was complete however. Without the
local buyers, growers could not transport (highly perishable) tomatoes to the large
consumer centers in Sao Paulo and other Southeastern and Southern states.
These early efforts had mixed results for medium growers. On the one hand,
many medium growers successfully adopted irrigated crops over a ten year period,
transitioning from annuals to perennials, and have as a result improved their livlihoods,
and generated employment and income. The diversification from annuals to perennials
can be illustrated by examining data for the largest irrigation project in PJ, the Senador
Nilo Coelho Irrigation Perimeter (DISNC 1999, 2001). This data reflect three notable
trends:
e First, growers began substituting annual crops with perennials in the early
1990s and by the late 1990s, perennial crops occupied over 70% of the
land in the project, tending towards 100% in 2001, as shown in Figure 9.
* Second, by the late 1990s, most medium growers (54%) had adopted the
production of a perennial crop, especially bananas, mangoes, coconut,
guava, and grapes.
* And third, by 1998, at which point perennials already covered nearly 80%
of the land in the project, 44% of growers had occupied their lots for at
least 11 years, and most of these had been original occupants.
Damiani (1999) describes this process and argues that growers' successful
transition towards perenial fruit crops derived from CODEVASF's development strategy.
According to Damiani, CODEVASF fostered a sequence in learning from annuals to
perennials, allowing growers to gradually learn about irrigation technology and
marketing, while gradually investing in perennials while living off the continuous income
from annuals. CODEVASF also faciliated this transition by facilitating access to credit
through World Bank funded Programa de Fruticultura (1989), administered by the Bank
of the Northeast, which unintentionally faciliated the transfer of technology among
growers.
112 The Senador Nilo Coelho projects accounts for about half of the total area in CODEVASF's six public
irrigation projects in PJ (22,061 of 46,729 ha, or 47%) and about half of the total government expenditures
by CODEVASF on common irrigation infrastructure and "benfeitorias" in lots (US$341 million of US$674
million, or 51%) (small growers 1999).
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Figure 9. Share of annual and perennial crops produced in Senador Nilo Coelho Project
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Source: DISNC 2002.
On the other hand, this diversification among medium growers has been
accompanied by the substitution of the original smallholders by medium growers, many
of them from Sao Paulo and of Japanese and Italian descent." 3 According to available
data, between 40%-70% of the original settlers in some of CODEVASF's projects
abandoned their lots because they were unable to succeed in irrigated agriculture or
diversify into perennials."4 The abandonment by the original settlers opened the way
for occupation by the newer, medium sized growers, whose entry into production was
facilitated by the availability of credit and the expansion of processing capacity among
larger firms. medium growers in PJ, as elsewhere, had always faced the problem of
difficult access to investment capital. This was especially constraining in the case of fruit
production which generally take several years to become commercially profitable
because of the first years in which these plants do not produce fruits. To circumvent this
problem, CODEVASF and the Bank of the Northeast reached an accord in 1994 that
m As described by Cavalcanti (1999).
"4 small growers (1999) estimates turn-over rates of about 50% for the Bebedouro and Mandacaru Projects
and of 43% for Curaga, and Alves da Silva et al (1996) and Rocha (1996) estimate turn-over rates of 70%
and 60%, respectively, for the Senador Nilo Coelho Project. The estimates for the Senador Nilo Coelho
Project were confirmed through a personal interview with the current director of the Senador Nilo Coelho
Irrigation District.
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enabled growers to use their lots as collateral for investment capital. The newer growers
also benefited from the rising tendency of larger firms to subcontract production and
from the recent increase in the number of large processing firms.
These newer growers are generally agricultural technicians or agronomists, many
from the South and Southeast regions, others former employees of the larger firms or
EMBRAPA. This substitution can be explained by factors that affected the performance
of the original settlers, along with policies and changing market conditions that facilitated
the entrance of the better-qualified medium growers.
As in SC, medium growers in PJ no longer count on the abundant public sector
support of earlier decades. Whereas in SC medium growers continue to benefit from a
lasting relationship with EPAGRI, medium growers in PJ instead benefit from newer
mechanisms used by EMBRAPA that ensure small growers access to agricultural
research. One example is EMBRAPA's research of seedless grapes which is being done
in collaboration with Brazilian Service for Micro and Small Enterprises (SEBRAE) to
ensure that research findings reach smaller grape growers. EMBRAPA's work with
seedless grapes began in 1995 with experimental installation of 20 varieties, of which one
has been especially successful (Festival). As part of this effort, EMBRAPA developed a
collaborative effort with SEBRAE to disseminate seedless grape technology to medium
growers. This dissemination is critical for the adoption of seedless varieties since they
demand more careful management of grafts in order to avoid maturation during rainy
season, to which seedless varieties are especially susceptible. 15
Another example is EMBRAPA's recent collaboration directly with medium
growers bypassing the previously used intermediation by the sectoral association,
VALEXPORT. It used to be that EMBRAPA only worked with VALEXPORT, who
then turned around and charged growers for provision of public services. In the case of
integrated production, for example, VALEXPORT had proposed to EMBRAPA that it be
the sole administrator in PJ. Concerned that this intermediation by VALEXPORT would
only raise costs for adherence to the program, groups of medium growers, namely
APROVALE (a mango cooperative), CAJ, and the Irrigation District, successfully
requested that EMBRAPA work directly with them independently of VALEXPORT.
112
115 See EMBRAPA Semi-Arido (2002).
In hindsight, CODEVASF committed several of the mistakes pervasive in public
irrigation projects in Brazil and elsewhere, including in its initial selection of
beneficiaries, provision of technical assistance, and initial choice of crop (the emphasis
on tomatoes). At the same time, CODEVASF established a structure of production
inclusive of medium growers and enabled many of them to subsequently adopt perennial
fruit crops and participate in the increasingly demanding fresh fruit market.
Halfway there: the piecemeal approach to medium growers in RN
In contrast to the other cases, medium growers did not participate in the early
phase of the melon industry in RN, but rather entered the market a decade later, in the
early 1990s, and rapidly increased their participation, reaching 27% of area planted by
1997 (Table 10).116 The changing composition of growers was not the result of planned
policy as that promoted by the state government of SC commited to small grower
development or the politically-backed CODEVASF approach to incorporating medium
growers. Despite the absence of a coordinating agency, medium growers nevertheless
benefited from several public sector initiatives in RN, including 1) a public irrigation
project in Assu, 2) federal agrarian reform settlements of the National Institute for
Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) throughout the state, and 3) a Bank of the
Northeast (BN)-sponsored program that subsidized land for new agronomists.
These early steps enabled many medium growers in RN to take advantage of the
expanding market that resulted from the liberalization and stabilization policies of the
mid 1990s - precisely when the pioneering firms began subcontracting, and of the
discovery of new and more accessable sources of water. 117 Although each of these
initiatives ultimately helped medium growers adopt melon production, I argue their
116 Although more recent data on medium grower participation in RN is unavailable, I suspect it has
increased as the pioneering firms went bankrupt between 2000-2002, the largest firm now (an "offspring"
of the pioneering firm) subcontracts about half of its production, and former agronomists from these
bankrupt firms have established their own farms and marketing groups, thus raising the total number of
medium growers and their participation in total production.
m Up until the mid 1990s, most of the irrigation in Mossoro was based on water drawn from deep water
wells (700-1000m), which cost up to US$ 500,000 to build. In the mid 1990s, a local geologist discovered
the possibility of shallower wells, costing as little as US$ 15,000. Even so, there were several public sector
supports that, in the least, influenced how segments of medium growers adopted irrigated production. See
Gomes (1999).
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impacts were minimized because they did not have a committed state government as in
SC or a central agency with political backing, as the Coelho Family in CODEVASF.
How a public dam went private
In contrast to the widespread benefits of the irrigation infrastructure among fruit
growers in PJ, the public dam built by the federal government in RN in 1985 benefited
mostly two very large melon growers for its first decade and a half.' 18 The National
Department of Works Against Droughts (DNOCS) originally planned the public dam in
Assd along with a public irrigation project intended for small growers, the Baixo Assd
Project. Although irrigation agencies have an advantage in implementing redistributive
programs because of their power to expropriate land for projects (Tendler 1982) and
DNOCS originally designed the dam with a redistributive component through a public
irrigation project, the redistributive effects in Assl have been minimal.' 19
Part of the problem was that DNOCS was not focused on implementing irrigation
projects per se. It build the Armando Ribeiro Dam in Assu in 1983 as part of DNOCS'
strategy of retaining and distributing water throughout the semi-arid Northeast region. It
completed the irrigation project component only a decade later, at which point may locals
who had hoped to participate in the project had already sold their lands. At the same
time, once established, growers that did settle in the project never received adequate
technical assistance and many continued producing the same combination of crops they
had done so without irrigation. Finally, large private entrepreneurs purchased the best
lands in terms of soils and location along the area of influence of the dam.
Modernizing agrarian reform settlements
Aside from the Baixo Assu Project, the federal government also facilitated
smallholder access to land, credi, and technical assistance in RN through about 20 federal
agrarian reform settlements administered by the National Institute for Colonization and
Agrarian Reform (INCRA). INCRA established these agrarian reform settlements during
the 1980s as part of its strategey to redistribute land in the region. Each settlement
consisted of a residential village with small lots destined for subsistence production by
118 The majority of melons produced in RN comes from the western municipalities of Mossoro and
Barauna, which use underground aquifers as source their source of irrigation water. The public dam in
Assil only mattered for growers in and around Assd, where no such aquifers exist.
119 This section draws mainly from the work by Aldenor Gomes da Silva (1992, 1997), of the Federal
University of Rio Grande do Norte, on how the introduction of large scale irrigation projects transformed
the economy and labor relations in the Assd Valley.
114
each family and a large lot for collective production of a commercial crop. For decades,
growers produced rainfed subsistence crops, complementing their incomes through a
combination of small animal husbandry and wage income from employment in the large
firms or in town.
These smallholders, however, were never a part of a broader strategy, such as that
in SC or in PJ. Consequently, these smallholders kept their rustic, peasant type
production of subsistence crops for deacdes, switching to irrigated melons only in the mid
1990s, favored by a confluence of factors: newly established lines of credit for
smallholders (Programa de Apoio ao Pequeio Produtor, PAPP and the Programa de
Credito Special para Reforma Agrdria, PROCERA), rising tendency of large firms to
subcontract, and the direct support of a Dutch-funded NGO (Associagdo de Assistencia a
Comunidades do Campo, AACC) that provided technical assistance to the settlements in
their transition from subsistence crops to melon production. As a result of this process,
by 1997, growers in 13 settlements were altogether producing 366 ha of melons, about
6% of total state production. More recently, the US based NGO World Vision (with
offices in Recife) invited 200 smallholders in the settlements to collectively sell directly
to the European market under World Vision's Fair Trade Program. 121
Agronomy graduates as extension workers
The third publis sector initiative in RN that stood out for faciliating small and
medium grower adoption of melons was the Bank of the Northeast's program that
subsidized land for new agronomists in turn for technical assistance to other local
growers (Programa de Apoio Crediticio a ReorientagVdo da Pequena e Media Unidade
Produtiva Rural do Semi-Arido Nordestino, PRODEASA). 2 2 Despite several problems
that led to its termination in 19xx, the PRODESA left its legacy in RN through providing
1 Based on data from INCRA/RN-Segio de Assentamentos, as cited in Andrade (1998).
121 In its first years of support (1999-2000), World Vision manged to help growers reduce their overall
export costs from 26% to 8% of the total value of sales, and obtain a 58% increase in the per unit price of
melons. See World Vision (2001).
m Through PRODESA, qualified agronomists receive bank loans for the purchase of land (up to 500 ha) in
the semi-arid region, investments, technical assistance, a vehicle, farm machinery, and other expenses
associated with starting an agricultural enterprise. The payment period for these loans allowed for a two-
year grace period and up to twelve years for repayment of investment capital. In turn, these agronomists
committed to providing technical assistance to other growers by designing agricultural projects; providing
guidance with bank procedures; providing a given number of field visits; and promoting the establishment
of other growers within the PRODESA. These growers also committed to allowing supervised internships
from agronomy students in their properties and to participating in fairs and expos (BN/IICA 1997).
115
a jumpstart to highly qualified and entrepreneurial agronomists and creating for them a
forum for interaction which has outlasted the PRODESA itself. In fact, a group of five
"Prodesianos" was among the first to successfully organize into a joint marketing group,
selling quality melons domestically and abroad. At its peak, this group produced about
180 hectares, or 3% of state's production. Just as important, the success of these
"Prodesianos" attracted other, non-Prodesiano medium growers to the sector.
In sum, the participation of medium growers across these cases in the fresh fruit
sector can be traced back to public sector policies that facilitated their access to land,
credit, and technical assistance. These policies were especially effective in SC because of
the state's long-standing commitment to the development of small and medium growers,
including by the building of agricultural extension and R&D institutions that established
ties and capabilities that outlasted the government cutbacks in the 1990s. Production by
small and medium growers in PJ is also a direct outcome of CODEVASF policies. Yet
the form in which CODEVASF provided that support led to a very different outcome:
although it enabled hundreds of medium-sized growers to adopt fruit mango and grape
production in the 1990s, at was at the economic and social costs of high turnover rates
among the original settlers. Finally, the kind of public sector support that facilitated
small and medium growers production in RN was piecemeal, neither enabling a core
group of medium growers to adopt fruit production, nor creating institutions to support
them.
Beyond the state: private extension, and subcontractual and ethnic ties
Having established how most medium growers first adopted fruit production in
each case, this section explains how they have managed to remain in the market and
upgrade in recent years despite the demise of the kinds of public sector support they
received in earlier years, especially in SC and PJ. I argue that medium growers'
capabilities to participate in the market today and upgrade are associated with
1) An increase in (but limited) private sources of agricultural extension on
which medium growers now depend.
2) A rising tendency for larger firms to subcontract production from medium
growers, and
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3) The endurance of ethnic based networks based on medium growers.
When agricultural extension goes private: input suppliers and consultants
In trying to identify sources of innovation among growers, my interviewees
repeatedly reminded me of the importance of the social milieu - how growers
continuously interact and exchange views on production technologies. 123 Growers meet
formally, including at associational meetings and those coordinated by federal or state
agencies, such as training course on fruit flies by EMBRAPA in RN or an HACCP
training by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in PJ. They also congregate at
the countless seminars and presentations given by the multinational agricultural input
suppliers and the field days sponsored by the input stores. Growers meet socially and
informally throughout town, while waiting for service in banks, shopping for agricultural
inputs, and having drinks at the bar. This section argues that medium growers have
upgraded despite falling public sector agricultural extension because of their engagement
in this broader context. Absent the evidence on the formation and impact of these ties on
local upgrading, this section presents two drivers of innovation for which there is
(limited) evidence: input suppliers and consultants.
Earlier in this chapter, I argue that the state shaped the extent to which medium
growers adopted these crops. Apple growers in SC benefited from the guidance provided
by the state's PROFIT program, including its support with credit, research, training, and
extension, which the state coordinated through its network of research and training
centers, and extension offices. Meanwhile, medium growers in PJ benefited from the
tremendous federal investments in irrigation infrastructure by receiving lots ready for
irrigation, facilitated access to credit and markets (through the tomato processing firms),
and research and extension support through federal and state agencies, including
CODEVASF, EMBRAPA, and IPA. Yet in both cases, the public sector drastically
reduced its support in the past decade, including with respect to agricultural extension. In
123 The importance of the local context in the process of innovation has been studied elsewhere. Gertler,
Wolfe, and Garkut (2000) summarize the main views on the importance of local embeddedness in
explaining innovation. Schmitz (1995) analyzes the role of these "non-economic ties" between local firms
in a Brazilian shoe cluster in the "diffusion and innovation of ideas." Walters (1999), drawing from the
wine industries in Chile and Argentina, focuses on the importance of "learning institutions" which promote
interactions among agents of a value chain that are conducive to continuous upgrading. There are no such
studies for my cases and the evidence I obtained is mostly anecdotal and very piecemeal.
117
contrast to abundant evidence on the failure of public sector agricultural extension to
deliver "anything of value," the extension services in these cases were central in helping
medium growers in SC to adopt apple production, and medium growers in PJ to adopt
irrigated annual crops that preceded their work with irrigated perennial fruit crops. This
reduction in technical support occurred precisely as growers began face greater pressures
for improved products and production processes.
The fall of public sector agricultural extension across the cases can be attributed
to federal level policies.124 The federal government created the Brazilian Agricultural
Extension Agency (Empresa Brasileiro de Extensdo Rural, EMATER) in 1975 along
with EMBRAPA. EMATER's mission was to coordinate state-level extension agencies
and provide financial support to those that would be willing to adopt the principles and
selection criteria of its directors similar to those of EMBRAPA and EMATER. This
measure led to the creation of the state level EMATERs, most of which substituted the
previously existing non-profit state level civic associations. Only three states kept their
own state associations: Parani, Rio Grande do Sul, and Santa Catarina, which in turn
provided service to EMATER.
For its first several years, EMATER had generous federal funding for
construction of training centers and extension offices, and for salaries. The initial
funding was from the Ministry of Agriculture, and subsequently, through a World Bank
loan that supported its expenditures (including salaries) during 1979-1985. By then
EMATER was already facing mounting criticism for ineffectiveness, while it broadened
its agenda to include land reform, including through participation of political
demonstrations in Brasilia alongside the MST. According to Olinger (1996), these events
led President Sarney to propose the extinction of EMATER to the National Congress.
Although Congress initially turned down the proposal, it eventually accepted it in 1990
when presented by President Collor. As a result, federal spending on agricultural
extension fell from 21 % of total government spending in agriculture in the early 1980s to
5.5% by the late 1990s (Gasques 2001). Few were the state governments that picked up
124 This section is mostly based on Olinger's (1996) account of the rise and fall of public agricultural
extension in Brazil. Mr. Olinger was the founder and director of ACARESC; Secretary of Agriculture of
the State of Santa Catarina (1969-1976); and President of the Brazilian Agency for Agricultural Extension
(EMBRATER) (1979-1986).
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the slack; most states marginalized its EMATERs to the point where many eventually
closed down. Others merged whatever was left from their extension agencies with their
state agricultural research agencies.
In SC, the fall of ACARESC was gradual, culminating with its merger with the
state's research agency, Empasc, into the now existing Epagri in 1991. According to a
former director of EMBRATER and SC State Secretary of Agriculture (Olinguer 1996),
the fall of ACARESC actually dates back to the very creation of EMBRATER in 1975
which led to:
e Increase in number of ACARESC staff without the training and
qualification of the original ACARESC staff
e Increased staff size reduced monitoring and quality of local offices
e New entrants included political appointees, often adversaries, diverting
efforts to political cleaveges within ACARESC
e Increase in wage differentials between administrative and technical staff
* Lower investment in continued training
Despite these events, ACARESC maintained its presence in the field through the
1980s, yet gradually losing the impetus with which it had operated until then. The 1991
merger led to the dismissal of most of its workforce. Those that remained were assigned
to municipal city offices, where an increase in bureaucratic duties reduced their
availability for continued field visits to growers.
In PJ, growers counted on a series of different providers of agricultural extension.
Growers initially counted on Emater extension workers based in each of the villages of
the irrigation projects. CODEVASF also had its own cadre of extension workers, with at
least one allocated to each of the several villages in each irrigation project. With several
changes in its management and funding, CODEVASF sustained its agricultural extension
service until the mid 1990s, when it then limited its work to project development.
The above reflects a substantial reduction in public extension driven by changing
federal level policies, more a reflection of the making and breaking of political coalitions
than a belief that growers no longer need public sector support with agricultural
extension. Reduction in public provision of agricultural extension would be justified if
the activity has in fact been effectively adopted and private providers have taken up
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information-diffusion services (Birkenhaeuser et al 1991). Evidence from my cases
suggest that private sources of agricultural extension have indeed risen over the past
decade. Yet, as has been noted elsewhere, this private extension is unlikely to "fill the
gap" left by the fall of public sector extension.
Input suppliers
The expansion of fruit production across the cases has been accompanied by an
increase in the number of agricultural input stores and investments by national and
multinational agricultural input suppliers. The number of stores dedicated to serving fruit
production have more than tripled in PJ and RN since the late 1980s: PJ went from
having five stores in the 1980s to twenty stores today, while the number of stores in RN
increased from two to seven in the same period. As a result of increased competition
among stores, the variety of services these stores offer to growers have multiplied. Aside
from selling agricultural inputs and implements, stores now serve as important providers
of technical assistance and, occasionally, of financial support.
Despite the expanding role for input suppliers with technical assistance, they by
no means fully meet the needs of medium growers. If for no other reason, input stores
emphasize profits over welfare, rightly so as private enterprises. This means they stress
the promotion of the products for which they are distributors regardless of whether these
products are in effect the best available for each growers. In addition, input stores limit
their provision of technical assistance to growers that have enough volume to make their
efforts worthwhile, meaning medium growers are rarely among their main clients.
In PJ, stores organize free workshops on main crops produced in each project,
choose growers for field trials to whom they provide technical assistance throughout
cycle, then host field days in each trial area through which store agronomists review
recommended production practices. In addition, store agronomists visit growers on
demand to suggest possible solutions to technical problems growers may face with
production. As a result, a visit through the irrigation projects will reveal the presence of
logo-marked vehicles driven by store extension workers where once the motorcycle or
downtrodden vehicle of the public extension worker was found.
Assuming the largest 5-6 stores have 3 or 4 agronomists (or agricultural
technicians, as is usually the case), there are between 15-24 agronomists to provide
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technical extension. In light of the 1,400 medium growers in the Senador Nilo Coelho
Project alone, this cadre of agronomists is unlikely to reach everyone. In Fraiburgo, SC,
stores also limit their technical assistance to the "larger" smaller growers, those who in
addition to apples also plant garlic or other shorter cycle crop for which the agronomist
can also earn for his assistance.
In RN, the technical assistance provided by input suppliers has been particularly
important in the absence of public sector support with R&D as the stores themselves have
helped growers identify the most suitable melon varieties to produce. Input suppliers in
this case serve as the main liasion between growers (including medium growers) and
multinational seed distributers. Agronomists from the stores essentially choose several
growers to carry out field trials with particular varieties and provide them assistance
throughout the growing cycle. At harvest time, store agronomists evaluate the outcomes
and pass the information onto the multinational seed distributers, who then market
successful varieties and continue their variety improvement program for the region.
Input suppliers in RN also serve as financial institutions by providing melon growers
payment plan with grace periods longer than the melon cycle thus allowing growrs to pay
for their inputs with their sales revenues.
For their part, national and multinational agricultural input suppliers have also
been increasingly engaged with growers. Across the cases, these suppleirs hold seminars
to showcase new products, at times in local auditoriums, at times at local bars and
restaurants. Each of these meetings provide forum for growers to meet, exchange
information.
Consultants
The growth of these clusters has also been accompanied by an increase in the
number of agronomists providing consulting services to growers. These consultants tend
to have substantial production expertise and knowledge of markets. Although firms have
always counted on consultants, these consultants were generally hired from outside the
region. The difference now is that most consultants have either settled down in the fruit
producing areas from elsewhere, or are from the clusters themselves, meaning they are
better acquainted with local varieties and local conditions, as well as with the resources
available to growers locally as they strive to upgrade. These consultants are often from
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other states that move to the clusters to take advantage of the increasing number of
growers. Others are former employees of larger firms, that either lose their jobs as these
firms downsize or leave on their own to start their own consulting business or farm.
They have turned out to be important conduits of information and drivers of
dissemination across the clusters.
Like the input stores, these consultants also maintain tight relations with several
multinational agricultural input providers. These multinationals often seek the
consultants, some of whom travel abroad repeatedly in a given year, always funded by
the multinationals. Sometimes companies hold roundtables with growers and consultants
to discuss the performance of particular agricultural inputs or technical problems for
which growers are seeking inputs.
Aside from passing information directly on to their clients, consultants contribute
to a broader dissemination of technological information indirectly, as the information
they pass on to their clients gets passed on to their clients' neighbors and acquaintences.
Although consultants also prefer to work with larger growers, at least some consultants
provide services for at least some small growers, as way of keeping in touch with that
segement of growers, what they are producing, the problems they are facing, and the
technologies they are adopting.m
Subcontracting and medium growers
Many medium growers have also managed to participate in these markets by
engaging in subcontractual arrangements with large grower-exporters. With few
exceptions in SC and grape growers in PJ, large firms increased their practice of
subcontracting only in the mid 1990s, as they faced increased pressures for efficiency in
light of growing competition and falling profit margins, while no longer having access to
subsidized public credit.126 Subcontracting enabled larger growers to maintain or even
125 At least one consultant mentioned that working with smaller growers is the only way to test the
parameters for a given technology. "The perfect execution by these smaller growers is what gives us
consistent data, a lot more so than on the larger farms." That is, smaller growers have greater control of
field operations than do larger growers who depend on hierarchal, less direct field operations.
126 This "delay" reflects the unrealistically favorable economic environment surrounding these fruit clusters
until the 1990s, where abundant cheap credit and secure demand assured high profit margins despite
administrative inefficiencies.
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expand their volumes, while reducing per unit costs by relaying production risks and
labor costs to their suppliers. 127
Although precise data on subcontracting is difficult to obtain, the rise in
subcontracting is evident across the cases. In SC, the number of large firms
subcontracting increased from two in the late 1980s to about seven today, including the
largest firm in the sector, Fischer, which subcontracts about 25% of its production across
five large to medium growers.
In PJ, the sequence of subcontracing differs between grapes and mangoes. Large
grape growers began subcontracting in 1993 as their own production was insufficient in
meeting European demands during Brazil's export window.128 In the case of mangoes,
the three largest firms began subcontracting in the late 1990s along with the newer firms
that just established their pack houses in PJ, many of which pursuing a strategy based on
subcontracting at least half of the mangoes they process and market from the medium
growers in the irrigation projects.
Finally, the two lead firms in RN began subcontracting in 1994, reaching about
12% and 30% of their volume by 1997.129 These firms subcontracted from two kinds of
growers: the agronomist or agricultural technician who eventually became medium
growers, including the Prodesianos and the nissei; and smallholders in the agrarian
reform settlements that were just then beginning to produce melons collectively. In the
former case, many medium growers used the opportunity to supply the large firms as a
means of breaking into exports (JT, getting out from under). In the latter case, growers
subsequently exported directly to European buyers with the assistance of World Vision.
Subcontracting gave them the experience and also a positive reputation, since they had
sold under M/F trusted brands.
127 According to Albuquerque (2001), labor costs up to 55% of total production costs for grapes in PJ, 18%
for apples in SC, 10% for melons in RN, and 8% for mangos in PJ. An important component of this wage
labor which motivates firms to subcontract are the encargos sociais. As a result, production by large firms
can cost twice as much as that by medium growers. In the case of melons in RN, for example, production
by the large firms in 1996 was between R$3,500-6,000 per hectare, for medium growers R$2,500-3,000,
and small growers R$1,800-2,500 (EMBRAPA 1997). In the case of grapes in PJ, overall costs for smaller
growers in 1993 were 45% lower than for larger growers (Collins 1995).
128 See Collins (1995).
129 Gomes (1999).
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The two firms that first began subcontracting in the mid 1990s have since gone
bankrupt and closed down, yet other firms have moved into the sector, each with its own
subcontracting policy. Especially important has been the establishment of Nolem, the
successor of Maisa, whose owners designed it to focus largely on marketing of
subcontracted melons. Since its establishment in 1998, Nolem has subcontracted about
half of the melons it processes and sells, totalling about 1400 ha from about 30 growers.
It provides inputs equalling about 45% of the production costs upfront, and has a
minimum base price for exports - if the market price falls below the established
minimum price, Nolem splits the loss evenly with its suppliers. It also has an award
system, through which it pays growers a premium for continuity with volume, quality,
and punctuality.
Not all medium growers benefit from these contractual ties in the same way, of
course, since large firms establish a variety of contracts. These range from annual
contracts inclusive of inputs, technical assistance, soil analysis, harvesting, transportation,
processing and marketing, with a minimum assured base price, to informal verbal
arrangements limited to marketing. Nevertheless, the argument still holds that
subcontractual ties with larger grower-exporters has sustained the participation of
hundreds of medium growers in these fres fruit markets.
Central to my argument is the evidence that many medium growers have managed
to use these contractual ties with larger firms as a springboard to establishing direct ties
with buyers themselves.130 This was typical for several medium growers in RN, who
initially supplied the pioneering firms with melons, and subsequently, when contacted by
a foreign buyer familiar with the quality of their melons, switched from subcontracting to
direct source. The same was done by an association of medium mango growers in PJ.
After having sourced one of the leading mango exporters for several years, this
association is now establishing direct contacts with an importer in Rotterdam.
These findings contrast much of the in the literature on contract farming as to why
subcontracting is often not a good alternative for smallholders. Under contract farming,
medium growers commit to supplying a specified quantity and quality of fruit at a given
price to the large grower-exporters in return for provision of credit, inputs, and technical
130 Tendler (2001) makes this observation.
124
assistance. Thus, in principle, contract farming is a win-win situation: it reduces
production and marketing risks to grower-exporters by ensuring a guaranteed supply that
meet specific requirements, while medium growers have a secure market, along with
credit and inputs for production.'31 In practice, however, contract farming tends to fail as
a long lasting and developmental arrangement because of the difficulties in enforcing
contracts, the unequal bargaining power between buyers and medium growers,
monopsonistic behavior, and disruption of power relations, among other problems.' 32
What explains the more positive outcomes of the subcontractual ties across my
cases? First, the majority of medium growers across my cases are agronomists or
agricultural technicians, generally better educated and prepared to participate in these
high-value markets than the smallholders considered in other studies. This does not
invalidate my claim, however, since even these medium growers are many times smaller
than the larger firms in each of the cases in terms of production, employment, and
political clout.
Second, a major difference between these newer contractual arrangements and the
earlier patterns of contract farming is the general context in which these subcontracts are
taking place. Larger firms have increased their dependency on subcontracted production
while at the same time having to assure the compliance of their suppliers to the final
buyers. Larger firms are therefore more willing to engage with growers since the risks of
noncompliance hinge on the grower-exporter.
The enduring strength of ethnic-based networks: the COTIA legacy
Of particular importance in explaining the resiliency of medium growers across
my cases is COTIA: the now-extinct agricultural cooperative established by Japanese
immigrants in Sao Paulo in 1927 to help immigrant families become economically active
in Brazil through agricultural production. 133 As early as 1971, Carroll documents the
''strongly cohesive force and economic behavior of the Japanese immigrants" behind
COTIA. COTIA spread its experience and opened production frontiers throughout
131 See Dirven (1996), Key and Runsten (1999), and Schejtman (1996).
132 See Glover and Kusterer (1990) and Little and Watts (1994).
m See Marcovitch (1996) for a brief history of COTIA.
134 Cavalcanti (1999) also notes the strong work ethics ("o trabalho sdrio") of the Japanese growers in PJ.
Wells (1991, 1996), drawing from the experience of California agriculture, also notes the distinct economic
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Brazil until 1994, when it collapsed because of an overextended bureaucracy and
financial commitments. Despite its collapse, COTIA left Brazilian agriculture an
inheritance of insurmountable experience in production, marketing, and a successful
model of collective action, establishing a standard of production and marketing unmet by
most other Brazilian medium growers.
From its headquarters in S o Paulo, COTIA establishment of hundreds of
agricultural colonies throughout Brazil, becoming the largest agricultural cooperative in
Latin America, with 200 branch offices staffed by 22,000 employees and over 21,000
members. 3 5 It provided technical assistance and marketed crops produced by its
members and from non-members through extensive channels with domestic supermarket
chains, and a permanent office in Rotterdam for marketing agricultural products in
Europe. 136
Through its members, COTIA spread information on crop varieties and provided
a model of planting techniques for many crops throughout Brazil. In the context of my
three cases, COTIA turned out to play an important role in the development of each of
the clusters by providing local growers a competent production and marketing network,
as well as a model of collective action. Even following its closure, networks of former
COTIA members continued playing an important role in the development of the fresh
fruit industry through the formation of independent cooperatives in SC and PJ, and a
marketing group in RN. These cooperatives produced at most 14% of total production in
each cluster (see Table 11), yet their impacts on production technologies and crop
varieties reached beyond the non-nissei communities in at least two ways:
First, COTIA growers were among the pioneers in producing each crop, proving
the viability of these crops for small scale production. They were the first small scale
apple producers in SC; the ones who introduced table grapes in PJ; and involved in the
first field trials with melons in RN. Even without the helping hand of COTIA since 1994,
behavior of Japanese growers. She compares the innovative behavior of Anglo, Japanese, and Mexican
berry growers in California and argues that the Japanese stand out for their trust of the University of
California's technical information, attention to detail, avoidance of indebtedness, preference to remain
medium-sized, and preference for varieties that have already been tested.
135 Staff and membership data from interview with directors of CAJ in Juazeiro.
136 See Damiani (1999).
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these growers have continued to excel in producing quality fruits that please domestic
and foreign buyers.
And second, efforts by COTIA growers and by grower cooperatives made up of
former COTIA members have generated positive spillovers to other non-nissei growers,
including through the dissemination of public sector agricultural research, opening up of
markets for crops produced by medium growers by proving to foreign buyers the quality
of their production, and by providing a model of collective action.
Table 12. Participation of former COTIA growers across cases
Case Cooperative and No. of Production Total prod. in Share of
crop members (ha) cluster (ha) cooperative
Santa Catarina SANJO - apples 78 900 13,046 7%
Petrolina-Juazeiro CAJ - grapes 52 690 5,042 14%
Rio Grande do Norte STAa - melons 5 550 6,243 9%
a STA is not a cooperative, but rather a marketing group through which members each have their own individual
brands. Data for STA is for 1997, as is total area planted in RN.
COTIA left its legacy in SC through the Cooperative Agricola de Sdo Joaquim
(SANJO), the most successful apple grower cooperative in terms of volume and quality
of production. Interested in expanding into apple production, COTIA sent several scouts
from Sao Paulo to Santa Catarina in the early 1960s to investigate the best region for
apple production and in 1964 established a colony of six families from other parts of
Brazil in Sao Joaquim, over a total of 560 hectares. COTIA growers arrived in Sao
Joaquim with minimal capital and dilapidated machinery. In their favor, they had
COTIA as guarantee for bank, access to well established COTIA marketing channels and
brand name recognition outside Brazil, and an ethnic-based work ethic that enabled this
group of growers to succeed together, even following the collapse of COTIA.
Just as important, COTIA growers in SC benefited from the SC state
government's rising interest in promoting the production of apples. They obtained
investment and working capital through PROFIT, and learned about apple production
from the presence of JICA researchers and growers in SC who had already begun
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experimenting with apple production.' 37 Although there was no formal connection
between COTIA and JICA, growers interacted informally. Especially important in terms
of production technology, was the ongoing interaction between COTIA's agronomist in
Sio Joaquim and the JICA apple expert, Shirozawa, who introduced the Fuji variety in
the state.
Once COTIA went bankrupt in 1994, apple growers in Sio Joaquim organized
themselves into a new cooperative named SANJO, setting the example to other medium
growers ofthe advantages of working collectively. Already in the early 1990s, as COTIA
deteriorated, growers in SC planned an alternative form of organizing independent of
COTIA. They first established a marketing and transportation company in 1993 to
substitute the COTIA services on which they had depended since first producing apples
in 1974. In 1996, growers established their new cooperative to store, classify, package,
market and distribute apples through a joint brand name. With the collapse of COTIA,
the packing house and cold storages on which these growers depended were taken over
by banks (these growers had paid for the investment cost of this infrastructure, for which
COTIA was guarantor). As an alternative, growers jointly built a state of the art packing
house and controlled atmosphere cold storage large enough to store all of their output.
Today, SANJO has 78 members and produces about 37% of the apples produced in Sdo
Joaquim and 7% of total apple production in SC, making it the sixth largest apple
producer in SC. It markets through many clients they "inherited" from COTIA as well as
newer clients they have established themselves, including a direct buyer in Germany.
By the time CODEVASF began settling its projects in PJ in the 1970s, COTIA
already had about two decades of producing, buying, and marketing a variety of quality
fruits and vegetables in Sao Paulo, Parana, SC and elsewhere in Brazil. COTIA had such
a good reputation in terms of the quality of its products that CODEVASF invited COTIA
to establish a colony in one of the CODEVASF's earlierst irrigation projects in PJ, the
Curagi Project, cimpleted in 1978. COTIA then established a colony with 36 members
across 1,927 hectares, and opened a branch office in Juazeiro to provide technical
assistance and coordinate purchases.
137 Including a JICA colony in Curitibanos.
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CODEVASF's strategy in inviting COTIA to its projects paid off: COTIA
introduced melons and grapes the region, and provided a marketing channel to several
firms growers, who subsequently established their own channels. COTIA growers in the
Curagi project first produced industrial tomato, as did most other growers motivated by
CODEVASF and the presence of the tomato pulp processing firms that CODEVASF had
also attracted to the region. COTIA growers in PJ also produced melons which COTIA
had already been buying from other non-nissei growers in PJ and, in 1984, began
growing table grapes, a crop they introduced in the region and which has since become
one of the major fruit crops produced in and exported from PJ.138 COTIA had already
produced table grapes in Sao Paulo since the 1970s but, faced with high incidence of
pests associated with rainfall in that state, COTIA turned to the possibility of irrigating
grapes in the dry climate of PJ.
As for marketing channels, COTIA growers in PJ counted on COTIA's well
established domestic and export channels. By the time growers began producing in PJ,
COTIA had already been successfully exporting nissei-produced melons from Sao Paulo
and apples from SC through its exporters in Sao Paulo and office in Rotterdam. As
Damiani (1999) describes it, COTIA helped other growers in PJ break into exports by
lending one of their export managers to the newly established PJ grower cooperative,
VALEXPORT; providing contacts to buyers in Europe; and allowing the use of COTIA's
office in the Netherlands. Moreover, COTIA also purchased melons and grapes from
other growers, exporting them under their own brandname, and in the process teaching
these other growers about the norms and standards of the export market.
In addition, the COTIA growers in PJ established the Brazilian Grape Marketing
Board (BGMB) in 1992, a group within VALEXPORT focused on collective sales of
table grapes. "Through the BGMB, producers were able to agree and enforce minimum
quality standards, work out a program of when and how much each growers would
harvest, and jointly contract trucks and ships to bring the fruit to the market," as well as
jointly purchase inputs and packaging (Damiani 1999:120). The BGMB has continously
exported about 80% of the table grapes exported from PJ and 70% of the Brazilian table
grape exports.
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138 See Damiani (1999).
As was the case in SC, growers in PJ also organized themselves into an
independent cooperative once COTIA collapsed. The Cooperative Agricola de Juazeiro
(CAJ) consists of 45 growers, each with an average of 10-12 hectares of grapes, and
several also with 10 hectares of mango, or 5-6 hectares of ata/pina or passion fruit. The
former COTIA growers formed CAJ by agreeing to pay whatever debts COTIA had
associated with its operations in PJ, in turn for keeping the infrastructure in Juazeiro.
CAJ established its own technical crew of four agronomists, has doubled its production
and its storage infrastructure since 1994, and is overall more profitable. As one of its
members explained, "COTIA was our mother. Whatever the grower wanted, it would
provide him. When it disappeared, the grower felt unprotected and decided it had to
improve its technical level. It was then that we learned to obtain higher returns."
COTIA's agricultural expertise also reached melon growers in RN. Although
COTIA never established a colony in RN as it did in SC and PJ, it nevertheless
influenced the melon industry through 1) the transfer of technology via a nissei
consultant to the pioneering firm, 2) the subsequent move of several former COTIA
growers from Sao Paulo and other states to the region, and 3) the establishment of
COTIA-based marketing channels in Brazil and abroad. 139 Melon growers in RN, nissei
and non-nissei alike, thus benefited from COTIA's extensive experience in production
and marketing.
MAISA, the pioneering melon firm in Mossoro, contracted a COTIA-related
nissei from Sao Paulo in 1978 to sharecrop several rows of melons on an experimental
basis, where the firm and the grower split the returns evenly. The success of these early
trials encouraged other firms and growers to adopt melon production. At least five other
COTIA-related nissei from other states followed the firstcomer to RN, each helping the
arrival of the subsequent movers by establishing sharecropping arrangements or by
helping them find employment in one of the firms that were already producing melons.
These growers had previously worked with a variety of crops, including tomatoes, cotton,
peanuts, soy, beans, cucumbers, peppers, and, in some cases, melons (in Sao Paulo).
Among them was an agronomist from the reknown agronomy school ESALQ (Escola
139 I do not have an explanation as to why COTIA never established a colony in RN. I suspect it was
because of its mixed experience with melons in PJ in the 1980s. Also, by the time melon production took
off in RN in the early 1990s, COTIA had already begun its decline.
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Superior de Agricultura Luis de Queiroz), who had spent nine years as researcher and
extension worker for COTIA. Although COTIA did not carry out its own research, it
drew from agricultural research centers throughout Brazil and transferred this information
to COTIA members. This farmer moved to Mossoro when COTIA closed down to
provide support to the growers who were already in RN producing melons and to whom
he had provided support through COTIA. Upon moving to RN, he also started producing
himself.
In addition, growers in RN benefitted from former COTIA marketing channels, as
had been the case in SC and PJ. One of COTIA's melon exporting specialists moved to
RN to coordinate the marketing of melons produced by growers who had previously
marketed through COTIA. This specialist runs the RN office of a marketing firm
established by former staff of COTIA's division of marketing, headquartered in Sao
Paulo (STA). Along with the above mentioned agronomist, this marketing specialist
coordinates the domestic and export sales of all the nissei growers in RN, providing
technical assistance and quality control.
This chapter closes the analysis of how locally-embedded incentives and
constraints shape how growers respond to collective good problems by focusing
specifically on how medium growers have met the demands for quality, consistency,
reliable supplies, and improved varieties. The next chapter summarizes the main
argument and offers some insights into policy formulation.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation analyzes how growers of fresh fruit in Santa Catarina (SC),
Petrolina-Juazeiro (PJ), and Rio Grande do Norte (RN), Brazil, have resolved collective
good kinds of problem associated with the rise of supermarkets and the global fruit trade.
It set out to answer two questions: What institutional arrangements have growers used to
resolve collective problems and what explains the differences in these arrangements in
terms of what they achieve and whom they benefit?
This dissertation makes three basic points based on the main findings summarized
in Table 13. First, the more effective growers' association and public-private
collaborative efforts in helping growers obtain improved varieties, establish pest
monitoring programs, and develop integrated production practices are in SC where the
state government promoted a dual structure of production, established an institutional
venue through which to engage with growers large and small, became a leading expert in
apple research, and developed a well-structured, funded, and qualified agricultural
extension service. Just as important, the apple growers' association, ABPM, has been
well representative of its members, capable of voicing their needs, and supported by the
industry's largest apple firms.
CODEVASF also molded a dual structure of production in PJ similar to that
which ACARESC supported in SC, yet early state-grower relationship across these cases
differed in important ways. In SC, the state government agency, ACARESC, coordinated
the development of the apple industry, while the federal parastatal CODEVASF did so in
PJ. ACARESC worked closely with the pioneering firm in early apple research in SC;
CODEVASF, in turn, had to provide incentives for large firms to move to the region and
begin production. ACARESC emphasized agricultural extension and research from early
on, providing the basis for institutions that would sustain the sector's growth over time.
CODEVASF also coordinated agricultural extension and research, but its main focus was
heavy-duty irrigation infrastructure and tax incentives for colonization of its projects.
And finally, ACARESC facilitated apple production by small growers alongside larger
growers, while CODEVASF promoted a different mix of crops among larger growers and
small and medium growers. These differences ultimately affected the formation and
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outcomes of public-private partnerships and the possibility of medium and small growers
of participating in the fresh fruit industry.
Second, the different arrangements growers have used to resolve collective good
problems area also a function of the characteristics of their crops, especially production
cycle (annual versus perennial) and production costs, and their markets. Growers of
perennial crops (apples, mangos, and grapes) have more incentives to collaborate with
each other than do growers of the annual crop (melons) because of the higher costs and
risks involved with perennial crop production. As for markets, this dissertation provides
an example of a domestic market (for apples) that, at least up to the mid 1990s, was more
demanding than an export market (for melons).
The disincentives for inter-firm collaboration embedded in the comparatively
"easier" production of melons thus helps the growth of the melon industry despite the
absence of the kinds of collaborative institutions that have helped growers upgrade in the
other cases. One could argue that the melon industry is really the success story among
my cases because growers have managed to upgrade without the costly collective
arrangements and public support present in the other cases. The evidence, however,
reveals a comparatively more vulnerable sector: growers collectively failed to control the
widespread infestation with white flies beginning around 1999 and to agree on the
management of the water tables on which they depend; the pioneering firms have gone
bankrupt; and RN has gradually lost its share in national melon production and exports.
And third, that medium growers have remained in the market reflects their ability
to overcome the kinds of collective good problems affecting larger growers in addition to
those associated with smaller scale production. Because of their small scale individually,
medium growers have the additional challenge of pooling production and marketing,
while also assuring consistency in volume and quality. While many medium growers
have benefited from subcontractual ties to larger grower-exporters, this dissertation
emphasizes how Japanese-Brazilian ethnic ties have been especially helpful in enabling
groups of medium growers to weather the changing market environment and thrive in the
fruit industry.
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Table 13. Summary of findings
Case Form of government support in Nature of Ethnic ties Resulting collaborative
1970s-1980s crop arrangements
The state agricultural agency, Perennial Pioneering small Familiarity and enduring
ACARESC, learned from pioneering crop, with 3-4 growers belonged to social ties between state
firm and promoted apple production years COTIA cooperative and researchers, extension
by providing access to credit, between later established workers, and growers
( agricultural extension and training, planting and independent cooperative facilitated greater public-
and highly rated apple research first harvest. (SANJO) that produces private collaboration in
r system. Thus created, from early 7% of apples in SC. 1990s that helped resolve
on, institutional basis which collective action problems.
continues supporting growers'
upgrading efforts.
A federal engineering-based Perennial COTIA growers Crop-based groups (large
*! parastatal, CODEVASF, created crops, with 3- introduced table grapes mango growers via
irrigation projects including the 4 years in projects and later VALEXPORT, grape
3 provision of infrastructure, land, between established independent growers via BGMB and
2 credit, water, agricultural extension, planting and cooperative (CAJ) that CAJ) have resolved
:E and support in forming growers first harvest. produces 14% of grapes collective action problems.
0
* association. Supported dual in PJ.
a* structure of production based on
different mix of crops.
, No single government agency Annual crop, A Japanese immigrant Relative absence of
3 coordinated the development of the harvested as participated in early collaborative institutions0
Z melon industry. Instead, early as 60 melon trials and former since problems of
0
- development banks provided days. members of COTIA collective "inaction"
.8 substantial subsidized credit to two established an generated by pioneering
5 large pioneering firms, which independent marketing firms have persisted.
O invested in in-house capabilities group that produced up
.2 rather than those that could support to 9% of melons in RN.
Icc broader grower base.
Interpreting the recent development of fruit production across these cases as a
reflection of these locally-embedded factors suggests that 1) exports do not necessarily
explain why growers upgrade, 2) public sector policies can generate incentives and
disincentives for collaborative action, 3) "partnerships" are worth trying, but are difficult
to generate and often entail exclusive benefits, and 4) medium growers are often more
capable of participating in the markets for fresh fruits than that which is often assumed.
Why exports don't explain everything
The economic development literature rightly emphasizes the increasing
importance of export-driven growth. Breaking into exports is rarely easy and, in most
cases, brings firms face to face with world standards and best practices. Exports thus
ultimately force firms to become more cost-competitive and quality-oriented. This
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literature, however, tends to assume that export-based incentives are always positive by
facilitating technology transfer and inducing greater competitiveness.
The experience of Brazilian fruit growers questions the assumption that exports
are necessarily demanding of quality, or at least any more than what is demanded in the
domestic market. In fact, the experience of melon growers in RN and apple growers in
SC reflects just the opposite. Across the cases, melon growers were the first to export
and have historically exported a greater share of their production than any of the other
cases (growers have exported about 50% of output, compared to 35% for mangos, 11 % of
grapes, and 7% for apples). Yet melon growers had an exclusive four-month window to
the European market for over a decade. This window allowed them to become an
established supplier in Europe, but also "cursed" the industry by shielding it from the
kinds of competitive pressures confronting other growers. Apple growers, in particular,
from the very beginning confronted Brazilian imports of Argentine apples. As a result,
the apple industry that grew out of an import substitution industrialization strategy was in
the end more competitive than the export-oriented melon industry.
The public roots of collaborative (in)action
Whether or not growers collaborate reflect policy support in the 1970s and 1980s
that molded the structure of production and, consequently, the relationships among
growers and between growers and the state. This means that the state itself shaped
growers' perspectives on and means for how they could resolve their problems - if by
investing in and collaborating with local support institutions, or by focusing instead on
strengthening in-house capabilities and ties with buyers and input suppliers.
Comparing the outcomes in RN versus SC and PJ is especially illustrative here.
Fruit production RN differs from that in SC and PJ in the substantially different form of
public sector support growers have historically received. In RN, public sector support
was especially strong through the provision of highly subsidized credit to the pioneering
firms until the early 1990s. The provision of abundant and highly subsidized venture and
investment capital in the early years enabled these pioneering firms to test new varieties
of melons and learn the best production practices for the local conditions, establish
domestic and foreign export channels, and build a recognized name for locally produced
melons.
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But if easy credit to the pioneering firms facilitated the establishment of the
melon industry in RN, it also imposed constraints on how this industry would grow.
Public sector support in the form of a highly subsidized credit unattached to any kind of
performance standard and given without question over at least a decade meant that these
firms had the political clout to directly access and obtain government concessions
independent and regardless of other growers in the industry. These firms had no
incentives to lobby for government concessions that facilitate the entrance of other
growers earlier on. On the contrary, anecdotal evidence suggests that they tried deterring
the entrance of other growers to the market by resisting or blocking political support for
credit and agricultural extension programs targeted at smaller growers.
Likewise, this early established dynamic between the pioneering firms and
government agencies (including the Bank of Brazil, Bank of the Northeast, SUDENE)
undermined the possibility of the establishment of grower-state ties that could benefit the
cluster as a whole. Particularly with respect to agricultural research, for instance, the
amount of public credit allocated to these firms allowed them each to establish in-house
technical departments, hire consultants from other states and countries, and construct
their own laboratories. Two large firms thus captured substantial public sector support
(in the form of subsidized credit) and ultimately left little in the way of institution-
building that could benefit growers as they contend with the new market environment.
On building partnerships that work
Despite the well-accepted notion of the state's importance in promoting
innovation in agriculture and increasingly through partnerships with growers, the actual
process leading to this greater public-private interaction is rarely analyzed nor are the
conditions under which this public-private collaboration is more likely to occur or be
constructive and inclusive. The case studies in this dissertation, especially that of SC,
suggests two policy attributes that contribute to more effective public-private partnerships
in what they accomplish and inclusive in whom they benefit.
First, more so than the other cases, public sector support in SC focused on
developing quality, well-structured, and funded agricultural research and extension
agencies. The state became a leading expert in apple research, earning growers' respect
and lasting support. Especially during the 1970s and early 1980s, the SC state
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government formed a highly trained group of researchers specializing on apple
production, sought technical expertise and financial resources from industrialized country
agencies with extensive experience in apple production. Just as impressive as its
commitment to apple research was the state's well-structured and funded agricultural
extension service. The state established extension offices throughout the apple producing
areas, allowing for the high coverage especially during the 1970s of which growers still
speak of today. The very approach of the SC state government in promoting apple
production thus ushered the possibility of public-private partnerships from early on,
welcoming growers to engage with state extension workers and, in the process, and
earning growers' lasting respect.
And second, the state of SC from early on established venues to interact with both
large and small growers by having research stations near Fraiburgo (large growers) and
Sio Joaquim (small growers). This also meant that small (and later medium) growers
had a voice within the public realm in spite of and independent from the larger growers in
the industry.
Promises and perils of public-private partnerships
Consistent with the literature on partnerships, state-growers collaborations in
research attained concrete and applicable results, including the development of improved
apple (SC) and grape (PJ) varieties, integrated production practices in SC and PJ, pest
and disease monitoring programs (fruit flies in PJ and RN and black spots in SC), and
agricultural inputs that make apple harvests more uniform SC and that allow year-round
mango harvests in PJ. These partnerships also provided the venue for greater interaction
and mutual learning among growers and researchers. At the same time, my cases raise
two important issues the literature on partnerships does not address: the exclusive nature
of these partnerships, and their risk of undermining efforts the could benefit the entire
cluster in the long run.
That public-private partnerships are a means of improving service delivery to
growers assumes that user groups, in this case growers associations, are representative
bodies, through which members collaborate in voicing and solving their problems. The
problem is that some associations are better than others in representing their members
and in promoting participation. Across these cases, ABPM is the most representative of
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its cluster as reflected in its long lasting collaborative efforts and incorporation of small
and medium growers, including in its Board of Directors. On the other extreme is
PROFRUTAS in RN, which has been mainly a handmaiden of the large firms, bringing
very few benefits to other growers, specially to small and medium growers.
Just as important, the new federal funding mechanisms that require public sector
researchers to submit proposals in conjunction with growers associations naturally lead to
a self-selection of growers that can benefit from this research and, in the process, exclude
many others. Public sector researchers are more likely to seek endorsement from well-
established associations, which have been around longer and are generally led by the
largest firms (and therefore have greater political clout), than from the associations
formed more recently by medium-sized growers. As a result, where these associations
have traditionally benefited a few, new public-private partnerships are likely to remain
exclusive.
Finally, a tendency emerges from my cases demonstrating how closer state-
grower collaboration in research may ultimately undermine the long-term development of
each cluster. Rising collaboration between public sector researchers and growers has
been centered on problem-oriented research - immediate problems facing the growers for
which relatively short-term research and experimentation may yield solutions. The
problem, according to researchers at EPAGRI and CPATSA, is that this short-term,
immediatist approach, undermines the public sector's capabilities to carry out basic
longer-term research, much of which will ultimately be required as the basis for further
improved technologies in the future as the problems facing growers become even more
complex.
Listening to medium growers
While the literature tends to emphasize the many reasons why all but the largest
growers should remain in the market, including access to resources, production and
marketing knowledge, postharvest transport and marketing services, and expertise in the
use of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals, medium growers across the cases
analyzed in this study have accounted for as much as 30% to 60% of production. These
growers have remained in the market largely because of increasing marketing
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opportunities through subcontractual ties with larger growers, and by resourcefully
organizing cooperatives and marketing groups.
This study also suggests that medium growers have at times benefited
substantially from direct public sector support with agricultural research and extension
(especially in SC), and at times survived despite relatively weak or absent public sector
support in these respects (as in PJ and RN). In SC, the state's early commitment to
agricultural research and extension (via ACARESC and EMPASC) targeted at small
growers generated state-grower ties that have outlasted the government cutbacks and the
merging of research and extension (in the creation EPAGRI) in the 1990s. Not only has
the state government historically been committed to small grower development, but this
commitment is now embedded in EPAGRI's research and experimental centers
(especially that in Sao Joaquim) and its municipal-level offices.
Production by medium growers in PJ also resulted from direct government
support, in this case through the parastatal CODEVASF. Yet the form in which
CODEVASF provided that support led to a very different outcome: although it enabled
hundreds of medium-sized growers to adopt fruit mango and grape production beginning
in the mid 1990s, it was at the economic and social costs of high turnover rates among the
original settlers of its irrigation projects.
CODEVASF's strategies led to comparatively less favorable outcomes for
medium growers for at least two reasons. First, CODEVASF was first and foremost an
engineering-based agency, focused on constructing massive irrigation and productive
infrastructure along the entire San Fransisco River Valley. Its capabilities to work with
small growers in no way resembled those of ACARESC's, a rural development agency
with a mandate to provide agricultural extension, training, and credit to small growers.
And second, medium growers in SC have produced apples alongside larger growers,
while medium growers in PJ focused initially on different crops and only switched to
fruits in the 1990s.
As a result of these differences, medium growers in SC have benefited from
positive externalities associated with large grower production over the years, including
continued investments in public agricultural research, establishment of disease
monitoring systems, lobbying to include Brazilian apples in export marketing campaign,
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and strengthened growers' association. In contrast, medium growers in PJ have not
readily benefited from these kinds of large firm-generated externalities associated with
collective goods. Instead, medium mango and grape growers in PJ have only in the 1990s
established direct ties with CPATSA, as illustrated by its seedless grape research program
and the implementation of integrated production practices among an association of
medium mango growers. Why this attention to medium grower has taken so long despite
their proven capabilities in the fruit industry remains a puzzle.
To conclude, growers in Brazil and elsewhere will increasingly face demands for
quality and consistency, reliable supplies, improved varieties and norms and standards
imposed by buyers and importing country governments. A better understanding of the
formation and outcomes of how growers resolve collective good problems associated
with these demands may help in the design of policies to further upgrade production and
postharvesting technologies. This dissertation aims to be a step in this direction. In the
least, it suggests that governments often have more margin for action than that which is
often portrayed in helping growers farm for supermarkets.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Municipal-level production (hectares planted) in SC, PJ, and RN, 1998-2002
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Santa Catarina - apples
Total state production 13905
Fraiburdo -8C 5800
Agua Doce -SC 500
Lebon R6gis - SC 985
Monte Carlo - SC 1150
Sao Joaquim - SC 2742
Bom Jardim da Serra - SC 520
Bom Retiro - SC 257
Urubici - SC 366
Total area 12320
Ave. annual share 0.88
Ave. annual area planted 13046
13941 14593 15377 15907
5765 5765 5810 5940
550 650 650 650
980 980 1050 1130
1095 1141 1170 1170
2780 2940 3080 3340
580 653 724 849
257 470 600 600
370 370 400 400
12377 12969 13484 14079
Petrolina-Juazeiro - mangos
Total Pernambuco + Bahia
Petrofina - PE'
Lagoa Grande - PE
Santa Maria da Boa Vista - PE
Juazeiro - BA
Casa Nova - BA
Curage - BA
Sento S6 - BA
Total area
Ave. annual share
Ave. annual area planted
16822 18282
3989 5024
- 210
3740
782
298
368
9177
0.52
10432
210
3080
652
180
280
9636
19952 21591
3800 3800
44 50
210 210
4627 5936
716 716
200 200
360 360
9957 11272
Petrolina-Juazeiro - grapes
Total Pernambuco + Bahia 5141
Petrolina - PE 1400
Lagoa Grande - PE 950
Santa Maria da Boa Vista - PE 171
Juazeiro - BA 1540
Casa Nova - BA 469
Curagd - BA 100
Sento Se - BA 50
Total area 4680
Ave. annual share 0.93
Ave. annual area planted 5683
Rio Grande do Norte
Total state production
Bara na
Mossord
Total area
Ave. annual share
Ave. annual area planted
6437
1900
3250
5150
0.82
4544
5490
2300
950
450
756
469
100
100
5125
4377
2076
1100
3176
5184
1900
428
400
1389
349
160
150
4776
3724
2000
950
2950
6503 6097
2500 2040
570 600
400 450
1993 1993
349 349
100 100
150 150
6062 5682
6022
1500
3756
5256
6771
3690
2500
6190
Source: IBGE, Municipal Agricultural Production
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22872
4620
60
216
5940
716
200
365
12117
Appendix B. Share of production by grower size across the cases, selected years
Santa Catarinaa
area planted (ha) 1985 1991 1996
large > 60 52% 65% 70%
medium 6-60 28% 24% 19%
small < 6 20% 11% 11%
Petrolina-Juazeirob
area planted (ha) 1985 1988 1996 2002
large > 200 19% 34% 39% 44%
medium 10-200 - - - 3%
small < 10 81% 66% 61% 53%
Rio Grande do Nortec
area planted (ha) 1985 1990 1993 1997
leading > 900 100% 75% 75% 47%
large 301-600 16% 19% 26%
medium 60-300 9% 6% 22%
small < 50 0% 0% 5%
a Data for 1985 and 1996 from Santa Catarina census, as cited in Boeing (1998), data for 1991 from
Hentske (1994). Original data was transformed from tons to area planted based on an average
productivity of 17 tons/ha between 1988-1990, as cited in Boneti (1999). The cut-offs in tons are > 1000
tons, 100-1000 tons, and < 100 tons.
b Data for Senador Nilo Coelho Project, the largest among the six CODEVASF projects in Petrolina-
Juazeiro, accounting for over 50% of PJ's irrigated area. Data for 1985 and 1988 from Miranda (1989),
1996 from Alves da Silva (1996), and 2002 from www.codevasf.gov.br/
produtos/prosenadornilocoelho.htm. The categories refer to CODEVASF's terminology of "empresas"
(large) and "colonos" (small); medium growers refers to CODEVASF's recently created "lotes de tecnicos
agricolas," which are project units designated for agricultural technicians or agronomists.
c Data from own fieldwork, as presented in Gomes (1998). This case has additional category for "leading"
firms given the overwhelmingly dominance of the two largest firms in the sector. Also, the discontinuous
ranges for area planted reflect the large difference in area between the leading and large firms, and a
smaller difference between the area planted by the large firms and at least some of the medium growers.
142
Appendix C. Distribution of interviews by respondents and cases
SC PJ RN Total Share
Large growers 10 7 22 39 18%
Medium and small growers 12 8 30 50 23%
Public sector researchers 6 7 15 28 13%
Other public sector techniciansa 4 14 58 76 35%
Input suppliers 1 3 6 10 5%
Importers 0 4 3 7 3%
Federal level: Ministry and CNPq 6 3%
Total 33 43 134 216 100%
a Includes directors and other non-research technical staff from EPAGRI in SC; CPATSA,
CODEVASF, USDA, Bank of the Northeast, and CEFET (Agronomy school) in PJ; and Bank of the
Northeast (economics research office in Fortaleza and bank agency in Mossoro), and EMBRAPA
Tropical Agroindustry (in Fortaleza) for RN.
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Appendix D. Share of largest firms in each case
Case/Firm name Production (ha) Share of state
production
Santa Catarina - applesa
Fischer 3,600 26%
Agricola Fraiburgo 1,600 11%
Pom if rai 1,450 10%
Renar 1,100 8%
Agropel 1,000 7%
SANJO 900 6%
Total state production, 2002 14,079
Share of largest firms (minus SANJO) 62%
Petrolina-Juazeiro - mangosb
Fruitfort 380 3%
Ebraz 375 3%
Nova Fronteira 342 3%
Timbauba 300 2%
Agrobras 300 2%
Aguisa 280 2%
Agrodan 250 2%
Total state production, 2002 12,117
Share of largest firms 18%
Petrolina-Juazeiro - grapes
CAJ 690 12%
Fazenda Milano 320 6%
Timbauba 250 4%
Fruitmag 200 4%
Special Fruit 150 3%
Agropecuaria Vale das Uvas 140 2%
Agropecuaria Labrunier 130 2%
Logos Butia Agropecuaria 125 2%
Total state production 5,682
Share of largest firms (minus CAJ) 23%
Rio Grande do Norte - melons'
MAISA 2,000 32%
FRUNORTE 900 14%
Fazenda Sao Joao 550 9%
Santa Julia 500 8%
Transeuropa 300 5%
Total state production, 1997 6,243
Share of largest firms 68%
a Data for 2000/2001, from fieldwork.
b Data from personal communication with VALEXPORT, August 2004, except for Fazenda Milano (grapes),
obtained separately. Total state production refers to production in the states of Pernambuco (Petrolina) and
Bahia (Juazeiro), as listed in Appendix A.
c Data from Gomes (1999). All but Transeuropa have since gone bankrupt. The new lead firm, Nolem, is a
descendant of MAISA and currently produces 3,000 ha, or 60% of RN's total melon production (based on the
more recent estimate of 5,012 ha planted in RN). This table presents the 1997 scenario for RN and not the
2002 (like the other cases) because it was these larger firms prominent in RN until the early 2000s that
shaped the melon industry.
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